535.43.08

This commit is contained in:
russellcnv 2023-08-17 13:03:06 -07:00
parent eb5c7665a1
commit 18b7303c54
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GPG Key ID: 0F15D664965FBC5A
378 changed files with 124043 additions and 161949 deletions

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@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
## Release 535 Entries
### [535.43.08] 2023-08-17
### [535.43.02] 2023-05-30
#### Fixed

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# NVIDIA Linux Open GPU Kernel Module Source
This is the source release of the NVIDIA Linux open GPU kernel modules,
version 535.43.02.
version 535.43.08.
## How to Build
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ as root:
Note that the kernel modules built here must be used with GSP
firmware and user-space NVIDIA GPU driver components from a corresponding
535.43.02 driver release. This can be achieved by installing
535.43.08 driver release. This can be achieved by installing
the NVIDIA GPU driver from the .run file using the `--no-kernel-modules`
option. E.g.,
@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ software applications.
## Compatible GPUs
The open-gpu-kernel-modules can be used on any Turing or later GPU
(see the table below). However, in the 535.43.02 release,
(see the table below). However, in the 535.43.08 release,
GeForce and Workstation support is still considered alpha-quality.
To enable use of the open kernel modules on GeForce and Workstation GPUs,
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ set the "NVreg_OpenRmEnableUnsupportedGpus" nvidia.ko kernel module
parameter to 1. For more details, see the NVIDIA GPU driver end user
README here:
https://us.download.nvidia.com/XFree86/Linux-x86_64/535.43.02/README/kernel_open.html
https://us.download.nvidia.com/XFree86/Linux-x86_64/535.43.08/README/kernel_open.html
In the below table, if three IDs are listed, the first is the PCI Device
ID, the second is the PCI Subsystem Vendor ID, and the third is the PCI
@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ Subsystem Device ID.
| NVIDIA A100 80GB PCIe | 20B5 10DE 1642 |
| NVIDIA PG506-232 | 20B6 10DE 1492 |
| NVIDIA A30 | 20B7 10DE 1532 |
| NVIDIA A30 | 20B7 10DE 1804 |
| NVIDIA A100-PCIE-40GB | 20F1 10DE 145F |
| NVIDIA A800-SXM4-80GB | 20F3 10DE 179B |
| NVIDIA A800-SXM4-80GB | 20F3 10DE 179C |
@ -828,6 +829,10 @@ Subsystem Device ID.
| NVIDIA RTX 6000 Ada Generation | 26B1 103C 16A1 |
| NVIDIA RTX 6000 Ada Generation | 26B1 10DE 16A1 |
| NVIDIA RTX 6000 Ada Generation | 26B1 17AA 16A1 |
| NVIDIA RTX 5000 Ada Generation | 26B2 1028 17FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 5000 Ada Generation | 26B2 103C 17FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 5000 Ada Generation | 26B2 10DE 17FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 5000 Ada Generation | 26B2 17AA 17FA |
| NVIDIA L40 | 26B5 10DE 169D |
| NVIDIA L40 | 26B5 10DE 17DA |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4080 | 2704 |
@ -841,15 +846,21 @@ Subsystem Device ID.
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 SFF Ada Generation | 27B0 103C 16FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 SFF Ada Generation | 27B0 10DE 16FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 SFF Ada Generation | 27B0 17AA 16FA |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada Generation | 27B2 1028 181B |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada Generation | 27B2 103C 181B |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada Generation | 27B2 10DE 181B |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada Generation | 27B2 17AA 181B |
| NVIDIA L4 | 27B8 10DE 16CA |
| NVIDIA L4 | 27B8 10DE 16EE |
| NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada Generation Laptop GPU | 27BA |
| NVIDIA RTX 3500 Ada Generation Laptop GPU | 27BB |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4080 Laptop GPU | 27E0 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 Ti | 2803 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 Ti | 2805 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4070 Laptop GPU | 2820 |
| NVIDIA RTX 3000 Ada Generation Laptop GPU | 2838 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4070 Laptop GPU | 2860 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 | 2882 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 Laptop GPU | 28A0 |
| NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4050 Laptop GPU | 28A1 |
| NVIDIA RTX 2000 Ada Generation Laptop GPU | 28B8 |

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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ EXTRA_CFLAGS += -I$(src)/common/inc
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -I$(src)
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Wall $(DEFINES) $(INCLUDES) -Wno-cast-qual -Wno-error -Wno-format-extra-args
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -D__KERNEL__ -DMODULE -DNVRM
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DNV_VERSION_STRING=\"535.43.02\"
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DNV_VERSION_STRING=\"535.43.08\"
ifneq ($(SYSSRCHOST1X),)
EXTRA_CFLAGS += -I$(SYSSRCHOST1X)
@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ NV_HEADER_PRESENCE_TESTS = \
asm/opal-api.h \
sound/hdaudio.h \
asm/pgtable_types.h \
asm/page.h \
linux/stringhash.h \
linux/dma-map-ops.h \
rdma/peer_mem.h \
@ -300,7 +301,9 @@ NV_HEADER_PRESENCE_TESTS = \
linux/vfio_pci_core.h \
linux/mdev.h \
soc/tegra/bpmp-abi.h \
soc/tegra/bpmp.h
soc/tegra/bpmp.h \
linux/cc_platform.h \
asm/cpufeature.h
# Filename to store the define for the header in $(1); this is only consumed by
# the rule below that concatenates all of these together.

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@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/nodemask.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h> /* workqueue */
#include "nv-kthread-q.h" /* kthread based queue */
@ -510,7 +511,11 @@ static inline void nv_vfree(void *ptr, NvU64 size)
static inline void *nv_ioremap(NvU64 phys, NvU64 size)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) && defined(NV_IOREMAP_DRIVER_HARDENED_PRESENT)
void *ptr = ioremap_driver_hardened(phys, size);
#else
void *ptr = ioremap(phys, size);
#endif
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
@ -523,11 +528,11 @@ static inline void *nv_ioremap_nocache(NvU64 phys, NvU64 size)
static inline void *nv_ioremap_cache(NvU64 phys, NvU64 size)
{
#if defined(NV_IOREMAP_CACHE_PRESENT)
void *ptr = ioremap_cache(phys, size);
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
void *ptr = NULL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) && defined(NV_IOREMAP_CACHE_SHARED_PRESENT)
ptr = ioremap_cache_shared(phys, size);
#elif defined(NV_IOREMAP_CACHE_PRESENT)
ptr = ioremap_cache(phys, size);
#elif defined(NVCPU_PPC64LE)
//
// ioremap_cache() has been only implemented correctly for ppc64le with
@ -542,25 +547,32 @@ static inline void *nv_ioremap_cache(NvU64 phys, NvU64 size)
// (commit 40f1ce7fb7e8, kernel 3.0+) and that covers all kernels we
// support on power.
//
void *ptr = ioremap_prot(phys, size, pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL));
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
ptr = ioremap_prot(phys, size, pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL));
#else
return nv_ioremap(phys, size);
#endif
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
}
static inline void *nv_ioremap_wc(NvU64 phys, NvU64 size)
{
#if defined(NV_IOREMAP_WC_PRESENT)
void *ptr = ioremap_wc(phys, size);
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
void *ptr = NULL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) && defined(NV_IOREMAP_DRIVER_HARDENED_WC_PRESENT)
ptr = ioremap_driver_hardened_wc(phys, size);
#elif defined(NV_IOREMAP_WC_PRESENT)
ptr = ioremap_wc(phys, size);
#else
return nv_ioremap_nocache(phys, size);
#endif
if (ptr)
NV_MEMDBG_ADD(ptr, size);
return ptr;
}
static inline void nv_iounmap(void *ptr, NvU64 size)
@ -633,37 +645,24 @@ static NvBool nv_numa_node_has_memory(int node_id)
free_pages(ptr, order); \
}
extern NvU64 nv_shared_gpa_boundary;
static inline pgprot_t nv_sme_clr(pgprot_t prot)
{
#if defined(__sme_clr)
return __pgprot(__sme_clr(pgprot_val(prot)));
#else
return prot;
#endif // __sme_clr
}
static inline pgprot_t nv_adjust_pgprot(pgprot_t vm_prot, NvU32 extra)
{
pgprot_t prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(vm_prot) | extra);
#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) && defined(NV_PGPROT_DECRYPTED_PRESENT)
/*
* When AMD memory encryption is enabled, device memory mappings with the
* C-bit set read as 0xFF, so ensure the bit is cleared for user mappings.
*
* If cc_mkdec() is present, then pgprot_decrypted() can't be used.
*/
#if defined(NV_CC_MKDEC_PRESENT)
if (nv_shared_gpa_boundary != 0)
{
/*
* By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting and
* for AMD with vTOM, *set* means decrypted.
*/
prot = __pgprot(nv_shared_gpa_boundary | (pgprot_val(vm_prot)));
}
else
{
prot = __pgprot(__sme_clr(pgprot_val(vm_prot)));
}
#else
prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
#endif
#endif
return prot;
#if defined(pgprot_decrypted)
return pgprot_decrypted(prot);
#else
return nv_sme_clr(prot);
#endif // pgprot_decrypted
}
#if defined(PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC)
@ -1323,7 +1322,7 @@ nv_dma_maps_swiotlb(struct device *dev)
* SEV memory encryption") forces SWIOTLB to be enabled when AMD SEV
* is active in all cases.
*/
if (os_sev_enabled)
if (os_cc_enabled)
swiotlb_in_use = NV_TRUE;
#endif

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2016-2017 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2016-2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
@ -36,12 +36,21 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
* pin_user_pages() was added by commit eddb1c228f7951d399240
* ("mm/gup: introduce pin_user_pages*() and FOLL_PIN") in v5.6-rc1 (2020-01-30)
*
* Removed vmas parameter from pin_user_pages() by commit 40896a02751
* ("mm/gup: remove vmas parameter from pin_user_pages()")
* in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1 (2023-05-17)
*
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#if defined(NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_PRESENT)
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES pin_user_pages
#if defined(NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS)
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES pin_user_pages
#else
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages, vmas) \
pin_user_pages(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages)
#endif // NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS
#define NV_UNPIN_USER_PAGE unpin_user_page
#else
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES NV_GET_USER_PAGES
@ -64,11 +73,18 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
* commit 8e50b8b07f462ab4b91bc1491b1c91bd75e4ad40 which cherry-picked the
* replacement of the write and force parameters with gup_flags
*
* Removed vmas parameter from get_user_pages() by commit 7bbf9c8c99
* ("mm/gup: remove unused vmas parameter from get_user_pages()")
* in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1 (2023-05-17)
*
*/
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES(start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas) \
get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, flags, pages)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_VMAS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES get_user_pages
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES(start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas) \
get_user_pages(current, current->mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas)
#else
@ -81,13 +97,13 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
int write = flags & FOLL_WRITE;
int force = flags & FOLL_FORCE;
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE)
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS)
return get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, write, force, pages, vmas);
#else
// NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE
// NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS
return get_user_pages(current, current->mm, start, nr_pages, write,
force, pages, vmas);
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS
}
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS
@ -100,15 +116,22 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
* 64019a2e467a ("mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code")
* in v5.9-rc1 (2020-08-11). *
*
* Removed unused vmas parameter from pin_user_pages_remote() by commit
* 83bcc2e132("mm/gup: remove unused vmas parameter from pin_user_pages_remote()")
* in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1 (2023-05-14)
*
*/
#if defined(NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT)
#if defined (NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK)
#if defined(NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS)
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
pin_user_pages_remote(NULL, mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked)
#else
#elif defined(NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_VMAS)
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE pin_user_pages_remote
#endif // NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK
#else
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
pin_user_pages_remote(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, locked)
#endif // NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS
#else
#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE
#endif // NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT
@ -135,22 +158,30 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
* commit 64019a2e467a ("mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for
* all gup code") in v5.9-rc1 (2020-08-11).
*
* Removed vmas parameter from get_user_pages_remote() by commit a4bde14d549
* ("mm/gup: remove vmas parameter from get_user_pages_remote()")
* in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1 (2023-05-14)
*
*/
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT)
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
get_user_pages_remote(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, locked)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE get_user_pages_remote
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
get_user_pages_remote(NULL, mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS)
#elif defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS)
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
get_user_pages_remote(NULL, mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas)
#else
// NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE
// NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS
static inline long NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
@ -167,7 +198,7 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
}
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED
#else
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE)
#if defined(NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS)
static inline long NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
@ -185,7 +216,7 @@ typedef int vm_fault_t;
#else
#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE(mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas, locked) \
get_user_pages(NULL, mm, start, nr_pages, flags, pages, vmas)
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS
#endif // NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT
/*

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@ -510,6 +510,12 @@ struct nv_file_private_t
nv_file_private_t *ctl_nvfp;
void *ctl_nvfp_priv;
NvU32 register_or_refcount;
//
// True if a client or an event was ever allocated on this fd.
// If false, RMAPI cleanup is skipped.
//
NvBool bCleanupRmapi;
};
// Forward define the gpu ops structures
@ -959,6 +965,8 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_perform_version_check (nvidia_stack_t *, void *, NvU
void NV_API_CALL rm_power_source_change_event (nvidia_stack_t *, NvU32);
void NV_API_CALL rm_request_dnotifier_state (nvidia_stack_t *, nv_state_t *);
void NV_API_CALL rm_disable_gpu_state_persistence (nvidia_stack_t *sp, nv_state_t *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_p2p_init_mapping (nvidia_stack_t *, NvU64, NvU64 *, NvU64 *, NvU64 *, NvU64 *, NvU64, NvU64, NvU64, NvU64, void (*)(void *), void *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_p2p_destroy_mapping (nvidia_stack_t *, NvU64);

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@ -1455,12 +1455,12 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfacePagingChannelPushStream(UvmGpuPagingChannelHandle channe
concurrently with the same UvmCslContext parameter in different threads. The caller must
guarantee this exclusion.
* nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption
* nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv
* nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt
* nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt
* nvUvmInterfaceCslSign
* nvUvmInterfaceCslQueryMessagePool
* nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv
*/
/*******************************************************************************
@ -1495,62 +1495,17 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslInitContext(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
*/
void nvUvmInterfaceDeinitCslContext(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption
Returns an IV that can be later used in the nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt
method. The IV contains a "freshness bit" which value is set by this method
and subsequently dirtied by nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt to prevent
non-malicious reuse of the IV.
See "CSL Interface and Locking" for locking requirements.
This function does not perform dynamic memory allocation.
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
encryptIv[OUT] - Parameter that is stored before a successful
device encryption. It is used as an input to
nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt.
Error codes:
NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - New IV would cause a counter to overflow.
*/
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslAcquireEncryptionIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslIv *encryptIv);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption
Logs and checks information about device encryption.
See "CSL Interface and Locking" for locking requirements.
This function does not perform dynamic memory allocation.
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
decryptIv[OUT] - Parameter that is stored before a successful
device encryption. It is used as an input to
nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt.
Error codes:
NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - The device encryption would cause a counter
to overflow.
*/
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslIv *decryptIv);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv
Rotates the IV for a given channel and direction.
Rotates the IV for a given channel and operation.
This function will rotate the IV on both the CPU and the GPU.
Outstanding messages that have been encrypted by the GPU should first be
decrypted before calling this function with direction equal to
UVM_CSL_DIR_GPU_TO_CPU. Similiarly, outstanding messages that have been
decrypted before calling this function with operation equal to
UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT. Similarly, outstanding messages that have been
encrypted by the CPU should first be decrypted before calling this function
with direction equal to UVM_CSL_DIR_CPU_TO_GPU. For a given direction
with operation equal to UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT. For a given operation
the channel must be idle before calling this function. This function can be
called regardless of the value of the IV's message counter.
@ -1559,17 +1514,17 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
direction[IN] - Either
- UVM_CSL_DIR_CPU_TO_GPU
- UVM_CSL_DIR_GPU_TO_CPU
operation[IN] - Either
- UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT
- UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT
Error codes:
NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - The rotate operation would cause a counter
to overflow.
NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - Invalid value for direction.
NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - Invalid value for operation.
*/
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslDirection direction);
UvmCslOperation operation);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt
@ -1580,7 +1535,7 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
this function produces undefined behavior. Performance is typically
maximized when the input and output buffers are 16-byte aligned. This is
natural alignment for AES block.
The encryptIV can be obtained from nvUvmInterfaceCslAcquireEncryptionIv.
The encryptIV can be obtained from nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv.
However, it is optional. If it is NULL, the next IV in line will be used.
See "CSL Interface and Locking" for locking requirements.
@ -1623,12 +1578,18 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
bufferSize[IN] - Size of the input and output buffers in
units of bytes. Value can range from 1 byte
to (2^32) - 1 bytes.
decryptIv[IN] - Parameter given by nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption.
bufferSize[IN] - Size of the input and output buffers in units of bytes.
Value can range from 1 byte to (2^32) - 1 bytes.
decryptIv[IN] - IV used to decrypt the ciphertext. Its value can either be given by
nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv, or, if NULL, the CSL context's
internal counter is used.
inputBuffer[IN] - Address of ciphertext input buffer.
outputBuffer[OUT] - Address of plaintext output buffer.
addAuthData[IN] - Address of the plaintext additional authenticated data used to
calculate the authentication tag. Can be NULL.
addAuthDataSize[IN] - Size of the additional authenticated data in units of bytes.
Value can range from 1 byte to (2^32) - 1 bytes.
This parameter is ignored if addAuthData is NULL.
authTagBuffer[IN] - Address of authentication tag buffer.
Its size is UVM_CSL_CRYPT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE_BYTES.
@ -1643,6 +1604,8 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
NvU8 const *inputBuffer,
UvmCslIv const *decryptIv,
NvU8 *outputBuffer,
NvU8 const *addAuthData,
NvU32 addAuthDataSize,
NvU8 const *authTagBuffer);
/*******************************************************************************
@ -1673,7 +1636,6 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslSign(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
NvU8 const *inputBuffer,
NvU8 *authTagBuffer);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslQueryMessagePool
@ -1684,14 +1646,45 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslSign(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
direction[IN] - Either UVM_CSL_DIR_CPU_TO_GPU or UVM_CSL_DIR_GPU_TO_CPU.
operation[IN] - Either UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT or UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT.
messageNum[OUT] - Number of messages left before overflow.
Error codes:
NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - The value of the direction parameter is illegal.
NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - The value of the operation parameter is illegal.
*/
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslQueryMessagePool(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslDirection direction,
UvmCslOperation operation,
NvU64 *messageNum);
/*******************************************************************************
nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv
Increments the message counter by the specified amount.
If iv is non-NULL then the incremented value is returned.
If operation is UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT then the returned IV's "freshness" bit is set and
can be used in nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt. If operation is UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT then
the returned IV can be used in nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt.
See "CSL Interface and Locking" for locking requirements.
This function does not perform dynamic memory allocation.
Arguments:
uvmCslContext[IN/OUT] - The CSL context.
operation[IN] - Either
- UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT
- UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT
increment[IN] - The amount by which the IV is incremented. Can be 0.
iv[out] - If non-NULL, a buffer to store the incremented IV.
Error codes:
NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - The value of the operation parameter is illegal.
NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES - Incrementing the message counter would result
in an overflow.
*/
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslOperation operation,
NvU64 increment,
UvmCslIv *iv);
#endif // _NV_UVM_INTERFACE_H_

View File

@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ typedef struct UvmGpuChannelInfo_tag
// so a channel can be controlled via another channel (SEC2 or WLC/LCIC)
NvU64 gpFifoGpuVa;
NvU64 gpPutGpuVa;
NvU64 gpGetGpuVa;
// GPU VA of work submission offset is needed in Confidential Computing
// so CE channels can ring doorbell of other channels as required for
// WLC/LCIC work submission
@ -320,10 +321,6 @@ typedef struct UvmGpuChannelAllocParams_tag
// The next two fields store UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION values
NvU32 gpFifoLoc;
NvU32 gpPutLoc;
// Allocate the channel as secure. This flag should only be set when
// Confidential Compute is enabled.
NvBool secure;
} UvmGpuChannelAllocParams;
typedef struct UvmGpuPagingChannelAllocParams_tag
@ -367,9 +364,6 @@ typedef struct
// True if the CE can be used for P2P transactions
NvBool p2p:1;
// True if the CE supports encryption
NvBool secure:1;
// Mask of physical CEs assigned to this LCE
//
// The value returned by RM for this field may change when a GPU is
@ -851,6 +845,14 @@ typedef union UvmFaultMetadataPacket_tag
NvU8 _padding[32];
} UvmFaultMetadataPacket;
// This struct shall not be accessed nor modified directly by UVM as it is
// entirely managed by the RM layer
typedef struct UvmCslContext_tag
{
struct ccslContext_t *ctx;
void *nvidia_stack;
} UvmCslContext;
typedef struct UvmGpuFaultInfo_tag
{
struct
@ -908,6 +910,10 @@ typedef struct UvmGpuFaultInfo_tag
// Confidential Computing is disabled.
UvmFaultMetadataPacket *bufferMetadata;
// CSL context used for performing decryption of replayable faults when
// Confidential Computing is enabled.
UvmCslContext cslCtx;
// Indicates whether UVM owns the replayable fault buffer.
// The value of this field is always NV_TRUE When Confidential Computing
// is disabled.
@ -1046,24 +1052,16 @@ typedef UvmGpuPagingChannelInfo gpuPagingChannelInfo;
typedef UvmGpuPagingChannelAllocParams gpuPagingChannelAllocParams;
typedef UvmPmaAllocationOptions gpuPmaAllocationOptions;
// This struct shall not be accessed nor modified directly by UVM as it is
// entirely managed by the RM layer
typedef struct UvmCslContext_tag
{
struct ccslContext_t *ctx;
void *nvidia_stack;
} UvmCslContext;
typedef struct UvmCslIv
{
NvU8 iv[12];
NvU8 fresh;
} UvmCslIv;
typedef enum UvmCslDirection
typedef enum UvmCslOperation
{
UVM_CSL_DIR_CPU_TO_GPU,
UVM_CSL_DIR_GPU_TO_CPU
} UvmCslDirection;
UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT,
UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT
} UvmCslOperation;
#endif // _NV_UVM_TYPES_H_

View File

@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_offline_page_at_address(NvU64 address);
extern NvU32 os_page_size;
extern NvU64 os_page_mask;
extern NvU8 os_page_shift;
extern NvU32 os_sev_status;
extern NvBool os_sev_enabled;
extern NvBool os_cc_enabled;
extern NvBool os_cc_tdx_enabled;
extern NvBool os_dma_buf_enabled;
/*

View File

@ -103,13 +103,12 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_paging_channel_push_stream(nvidia_stack_t *, n
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_context_init(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t **, nvgpuChannelHandle_t);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_context_clear(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_log_device_encryption(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU8 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_rotate_iv(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU8);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_acquire_encryption_iv(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU8 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_encrypt(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU32, NvU8 const *, NvU8 *, NvU8 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_encrypt_with_iv(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU32, NvU8 const *, NvU8*, NvU8 *, NvU8 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_decrypt(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU32, NvU8 const *, NvU8 const *, NvU8 *, NvU8 const *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_decrypt(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU32, NvU8 const *, NvU8 const *, NvU8 *, NvU8 const *, NvU32, NvU8 const *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_sign(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU32, NvU8 const *, NvU8 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_query_message_pool(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU8, NvU64 *);
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_increment_iv(nvidia_stack_t *, struct ccslContext_t *, NvU8, NvU64, NvU8 *);
#endif

View File

@ -445,6 +445,9 @@ compile_test() {
#if defined(NV_ASM_PGTABLE_TYPES_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#endif
#if defined(NV_ASM_PAGE_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/page.h>
#endif
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#else
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@ -467,6 +470,9 @@ compile_test() {
#if defined(NV_ASM_PGTABLE_TYPES_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#endif
#if defined(NV_ASM_PAGE_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/page.h>
#endif
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#else
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@ -524,6 +530,9 @@ compile_test() {
#if defined(NV_ASM_PGTABLE_TYPES_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#endif
#if defined(NV_ASM_PAGE_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/page.h>
#endif
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#else
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@ -551,6 +560,9 @@ compile_test() {
#if defined(NV_ASM_PGTABLE_TYPES_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#endif
#if defined(NV_ASM_PAGE_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/page.h>
#endif
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#else
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@ -695,6 +707,50 @@ compile_test() {
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_IOREMAP_WC_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
ioremap_driver_hardened)
#
# Determine if the ioremap_driver_hardened() function is present.
# It does not exist on all architectures.
# TODO: Update the commit ID once the API is upstreamed.
#
CODE="
#include <asm/io.h>
void conftest_ioremap_driver_hardened(void) {
ioremap_driver_hardened();
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_IOREMAP_DRIVER_HARDENED_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
ioremap_driver_hardened_wc)
#
# Determine if the ioremap_driver_hardened_wc() function is present.
# It does not exist on all architectures.
# TODO: Update the commit ID once the API is upstreamed.
#
CODE="
#include <asm/io.h>
void conftest_ioremap_driver_hardened_wc(void) {
ioremap_driver_hardened_wc();
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_IOREMAP_DRIVER_HARDENED_WC_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
ioremap_cache_shared)
#
# Determine if the ioremap_cache_shared() function is present.
# It does not exist on all architectures.
# TODO: Update the commit ID once the API is upstreamed.
#
CODE="
#include <asm/io.h>
void conftest_ioremap_cache_shared(void) {
ioremap_cache_shared();
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_IOREMAP_CACHE_SHARED_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
dom0_kernel_present)
# Add config parameter if running on DOM0.
if [ -n "$VGX_BUILD" ]; then
@ -919,6 +975,21 @@ compile_test() {
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_VFIO_MIGRATION_OPS_PRESENT" "" "types"
;;
vfio_precopy_info)
#
# Determine if vfio_precopy_info struct is present or not
#
# Added by commit 4db52602a6074 ("vfio: Extend the device migration
# protocol with PRE_COPY" in v6.2
#
CODE="
#include <linux/vfio.h>
struct vfio_precopy_info precopy_info;
"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_VFIO_PRECOPY_INFO_PRESENT" "" "types"
;;
vfio_log_ops)
#
# Determine if vfio_log_ops struct is present or not
@ -1120,6 +1191,23 @@ compile_test() {
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_VFIO_DEVICE_OPS_HAS_DMA_UNMAP" "" "types"
;;
vfio_device_ops_has_bind_iommufd)
#
# Determine if 'vfio_device_ops' struct has 'bind_iommufd' field.
#
# Added by commit a4d1f91db5021 ("vfio-iommufd: Support iommufd
# for physical VFIO devices") in v6.2
#
CODE="
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/vfio.h>
int conftest_vfio_device_ops_has_bind_iommufd(void) {
return offsetof(struct vfio_device_ops, bind_iommufd);
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_VFIO_DEVICE_OPS_HAS_BIND_IOMMUFD" "" "types"
;;
pci_irq_vector_helpers)
#
# Determine if pci_alloc_irq_vectors(), pci_free_irq_vectors()
@ -2395,6 +2483,10 @@ compile_test() {
# commit 768ae309a961 ("mm: replace get_user_pages() write/force
# parameters with gup_flags") in v4.9 (2016-10-13)
#
# Removed vmas parameter from get_user_pages() by commit 7bbf9c8c99
# ("mm/gup: remove unused vmas parameter from get_user_pages()")
# in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1
#
# linux-4.4.168 cherry-picked commit 768ae309a961 without
# c12d2da56d0e which is covered in Conftest #3.
#
@ -2404,22 +2496,28 @@ compile_test() {
# passing conftest's
#
set_get_user_pages_defines () {
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS" ]; then
@ -2427,6 +2525,7 @@ compile_test() {
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
}
# Conftest #1: Check if get_user_pages accepts 6 arguments.
@ -2447,14 +2546,15 @@ compile_test() {
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE"
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
# Conftest #2: Check if get_user_pages has gup_flags instead of
# write and force parameters. And that gup doesn't accept a
# task_struct and mm_struct as its first arguments.
# task_struct and mm_struct as its first arguments. get_user_pages
# has vm_area_struct as its last argument.
# Return if available.
# Fall through to conftest #3 on failure.
@ -2472,16 +2572,17 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS"
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
# Conftest #3: Check if get_user_pages has gup_flags instead of
# write and force parameters AND that gup has task_struct and
# mm_struct as its first arguments.
# write and force parameters. The gup has task_struct and
# mm_struct as its first arguments. get_user_pages
# has vm_area_struct as its last argument.
# Return if available.
# Fall through to default case if absent.
# Fall through to conftest #4 on failure.
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
@ -2499,12 +2600,35 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS"
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE"
# Conftest #4: gup doesn't accept a task_struct and mm_struct as
# its first arguments. check if get_user_pages() does not take
# vmas argument.
# Fall through to default case otherwise.
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
long get_user_pages(unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags,
struct page **pages) {
return 0;
}" > conftest$$.c
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
set_get_user_pages_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS"
return
;;
@ -2531,6 +2655,10 @@ compile_test() {
# commit 64019a2e467a ("mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for
# all gup code") in v5.9-rc1 (2020-08-11).
#
# Removed vmas parameter from get_user_pages_remote() by commit
# a4bde14d549 ("mm/gup: remove vmas parameter from get_user_pages_remote()")
# in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1
#
#
# This function sets the NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_* macros as per
@ -2543,22 +2671,28 @@ compile_test() {
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED" ]; then
@ -2566,6 +2700,7 @@ compile_test() {
else
echo "#undef NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
}
# conftest #1: check if get_user_pages_remote() is available
@ -2588,8 +2723,8 @@ compile_test() {
fi
#
# conftest #2: check if get_user_pages_remote() has write and
# force arguments. Return if these arguments are present
# conftest #2: check if get_user_pages_remote() has write, force
# and vmas arguments. Return if these arguments are present
# Fall through to conftest #3 if these args are absent.
#
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
@ -2609,14 +2744,14 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE"
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_WRITE_FORCE_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
#
# conftest #3: check if get_user_pages_remote() has gpu_flags
# arguments. Return if these arguments are present
# conftest #3: check if get_user_pages_remote() has gpu_flags and
# vmas arguments. Return if these arguments are present
# Fall through to conftest #4 if these args are absent.
#
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
@ -2635,13 +2770,14 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS"
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
#
# conftest #4: check if get_user_pages_remote() has locked argument
# conftest #4: check if get_user_pages_remote() has locked and
# vmas argument
# Return if these arguments are present. Fall through to conftest #5
# if these args are absent.
#
@ -2662,7 +2798,7 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED"
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
@ -2686,10 +2822,34 @@ compile_test() {
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
fi
#
# conftest #6: check if get_user_pages_remote() does not take
# vmas argument.
#
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
long get_user_pages_remote(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags,
struct page **pages,
int *locked) {
return 0;
}" > conftest$$.c
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_get_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_GET_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_FLAGS_LOCKED"
rm -f conftest$$.o
fi
;;
pin_user_pages)
@ -2701,17 +2861,65 @@ compile_test() {
# pin_user_pages() was added by commit eddb1c228f7951d399240
# ("mm/gup: introduce pin_user_pages*() and FOLL_PIN") in
# v5.6-rc1 (2020-01-30)
#
# Removed vmas parameter from pin_user_pages() by commit
# 40896a02751("mm/gup: remove vmas parameter from pin_user_pages()")
# in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1
set_pin_user_pages_defines () {
if [ "$1" = "" ]; then
echo "#undef NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_PRESENT" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_PRESENT" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
}
# conftest #1: check if pin_user_pages() is available
# return if not available.
# Fall through to conftest #2 if it is present
#
CODE="
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
void conftest_pin_user_pages(void) {
pin_user_pages();
}"
}" > conftest$$.c
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_PRESENT" "" "functions"
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_pin_user_pages_defines ""
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
# conftest #2: Check if pin_user_pages() has vmas argument
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
long pin_user_pages(unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags,
struct page **pages,
struct vm_area_struct **vmas) {
return 0;
}" > conftest$$.c
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_pin_user_pages_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_HAS_ARGS_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
else
set_pin_user_pages_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_PRESENT"
fi
;;
pin_user_pages_remote)
@ -2724,6 +2932,10 @@ compile_test() {
# pin_user_pages_remote() removed 'tsk' parameter by
# commit 64019a2e467a ("mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for
# all gup code") in v5.9-rc1 (2020-08-11).
#
# Removed unused vmas parameter from pin_user_pages_remote() by
# commit 83bcc2e132 ("mm/gup: remove unused vmas parameter from
# pin_user_pages_remote()") in linux-next, expected in v6.5-rc1
#
# This function sets the NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_* macros as per
@ -2736,10 +2948,16 @@ compile_test() {
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK" ]; then
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK" | append_conftest "functions"
if [ "$1" = "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK" | append_conftest "functions"
echo "#undef NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
if [ "$1" = "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" ]; then
echo "#define NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
else
echo "#undef NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_VMAS" | append_conftest "functions"
fi
}
@ -2762,7 +2980,11 @@ compile_test() {
return
fi
# conftest #2: Check if pin_user_pages_remote() has tsk argument
# conftest #2: Check if pin_user_pages_remote() has tsk and
# vmas argument
# Return if these arguments are present else fall through to
# conftest #3
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
long pin_user_pages_remote(struct task_struct *tsk,
@ -2780,11 +3002,34 @@ compile_test() {
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_pin_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK"
set_pin_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_TSK_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
return
fi
# conftest #3: Check if pin_user_pages_remote() has vmas argument
echo "$CONFTEST_PREAMBLE
#include <linux/mm.h>
long pin_user_pages_remote(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags,
struct page **pages,
struct vm_area_struct **vmas,
int *locked) {
return 0;
}" > conftest$$.c
$CC $CFLAGS -c conftest$$.c > /dev/null 2>&1
rm -f conftest$$.c
if [ -f conftest$$.o ]; then
set_pin_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_HAS_ARGS_VMAS"
rm -f conftest$$.o
else
set_pin_user_pages_remote_defines "NV_PIN_USER_PAGES_REMOTE_PRESENT"
fi
;;
vfio_pin_pages_has_vfio_device_arg)
@ -4699,40 +4944,22 @@ compile_test() {
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_PCI_CHANNEL_STATE_PRESENT" "" "types"
;;
pgprot_decrypted)
cc_platform_has)
#
# Determine if the macro 'pgprot_decrypted()' is present.
# Determine if 'cc_platform_has()' is present.
#
# Added by commit 21729f81ce8a ("x86/mm: Provide general kernel
# support for memory encryption") in v4.14 (2017-07-18)
# Added by commit aa5a461171f9 ("x86/sev: Add an x86 version of
# cc_platform_has()") in v5.15.3 (2021-10-04)
CODE="
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
void conftest_pgprot_decrypted(void)
if(pgprot_decrypted()) {}
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_PGPROT_DECRYPTED_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
cc_mkdec)
#
# Determine if cc_mkdec() is present.
#
# cc_mkdec() by commit b577f542f93c ("x86/coco: Add API to handle
# encryption mask) in v5.18-rc1 (2022-02-22).
#
CODE="
#if defined(NV_ASM_COCO_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/coco.h>
#if defined(NV_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H_PRESENT)
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#endif
void conftest_cc_mkdec(void) {
cc_mkdec();
void conftest_cc_platfrom_has(void) {
cc_platform_has();
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_CC_MKDEC_PRESENT" "" "functions"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_CC_PLATFORM_PRESENT" "" "functions"
;;
drm_prime_pages_to_sg_has_drm_device_arg)
@ -6052,6 +6279,68 @@ compile_test() {
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_MEMORY_FAILURE_MF_SW_SIMULATED_DEFINED" "" "types"
;;
crypto)
#
# Determine if we support various crypto functions.
# This test is not complete and may return false positive.
#
CODE="
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/ecc_curve.h>
#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/internal/ecc.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/sm3.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
void conftest_crypto(void) {
struct shash_desc sd;
struct crypto_shash cs;
(void)crypto_shash_tfm_digest;
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_CRYPTO_PRESENT" "" "symbols"
;;
mempolicy_has_unified_nodes)
#
# Determine if the 'mempolicy' structure has
# nodes union.
#
# nodes field was added by commit 269fbe72cd ("mm/mempolicy:
# use unified 'nodes' for bind/interleave/prefer policies") in
# v5.14 (2021-06-30).
#
CODE="
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
int conftest_mempolicy_has_unified_nodes(void) {
return offsetof(struct mempolicy, nodes);
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_MEMPOLICY_HAS_UNIFIED_NODES" "" "types"
;;
mempolicy_has_home_node)
#
# Determine if the 'mempolicy' structure has
# home_node field.
#
# home_node field was added by commit c6018b4b254
# ("mm/mempolicy: add set_mempolicy_home_node syscall") in v5.17
# (2022-01-14).
#
CODE="
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
int conftest_mempolicy_has_home_node(void) {
return offsetof(struct mempolicy, home_node);
}"
compile_check_conftest "$CODE" "NV_MEMPOLICY_HAS_HOME_NODE" "" "types"
;;
# When adding a new conftest entry, please use the correct format for
# specifying the relevant upstream Linux kernel commit.
#
@ -6385,8 +6674,8 @@ case "$5" in
if [ "$VFIO_IOMMU_PRESENT" != "0" ] && [ "$KVM_PRESENT" != "0" ] ; then
# On x86_64, vGPU requires MDEV framework to be present.
# On aarch64, vGPU requires vfio-pci-core framework to be present.
if ([ "$ARCH" = "arm64" ] && [ "$VFIO_PCI_CORE_PRESENT" != "0" ]) ||
# On aarch64, vGPU requires MDEV or vfio-pci-core framework to be present.
if ([ "$ARCH" = "arm64" ] && ([ "$VFIO_MDEV_PRESENT" != "0" ] || [ "$VFIO_PCI_CORE_PRESENT" != "0" ])) ||
([ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ] && [ "$VFIO_MDEV_PRESENT" != "0" ];) then
exit 0
fi
@ -6398,8 +6687,8 @@ case "$5" in
echo "CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1";
fi
if [ "$ARCH" = "arm64" ] && [ "$VFIO_PCI_CORE_PRESENT" = "0" ]; then
echo "CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_CORE";
if [ "$ARCH" = "arm64" ] && [ "$VFIO_MDEV_PRESENT" = "0" ] && [ "$VFIO_PCI_CORE_PRESENT" = "0" ]; then
echo "either CONFIG_VFIO_MDEV or CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_CORE";
fi
if [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ] && [ "$VFIO_MDEV_PRESENT" = "0" ]; then

View File

@ -1367,8 +1367,23 @@ static struct drm_driver nv_drm_driver = {
.ioctls = nv_drm_ioctls,
.num_ioctls = ARRAY_SIZE(nv_drm_ioctls),
/*
* linux-next commit 71a7974ac701 ("drm/prime: Unexport helpers for fd/handle
* conversion") unexports drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd() and
* drm_gem_prime_fd_to_handle().
*
* Prior linux-next commit 6b85aa68d9d5 ("drm: Enable PRIME import/export for
* all drivers") made these helpers the default when .prime_handle_to_fd /
* .prime_fd_to_handle are unspecified, so it's fine to just skip specifying
* them if the helpers aren't present.
*/
#if NV_IS_EXPORT_SYMBOL_PRESENT_drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd
.prime_handle_to_fd = drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd,
#endif
#if NV_IS_EXPORT_SYMBOL_PRESENT_drm_gem_prime_fd_to_handle
.prime_fd_to_handle = drm_gem_prime_fd_to_handle,
#endif
.gem_prime_import = nv_drm_gem_prime_import,
.gem_prime_import_sg_table = nv_drm_gem_prime_import_sg_table,

View File

@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static inline int nv_drm_gem_handle_create(struct drm_file *filp,
return drm_gem_handle_create(filp, &nv_gem->base, handle);
}
#if defined(NV_DRM_FENCE_AVAILABLE)
static inline nv_dma_resv_t *nv_drm_gem_res_obj(struct nv_drm_gem_object *nv_gem)
{
#if defined(NV_DRM_GEM_OBJECT_HAS_RESV)
@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ static inline nv_dma_resv_t *nv_drm_gem_res_obj(struct nv_drm_gem_object *nv_gem
return nv_gem->base.dma_buf ? nv_gem->base.dma_buf->resv : &nv_gem->resv;
#endif
}
#endif
void nv_drm_gem_object_init(struct nv_drm_device *nv_dev,
struct nv_drm_gem_object *nv_gem,

View File

@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += drm_atomic_available
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_gpl_refcount_inc
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_gpl_refcount_dec_and_test
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += drm_alpha_blending_available
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_drm_gem_prime_fd_to_handle
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += drm_dev_unref
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += drm_reinit_primary_mode_group

View File

@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
static bool output_rounding_fix = true;
module_param_named(output_rounding_fix, output_rounding_fix, bool, 0400);
static bool disable_vrr_memclk_switch = false;
module_param_named(disable_vrr_memclk_switch, disable_vrr_memclk_switch, bool, 0400);
/* These parameters are used for fault injection tests. Normally the defaults
* should be used. */
MODULE_PARM_DESC(fail_malloc, "Fail the Nth call to nvkms_alloc");
@ -91,6 +94,11 @@ NvBool nvkms_output_rounding_fix(void)
return output_rounding_fix;
}
NvBool nvkms_disable_vrr_memclk_switch(void)
{
return disable_vrr_memclk_switch;
}
#define NVKMS_SYNCPT_STUBS_NEEDED
/*************************************************************************

View File

@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ typedef struct {
NvBool nvkms_output_rounding_fix(void);
NvBool nvkms_disable_vrr_memclk_switch(void);
void nvkms_call_rm (void *ops);
void* nvkms_alloc (size_t size,
NvBool zero);

View File

@ -108,5 +108,7 @@ NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += migrate_device_range
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += vm_area_struct_has_const_vm_flags
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += handle_mm_fault_has_mm_arg
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += handle_mm_fault_has_pt_regs_arg
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += mempolicy_has_unified_nodes
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += mempolicy_has_home_node
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_int_active_memcg

View File

@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ bool uvm_hal_ampere_ce_memcopy_is_valid_c6b5(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_gpu_address_t
return true;
if (uvm_channel_is_proxy(push->channel)) {
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer;
if (dst.is_virtual) {
UVM_ERR_PRINT("Destination address of memcopy must be physical, not virtual\n");
return false;
@ -142,7 +144,8 @@ bool uvm_hal_ampere_ce_memcopy_is_valid_c6b5(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_gpu_address_t
return false;
}
push_begin_gpu_va = uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(push->channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer, push);
pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(push->channel);
push_begin_gpu_va = uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
if ((src.address < push_begin_gpu_va) || (src.address >= push_begin_gpu_va + uvm_push_get_size(push))) {
UVM_ERR_PRINT("Source address of memcopy must point to pushbuffer\n");
@ -177,10 +180,13 @@ bool uvm_hal_ampere_ce_memcopy_is_valid_c6b5(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_gpu_address_t
// irrespective of the virtualization mode.
void uvm_hal_ampere_ce_memcopy_patch_src_c6b5(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_gpu_address_t *src)
{
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer;
if (!uvm_channel_is_proxy(push->channel))
return;
src->address -= uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(push->channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer, push);
pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(push->channel);
src->address -= uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
}
bool uvm_hal_ampere_ce_memset_is_valid_c6b5(uvm_push_t *push,

View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "uvm_va_range.h"
#include "uvm_ats_faults.h"
#include "uvm_migrate_pageable.h"
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
// TODO: Bug 2103669: Implement a real prefetching policy and remove or adapt
// these experimental parameters. These are intended to help guide that policy.
@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ static NV_STATUS service_ats_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
NvU64 start,
size_t length,
uvm_fault_access_type_t access_type,
uvm_fault_client_type_t client_type)
uvm_ats_fault_context_t *ats_context)
{
uvm_va_space_t *va_space = gpu_va_space->va_space;
struct mm_struct *mm = va_space->va_space_mm.mm;
@ -95,17 +96,18 @@ static NV_STATUS service_ats_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
// 2) guest physical -> host physical
//
// The overall ATS translation will fault if either of those translations is
// invalid. The get_user_pages() call above handles translation #1, but not
// #2. We don't know if we're running as a guest, but in case we are we can
// force that translation to be valid by touching the guest physical address
// from the CPU. If the translation is not valid then the access will cause
// a hypervisor fault. Note that dma_map_page() can't establish mappings
// used by GPU ATS SVA translations. GPU accesses to host physical addresses
// obtained as a result of the address translation request uses the CPU
// address space instead of the IOMMU address space since the translated
// host physical address isn't necessarily an IOMMU address. The only way to
// establish guest physical to host physical mapping in the CPU address
// space is to touch the page from the CPU.
// invalid. The pin_user_pages() call within uvm_migrate_pageable() call
// below handles translation #1, but not #2. We don't know if we're running
// as a guest, but in case we are we can force that translation to be valid
// by touching the guest physical address from the CPU. If the translation
// is not valid then the access will cause a hypervisor fault. Note that
// dma_map_page() can't establish mappings used by GPU ATS SVA translations.
// GPU accesses to host physical addresses obtained as a result of the
// address translation request uses the CPU address space instead of the
// IOMMU address space since the translated host physical address isn't
// necessarily an IOMMU address. The only way to establish guest physical to
// host physical mapping in the CPU address space is to touch the page from
// the CPU.
//
// We assume that the hypervisor mappings are all VM_PFNMAP, VM_SHARED, and
// VM_WRITE, meaning that the mappings are all granted write access on any
@ -116,20 +118,26 @@ static NV_STATUS service_ats_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
uvm_migrate_args_t uvm_migrate_args =
{
.va_space = va_space,
.mm = mm,
.dst_id = gpu_va_space->gpu->parent->id,
.dst_node_id = -1,
.populate_permissions = write ? UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_WRITE : UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_ANY,
.touch = true,
.skip_mapped = true,
.user_space_start = &user_space_start,
.user_space_length = &user_space_length,
.va_space = va_space,
.mm = mm,
.dst_id = ats_context->residency_id,
.dst_node_id = ats_context->residency_node,
.populate_permissions = write ? UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_WRITE : UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_ANY,
.touch = true,
.skip_mapped = true,
.populate_on_cpu_alloc_failures = true,
.user_space_start = &user_space_start,
.user_space_length = &user_space_length,
};
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_ats_can_service_faults(gpu_va_space, mm));
expand_fault_region(vma, start, length, client_type, &uvm_migrate_args.start, &uvm_migrate_args.length);
expand_fault_region(vma,
start,
length,
ats_context->client_type,
&uvm_migrate_args.start,
&uvm_migrate_args.length);
// We are trying to use migrate_vma API in the kernel (if it exists) to
// populate and map the faulting region on the GPU. We want to do this only
@ -165,6 +173,58 @@ static void flush_tlb_write_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
uvm_tlb_batch_invalidate(&ats_invalidate->write_faults_tlb_batch, addr, size, PAGE_SIZE, UVM_MEMBAR_NONE);
}
static void ats_batch_select_residency(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
uvm_ats_fault_context_t *ats_context)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = gpu_va_space->gpu;
int residency = uvm_gpu_numa_node(gpu);
#if defined(NV_MEMPOLICY_HAS_UNIFIED_NODES)
struct mempolicy *vma_policy = vma_policy(vma);
unsigned short mode;
if (!vma_policy)
goto done;
mode = vma_policy->mode;
if ((mode == MPOL_BIND) || (mode == MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY) || (mode == MPOL_PREFERRED)) {
int home_node = NUMA_NO_NODE;
#if defined(NV_MEMPOLICY_HAS_HOME_NODE)
if ((mode != MPOL_PREFERRED) && (vma_policy->home_node != NUMA_NO_NODE))
home_node = vma_policy->home_node;
#endif
// Prefer home_node if set. Otherwise, prefer the faulting GPU if it's
// in the list of preferred nodes, else prefer the closest_cpu_numa_node
// to the GPU if closest_cpu_numa_node is in the list of preferred
// nodes. Fallback to the faulting GPU if all else fails.
if (home_node != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
residency = home_node;
}
else if (!node_isset(residency, vma_policy->nodes)) {
int closest_cpu_numa_node = gpu->parent->closest_cpu_numa_node;
if ((closest_cpu_numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE) && node_isset(closest_cpu_numa_node, vma_policy->nodes))
residency = gpu->parent->closest_cpu_numa_node;
else
residency = first_node(vma_policy->nodes);
}
}
// Update gpu if residency is not the faulting gpu.
if (residency != uvm_gpu_numa_node(gpu))
gpu = uvm_va_space_find_gpu_with_memory_node_id(gpu_va_space->va_space, residency);
done:
#endif
ats_context->residency_id = gpu ? gpu->parent->id : UVM_ID_CPU;
ats_context->residency_node = residency;
}
NV_STATUS uvm_ats_service_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
NvU64 base,
@ -205,6 +265,8 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_ats_service_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
uvm_page_mask_zero(write_fault_mask);
}
ats_batch_select_residency(gpu_va_space, vma, ats_context);
for_each_va_block_subregion_in_mask(subregion, write_fault_mask, region) {
NvU64 start = base + (subregion.first * PAGE_SIZE);
size_t length = uvm_va_block_region_num_pages(subregion) * PAGE_SIZE;
@ -215,7 +277,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_ats_service_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
UVM_ASSERT(start >= vma->vm_start);
UVM_ASSERT((start + length) <= vma->vm_end);
status = service_ats_faults(gpu_va_space, vma, start, length, access_type, client_type);
status = service_ats_faults(gpu_va_space, vma, start, length, access_type, ats_context);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
@ -244,11 +306,12 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_ats_service_faults(uvm_gpu_va_space_t *gpu_va_space,
for_each_va_block_subregion_in_mask(subregion, read_fault_mask, region) {
NvU64 start = base + (subregion.first * PAGE_SIZE);
size_t length = uvm_va_block_region_num_pages(subregion) * PAGE_SIZE;
uvm_fault_access_type_t access_type = UVM_FAULT_ACCESS_TYPE_READ;
UVM_ASSERT(start >= vma->vm_start);
UVM_ASSERT((start + length) <= vma->vm_end);
status = service_ats_faults(gpu_va_space, vma, start, length, UVM_FAULT_ACCESS_TYPE_READ, client_type);
status = service_ats_faults(gpu_va_space, vma, start, length, access_type, ats_context);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;

View File

@ -338,11 +338,6 @@ static NV_STATUS test_memcpy_and_memset_inner(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
return NV_OK;
}
if (!gpu->parent->ce_hal->memcopy_is_valid(&push, dst, src)) {
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_push_end_and_wait(&push));
return NV_OK;
}
// The input virtual addresses exist in UVM's internal address space, not
// the proxy address space
if (uvm_channel_is_proxy(push.channel)) {
@ -401,7 +396,7 @@ static NV_STATUS test_memcpy_and_memset_inner(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
static NV_STATUS test_memcpy_and_memset(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
bool is_proxy_va_space;
bool is_proxy_va_space = false;
uvm_gpu_address_t gpu_verif_addr;
void *cpu_verif_addr;
uvm_mem_t *verif_mem = NULL;
@ -437,6 +432,34 @@ static NV_STATUS test_memcpy_and_memset(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
}
}
// Virtual address (in UVM's internal address space) backed by sysmem
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_rm_mem_alloc(gpu, UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS, size, 0, &sys_rm_mem), done);
gpu_addresses[0] = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(sys_rm_mem, gpu, is_proxy_va_space);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu)) {
for (i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
for (s = 0; s < ARRAY_SIZE(element_sizes); s++) {
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(test_memcpy_and_memset_inner(gpu,
gpu_addresses[0],
gpu_addresses[0],
size,
element_sizes[s],
gpu_verif_addr,
cpu_verif_addr,
i),
done);
}
}
// Because gpu_verif_addr is in sysmem, when the Confidential
// Computing feature is enabled, only the previous cases are valid.
// TODO: Bug 3839176: the test partially waived on Confidential
// Computing because it assumes that GPU can access system memory
// without using encryption.
goto done;
}
// Using a page size equal to the allocation size ensures that the UVM
// memories about to be allocated are physically contiguous. And since the
// size is a valid GPU page size, the memories can be virtually mapped on
@ -448,37 +471,22 @@ static NV_STATUS test_memcpy_and_memset(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
// Physical address in sysmem
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_alloc(&mem_params, &sys_uvm_mem), done);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_gpu_phys(sys_uvm_mem, gpu), done);
gpu_addresses[0] = uvm_mem_gpu_address_physical(sys_uvm_mem, gpu, 0, size);
gpu_addresses[1] = uvm_mem_gpu_address_physical(sys_uvm_mem, gpu, 0, size);
// Physical address in vidmem
mem_params.backing_gpu = gpu;
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_alloc(&mem_params, &gpu_uvm_mem), done);
gpu_addresses[1] = uvm_mem_gpu_address_physical(gpu_uvm_mem, gpu, 0, size);
gpu_addresses[2] = uvm_mem_gpu_address_physical(gpu_uvm_mem, gpu, 0, size);
// Virtual address (in UVM's internal address space) backed by vidmem
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_rm_mem_alloc(gpu, UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_GPU, size, 0, &gpu_rm_mem), done);
is_proxy_va_space = false;
gpu_addresses[2] = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(gpu_rm_mem, gpu, is_proxy_va_space);
gpu_addresses[3] = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(gpu_rm_mem, gpu, is_proxy_va_space);
// Virtual address (in UVM's internal address space) backed by sysmem
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_rm_mem_alloc(gpu, UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS, size, 0, &sys_rm_mem), done);
gpu_addresses[3] = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(sys_rm_mem, gpu, is_proxy_va_space);
for (i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(gpu_addresses); ++j) {
for (k = 0; k < ARRAY_SIZE(gpu_addresses); ++k) {
for (s = 0; s < ARRAY_SIZE(element_sizes); s++) {
// Because gpu_verif_addr is in sysmem, when the Confidential
// Computing feature is enabled, only the following cases are
// valid.
//
// TODO: Bug 3839176: the test partially waived on
// Confidential Computing because it assumes that GPU can
// access system memory without using encryption.
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) &&
!(gpu_addresses[k].is_unprotected && gpu_addresses[j].is_unprotected)) {
continue;
}
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(test_memcpy_and_memset_inner(gpu,
gpu_addresses[k],
gpu_addresses[j],
@ -752,7 +760,7 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_vidmem_protected(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_mem_t **mem, size_t
*mem = NULL;
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem_protected(size, gpu, mem));
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem(size, gpu, mem));
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_gpu_kernel(*mem, gpu), err);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(zero_vidmem(*mem), err);

View File

@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static NvU32 uvm_channel_update_progress_with_max(uvm_channel_t *channel,
break;
if (entry->type == UVM_GPFIFO_ENTRY_TYPE_NORMAL) {
uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer, entry);
uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(channel, entry);
list_add_tail(&entry->push_info->available_list_node, &channel->available_push_infos);
}
@ -272,19 +272,26 @@ static bool try_claim_channel(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo_entries)
static void unlock_channel_for_push(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel)) {
NvU32 index = uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel);
NvU32 index;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
uvm_channel_pool_assert_locked(channel->pool);
UVM_ASSERT(test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks));
__clear_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks);
uvm_up_out_of_order(&channel->pool->push_sem);
}
if (!uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return;
index = uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel);
uvm_channel_pool_assert_locked(channel->pool);
UVM_ASSERT(test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks));
__clear_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks);
uvm_up_out_of_order(&channel->pool->push_sem);
}
static bool is_channel_locked_for_push(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel))
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return test_bit(uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel), channel->pool->push_locks);
// For CE and proxy channels, we always return that the channel is locked,
@ -295,25 +302,25 @@ static bool is_channel_locked_for_push(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static void lock_channel_for_push(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel)) {
NvU32 index = uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
NvU32 index = uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel);
uvm_channel_pool_assert_locked(channel->pool);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
uvm_channel_pool_assert_locked(channel->pool);
UVM_ASSERT(!test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks));
UVM_ASSERT(!test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks));
__set_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks);
}
__set_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks);
}
static bool test_claim_and_lock_channel(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo_entries)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
NvU32 index = uvm_channel_index_in_pool(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
uvm_channel_pool_assert_locked(channel->pool);
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel) &&
!test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks) &&
try_claim_channel_locked(channel, num_gpfifo_entries)) {
if (!test_bit(index, channel->pool->push_locks) && try_claim_channel_locked(channel, num_gpfifo_entries)) {
lock_channel_for_push(channel);
return true;
}
@ -321,57 +328,15 @@ static bool test_claim_and_lock_channel(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo
return false;
}
// Reserve a channel in the specified CE pool
static NV_STATUS channel_reserve_in_ce_pool(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t **channel_out)
{
uvm_channel_t *channel;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
UVM_ASSERT(pool);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_pool_is_ce(pool));
uvm_for_each_channel_in_pool(channel, pool) {
// TODO: Bug 1764953: Prefer idle/less busy channels
if (try_claim_channel(channel, 1)) {
*channel_out = channel;
return NV_OK;
}
}
uvm_spin_loop_init(&spin);
while (1) {
uvm_for_each_channel_in_pool(channel, pool) {
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_channel_update_progress(channel);
if (try_claim_channel(channel, 1)) {
*channel_out = channel;
return NV_OK;
}
status = uvm_channel_check_errors(channel);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
UVM_SPIN_LOOP(&spin);
}
}
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(0, "Cannot get here?!\n");
return NV_ERR_GENERIC;
}
// Reserve a channel in the specified secure pool
static NV_STATUS channel_reserve_in_secure_pool(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t **channel_out)
// Reserve a channel in the specified pool. The channel is locked until the push
// ends
static NV_STATUS channel_reserve_and_lock_in_pool(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t **channel_out)
{
uvm_channel_t *channel;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
NvU32 index;
UVM_ASSERT(pool);
UVM_ASSERT(pool->secure);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(pool->manager->gpu));
// This semaphore is uvm_up() in unlock_channel_for_push() as part of the
@ -426,6 +391,51 @@ done:
return NV_OK;
}
// Reserve a channel in the specified pool
static NV_STATUS channel_reserve_in_pool(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t **channel_out)
{
uvm_channel_t *channel;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
UVM_ASSERT(pool);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(pool->manager->gpu))
return channel_reserve_and_lock_in_pool(pool, channel_out);
uvm_for_each_channel_in_pool(channel, pool) {
// TODO: Bug 1764953: Prefer idle/less busy channels
if (try_claim_channel(channel, 1)) {
*channel_out = channel;
return NV_OK;
}
}
uvm_spin_loop_init(&spin);
while (1) {
uvm_for_each_channel_in_pool(channel, pool) {
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_channel_update_progress(channel);
if (try_claim_channel(channel, 1)) {
*channel_out = channel;
return NV_OK;
}
status = uvm_channel_check_errors(channel);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
UVM_SPIN_LOOP(&spin);
}
}
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(0, "Cannot get here?!\n");
return NV_ERR_GENERIC;
}
NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_type(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager, uvm_channel_type_t type, uvm_channel_t **channel_out)
{
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool = manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[type];
@ -433,10 +443,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_type(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager, uvm_channel_t
UVM_ASSERT(pool != NULL);
UVM_ASSERT(type < UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_COUNT);
if (pool->secure)
return channel_reserve_in_secure_pool(pool, channel_out);
return channel_reserve_in_ce_pool(pool, channel_out);
return channel_reserve_in_pool(pool, channel_out);
}
NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_gpu_to_gpu(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager,
@ -452,10 +459,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_gpu_to_gpu(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager,
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_CE);
if (pool->secure)
return channel_reserve_in_secure_pool(pool, channel_out);
return channel_reserve_in_ce_pool(pool, channel_out);
return channel_reserve_in_pool(pool, channel_out);
}
NV_STATUS uvm_channel_manager_wait(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
@ -491,7 +495,7 @@ static NvU32 channel_get_available_push_info_index(uvm_channel_t *channel)
return push_info - channel->push_infos;
}
static void channel_semaphore_gpu_encrypt_payload(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU64 semaphore_va)
static void channel_semaphore_gpu_encrypt_payload(uvm_push_t *push, NvU64 semaphore_va)
{
NvU32 iv_index;
uvm_gpu_address_t notifier_gpu_va;
@ -499,12 +503,14 @@ static void channel_semaphore_gpu_encrypt_payload(uvm_push_t *push, uvm_channel_
uvm_gpu_address_t semaphore_gpu_va;
uvm_gpu_address_t encrypted_payload_gpu_va;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = push->gpu;
uvm_channel_t *channel = push->channel;
uvm_gpu_semaphore_t *semaphore = &channel->tracking_sem.semaphore;
UvmCslIv *iv_cpu_addr = semaphore->conf_computing.ivs;
NvU32 payload_size = sizeof(*semaphore->payload);
NvU32 *last_pushed_notifier = &semaphore->conf_computing.last_pushed_notifier;
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
encrypted_payload_gpu_va = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(semaphore->conf_computing.encrypted_payload, gpu, false);
notifier_gpu_va = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(semaphore->conf_computing.notifier, gpu, false);
@ -538,19 +544,21 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_begin_push(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_push_t *push)
{
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_channel_manager_t *manager;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu;
UVM_ASSERT(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(push);
manager = channel->pool->manager;
gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
// Only SEC2 and WLC with set up fixed schedule can use direct push
// submission. All other cases (including WLC pre-schedule) need to
// reserve a launch channel that will be used to submit this push
// indirectly.
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel)) &&
!(uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel) && uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(manager)) &&
!uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel)) {
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(channel) &&
!(uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel) && uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(manager))) {
uvm_channel_type_t indirect_channel_type = uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(manager) ?
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_WLC :
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_SEC2;
@ -559,9 +567,9 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_begin_push(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_push_t *push)
return status;
}
// For secure channels, channel's lock should have been acquired in
// uvm_channel_reserve() or channel_reserve_in_secure_pool() before
// reaching here.
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, the channel's lock
// should have already been acquired in uvm_channel_reserve() or
// channel_reserve_and_lock_in_pool().
UVM_ASSERT(is_channel_locked_for_push(channel));
push->channel = channel;
@ -586,9 +594,8 @@ static void internal_channel_submit_work(uvm_push_t *push, NvU32 push_size, NvU3
NvU64 *gpfifo_entry;
NvU64 pushbuffer_va;
uvm_channel_t *channel = push->channel;
uvm_channel_manager_t *channel_manager = channel->pool->manager;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = channel_manager->pushbuffer;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = channel_manager->gpu;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*gpfifo_entry) != NVB06F_GP_ENTRY__SIZE);
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_proxy(channel));
@ -644,12 +651,11 @@ static void proxy_channel_submit_work(uvm_push_t *push, NvU32 push_size)
static void do_semaphore_release(uvm_push_t *push, NvU64 semaphore_va, NvU32 new_payload)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(push->channel))
gpu->parent->ce_hal->semaphore_release(push, semaphore_va, new_payload);
else if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(push->channel))
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->semaphore_release(push, semaphore_va, new_payload);
else
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(0, "Semaphore release on an unsupported channel.\n");
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->semaphore_release(push, semaphore_va, new_payload);
}
static void uvm_channel_tracking_semaphore_release(uvm_push_t *push, NvU64 semaphore_va, NvU32 new_payload)
@ -668,8 +674,8 @@ static void uvm_channel_tracking_semaphore_release(uvm_push_t *push, NvU64 semap
// needs to be scheduled to get an encrypted shadow copy in unprotected
// sysmem. This allows UVM to later decrypt it and observe the new
// semaphore value.
if (uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(push->channel))
channel_semaphore_gpu_encrypt_payload(push, push->channel, semaphore_va);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(push->gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(push->channel))
channel_semaphore_gpu_encrypt_payload(push, semaphore_va);
}
static uvm_channel_t *get_paired_channel(uvm_channel_t *channel)
@ -746,15 +752,12 @@ static void internal_channel_submit_work_wlc(uvm_push_t *push)
wmb();
// Ring the WLC doorbell to start processing the above push
UVM_GPU_WRITE_ONCE(*wlc_channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffset,
wlc_channel->channel_info.workSubmissionToken);
UVM_GPU_WRITE_ONCE(*wlc_channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffset, wlc_channel->channel_info.workSubmissionToken);
}
static NV_STATUS internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(uvm_push_t *push,
NvU32 old_cpu_put,
NvU32 new_gpu_put)
static void internal_channel_submit_work_indirect_wlc(uvm_push_t *push, NvU32 old_cpu_put, NvU32 new_gpu_put)
{
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = push->channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(push->channel);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
uvm_push_t indirect_push;
@ -765,10 +768,207 @@ static NV_STATUS internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(uvm_push_t *push,
NvU64 push_enc_gpu = uvm_pushbuffer_get_unprotected_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
void *push_enc_auth_tag;
uvm_gpu_address_t push_enc_auth_tag_gpu;
NvU64 gpfifo_gpu = push->channel->channel_info.gpFifoGpuVa + old_cpu_put * sizeof(gpfifo_entry);
NvU64 gpfifo_gpu_va = push->channel->channel_info.gpFifoGpuVa + old_cpu_put * sizeof(gpfifo_entry);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_wlc(push->launch_channel));
// WLC submissions are done under channel lock, so there should be no
// contention to get the right submission order.
UVM_ASSERT(push->channel->conf_computing.gpu_put == old_cpu_put);
// This can never stall or return error. WLC launch after WLC channels are
// initialized uses private static pb space and it neither needs the general
// PB space, nor it counts towards max concurrent pushes.
status = uvm_push_begin_on_reserved_channel(push->launch_channel,
&indirect_push,
"Worklaunch to '%s' via '%s'",
push->channel->name,
push->launch_channel->name);
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
// Move over the pushbuffer data
// WLC channels use a static preallocated space for launch auth tags
push_enc_auth_tag = indirect_push.channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_cpu;
push_enc_auth_tag_gpu = uvm_gpu_address_virtual(indirect_push.channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_gpu_va);
uvm_conf_computing_cpu_encrypt(indirect_push.channel,
push_enc_cpu,
push->begin,
NULL,
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_enc_auth_tag);
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
gpu->parent->ce_hal->decrypt(&indirect_push,
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push)),
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(push_enc_gpu),
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_enc_auth_tag_gpu);
gpu->parent->host_hal->set_gpfifo_entry(&gpfifo_entry,
uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push),
uvm_push_get_size(push),
UVM_GPFIFO_SYNC_PROCEED);
gpu->parent->ce_hal->memset_8(&indirect_push,
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(gpfifo_gpu_va),
gpfifo_entry,
sizeof(gpfifo_entry));
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, push->channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa, new_gpu_put);
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push,
push->channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffsetGpuVa,
push->channel->channel_info.workSubmissionToken);
// Ignore return value of push_wait. It can only fail with channel error
// which will be detected when waiting for the primary push.
(void)uvm_push_end_and_wait(&indirect_push);
push->channel->conf_computing.gpu_put = new_gpu_put;
}
static void update_gpput_via_sec2(uvm_push_t *sec2_push, uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 new_gpu_put)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(sec2_push);
void *gpput_auth_tag_cpu, *gpput_enc_cpu;
uvm_gpu_address_t gpput_auth_tag_gpu, gpput_enc_gpu;
NvU32 gpput_scratchpad[UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT/sizeof(new_gpu_put)];
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_sec2(sec2_push->channel));
gpput_enc_cpu = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(sec2_push,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&gpput_enc_gpu);
gpput_auth_tag_cpu = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(sec2_push,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT,
&gpput_auth_tag_gpu);
// Update GPPUT. The update needs 4B write to specific offset,
// however we can only do 16B aligned decrypt writes.
// A poison value is written to all other locations, this is ignored in
// most locations and overwritten by HW for GPGET location
memset(gpput_scratchpad, 0, sizeof(gpput_scratchpad));
UVM_ASSERT(sizeof(*gpput_scratchpad) == sizeof(new_gpu_put));
gpput_scratchpad[(channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa % UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT) /
sizeof(*gpput_scratchpad)] = new_gpu_put;
// Set value of GPGET to be the same as GPPUT. It will be overwritten by
// HW next time GET value changes. UVM never reads GPGET.
// However, RM does read it when freeing a channel. When this function
// is called from 'channel_manager_stop_wlc' we set the value of GPGET
// to the same value as GPPUT. Mismatch between these two values makes
// RM wait for any "pending" tasks, leading to significant delays in the
// channel teardown sequence.
UVM_ASSERT(channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa / UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT ==
channel->channel_info.gpGetGpuVa / UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT);
gpput_scratchpad[(channel->channel_info.gpGetGpuVa % UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT) /
sizeof(*gpput_scratchpad)] = new_gpu_put;
uvm_conf_computing_cpu_encrypt(sec2_push->channel,
gpput_enc_cpu,
gpput_scratchpad,
NULL,
sizeof(gpput_scratchpad),
gpput_auth_tag_cpu);
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->decrypt(sec2_push,
UVM_ALIGN_DOWN(channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT),
gpput_enc_gpu.address,
sizeof(gpput_scratchpad),
gpput_auth_tag_gpu.address);
}
static void set_gpfifo_via_sec2(uvm_push_t *sec2_push, uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 put, NvU64 value)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(sec2_push);
void *gpfifo_auth_tag_cpu, *gpfifo_enc_cpu;
uvm_gpu_address_t gpfifo_auth_tag_gpu, gpfifo_enc_gpu;
NvU64 gpfifo_gpu = channel->channel_info.gpFifoGpuVa + put * sizeof(value);
NvU64 gpfifo_scratchpad[2];
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_sec2(sec2_push->channel));
gpfifo_enc_cpu = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(sec2_push,
sizeof(gpfifo_scratchpad),
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&gpfifo_enc_gpu);
gpfifo_auth_tag_cpu = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(sec2_push,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT,
&gpfifo_auth_tag_gpu);
if (IS_ALIGNED(gpfifo_gpu, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT)) {
gpfifo_scratchpad[0] = value;
// Set the value of the odd entry to noop.
// It will be overwritten when the next entry is submitted.
gpu->parent->host_hal->set_gpfifo_noop(&gpfifo_scratchpad[1]);
}
else {
uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *previous_gpfifo;
UVM_ASSERT(put > 0);
previous_gpfifo = &channel->gpfifo_entries[put - 1];
if (previous_gpfifo->type == UVM_GPFIFO_ENTRY_TYPE_CONTROL) {
gpfifo_scratchpad[0] = previous_gpfifo->control_value;
}
else {
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
NvU64 prev_pb_va = uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_base(pushbuffer) + previous_gpfifo->pushbuffer_offset;
// Reconstruct the previous gpfifo entry. UVM_GPFIFO_SYNC_WAIT is
// used only in static WLC schedule.
// Overwriting the previous entry with the same value doesn't hurt,
// whether the previous entry has been processed or not
gpu->parent->host_hal->set_gpfifo_entry(&gpfifo_scratchpad[0],
prev_pb_va,
previous_gpfifo->pushbuffer_size,
UVM_GPFIFO_SYNC_PROCEED);
}
gpfifo_scratchpad[1] = value;
}
uvm_conf_computing_cpu_encrypt(sec2_push->channel,
gpfifo_enc_cpu,
gpfifo_scratchpad,
NULL,
sizeof(gpfifo_scratchpad),
gpfifo_auth_tag_cpu);
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->decrypt(sec2_push,
UVM_ALIGN_DOWN(gpfifo_gpu, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT),
gpfifo_enc_gpu.address,
sizeof(gpfifo_scratchpad),
gpfifo_auth_tag_gpu.address);
}
static NV_STATUS internal_channel_submit_work_indirect_sec2(uvm_push_t *push, NvU32 old_cpu_put, NvU32 new_gpu_put)
{
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(push->channel);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
uvm_push_t indirect_push;
NV_STATUS status;
NvU64 gpfifo_entry;
void *push_enc_cpu = uvm_pushbuffer_get_unprotected_cpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
NvU64 push_enc_gpu = uvm_pushbuffer_get_unprotected_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
void *push_auth_tag_cpu;
uvm_gpu_address_t push_auth_tag_gpu;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_sec2(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_sec2(push->launch_channel));
// If the old_cpu_put is not equal to the last gpu put, other pushes are
// pending that need to be submitted. That push/es' submission will update
@ -790,60 +990,36 @@ static NV_STATUS internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(uvm_push_t *push,
// Move over the pushbuffer data
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(indirect_push.channel)) {
push_enc_auth_tag = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(&indirect_push,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT,
&push_enc_auth_tag_gpu);
}
else {
// Auth tags cannot be in protected vidmem.
// WLC channels use a static preallocated space for launch auth tags
push_enc_auth_tag = indirect_push.channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_cpu;
push_enc_auth_tag_gpu = uvm_gpu_address_virtual(indirect_push.channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_gpu_va);
}
push_auth_tag_cpu = uvm_push_get_single_inline_buffer(&indirect_push,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT,
&push_auth_tag_gpu);
uvm_conf_computing_cpu_encrypt(indirect_push.channel,
push_enc_cpu,
push->begin,
NULL,
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_enc_auth_tag);
push_auth_tag_cpu);
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(indirect_push.channel)) {
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->decrypt(&indirect_push,
uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push),
push_enc_gpu,
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_enc_auth_tag_gpu.address);
}
else {
gpu->parent->ce_hal->decrypt(&indirect_push,
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push)),
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(push_enc_gpu),
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_enc_auth_tag_gpu);
}
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->decrypt(&indirect_push,
uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push),
push_enc_gpu,
uvm_push_get_size(push),
push_auth_tag_gpu.address);
gpu->parent->host_hal->set_gpfifo_entry(&gpfifo_entry,
uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push),
uvm_push_get_size(push),
UVM_GPFIFO_SYNC_PROCEED);
// TODO: Bug 2649842: RFE - Investigate using 64-bit semaphore
// SEC2 needs encrypt decrypt to be 16B aligned GPFIFO entries are only 8B
// Use 2x semaphore release to set the values directly.
// We could use a single 64 bit release if it were available
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, gpfifo_gpu, NvU64_LO32(gpfifo_entry));
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, gpfifo_gpu + 4, NvU64_HI32(gpfifo_entry));
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, push->channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa, new_gpu_put);
set_gpfifo_via_sec2(&indirect_push, push->channel, old_cpu_put, gpfifo_entry);
update_gpput_via_sec2(&indirect_push, push->channel, new_gpu_put);
// Ring the doorbell
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push,
push->channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffsetGpuVa,
@ -858,6 +1034,57 @@ static NV_STATUS internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(uvm_push_t *push,
return status;
}
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, the CPU is unable to
// access and read the pushbuffer. This is because it is located in the CPR of
// vidmem in this configuration. This function allows UVM to retrieve the
// content of the pushbuffer in an encrypted form for later decryption, hence,
// simulating the original access pattern. E.g, reading timestamp semaphores.
// See also: decrypt_push().
static void encrypt_push(uvm_push_t *push)
{
NvU64 push_protected_gpu_va;
NvU64 push_unprotected_gpu_va;
uvm_gpu_address_t auth_tag_gpu_va;
uvm_channel_t *channel = push->channel;
uvm_push_crypto_bundle_t *crypto_bundle;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
NvU32 push_size = uvm_push_get_size(push);
uvm_push_info_t *push_info = uvm_push_info_from_push(push);
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
unsigned auth_tag_offset = UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE * push->push_info_index;
if (!uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return;
if (!push_info->on_complete)
return;
if (!uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
return;
if (push_size == 0)
return;
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles != NULL);
crypto_bundle = channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles + push->push_info_index;
auth_tag_gpu_va = uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_va(channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags, gpu, false);
auth_tag_gpu_va.address += auth_tag_offset;
crypto_bundle->push_size = push_size;
push_protected_gpu_va = uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
push_unprotected_gpu_va = uvm_pushbuffer_get_unprotected_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
uvm_conf_computing_log_gpu_encryption(channel, &crypto_bundle->iv);
gpu->parent->ce_hal->encrypt(push,
uvm_gpu_address_virtual_unprotected(push_unprotected_gpu_va),
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(push_protected_gpu_va),
push_size,
auth_tag_gpu_va);
}
void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
{
uvm_channel_t *channel = push->channel;
@ -870,10 +1097,13 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
NvU32 push_size;
NvU32 cpu_put;
NvU32 new_cpu_put;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
bool needs_sec2_work_submit = false;
channel_pool_lock(channel->pool);
encrypt_push(push);
new_tracking_value = ++channel->tracking_sem.queued_value;
new_payload = (NvU32)new_tracking_value;
@ -882,7 +1112,7 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel) && uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(channel_manager)) {
uvm_channel_t *paired_lcic = wlc_get_paired_lcic(channel);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
gpu->parent->ce_hal->semaphore_reduction_inc(push,
paired_lcic->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa,
paired_lcic->num_gpfifo_entries - 1);
@ -896,7 +1126,7 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
// pushes. However, direct pushes to WLC can be smaller than this
// size. This is used e.g. by indirect submission of control
// gpfifo entries.
channel_manager->gpu->parent->host_hal->noop(push, UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE - uvm_push_get_size(push));
gpu->parent->host_hal->noop(push, UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE - uvm_push_get_size(push));
}
}
@ -914,7 +1144,7 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
// Indirect submission via SEC2/WLC needs pushes to be aligned for
// encryption/decryption. The pushbuffer_size of this push
// influences starting address of the next push.
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel)))
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
entry->pushbuffer_size = UVM_ALIGN_UP(push_size, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT);
entry->push_info = &channel->push_infos[push->push_info_index];
entry->type = UVM_GPFIFO_ENTRY_TYPE_NORMAL;
@ -928,16 +1158,13 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
else if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel) && uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(channel_manager)) {
internal_channel_submit_work_wlc(push);
}
else if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(channel_manager->gpu) && !uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel)) {
else if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(channel)) {
if (uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(channel_manager)) {
NV_STATUS status = internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(push, cpu_put, new_cpu_put);
// This codepath should only be used during initialization and thus
// NEVER return an error.
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
internal_channel_submit_work_indirect_wlc(push, cpu_put, new_cpu_put);
}
else {
// submitting via SEC2 starts a push, postpone until this push is ended
// submitting via SEC2 starts a push, postpone until this push is
// ended
needs_sec2_work_submit = true;
}
}
@ -963,7 +1190,7 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
wmb();
if (needs_sec2_work_submit) {
NV_STATUS status = internal_channel_submit_work_indirect(push, cpu_put, new_cpu_put);
NV_STATUS status = internal_channel_submit_work_indirect_sec2(push, cpu_put, new_cpu_put);
// This codepath should only be used during initialization and thus
// NEVER return an error.
@ -976,12 +1203,13 @@ void uvm_channel_end_push(uvm_push_t *push)
static void submit_ctrl_gpfifo(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *entry, NvU32 new_cpu_put)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = channel->pool->manager->gpu;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
NvU32 cpu_put = channel->cpu_put;
NvU64 *gpfifo_entry;
UVM_ASSERT(entry == &channel->gpfifo_entries[cpu_put]);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && !uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
return;
gpfifo_entry = (NvU64*)channel->channel_info.gpFifoEntries + cpu_put;
@ -1007,9 +1235,8 @@ static NV_STATUS submit_ctrl_gpfifo_indirect(uvm_channel_t *channel,
uvm_channel_type_t indirect_channel_type = uvm_channel_manager_is_wlc_ready(channel->pool->manager) ?
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_WLC :
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_SEC2;
NvU64 gpfifo_gpu = channel->channel_info.gpFifoGpuVa + (old_cpu_put * sizeof(entry->control_value));
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
// If the old_cpu_put is not equal to the last gpu put,
// Another push(es) is pending that needs to be submitted.
@ -1026,17 +1253,26 @@ static NV_STATUS submit_ctrl_gpfifo_indirect(uvm_channel_t *channel,
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// TODO: Bug 2649842: RFE - Investigate using 64-bit semaphore
// SEC2 needs encrypt decrypt to be 16B aligned GPFIFO entries are only 8B
// Use 2x semaphore release to set the values directly.
// One 64bit semahore release can be used instead once implemented.
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, gpfifo_gpu, NvU64_LO32(entry->control_value));
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, gpfifo_gpu + 4, NvU64_HI32(entry->control_value));
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(indirect_push.channel)) {
set_gpfifo_via_sec2(&indirect_push, channel, old_cpu_put, entry->control_value);
update_gpput_via_sec2(&indirect_push, channel, new_gpu_put);
} else {
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(&indirect_push);
NvU64 gpfifo_gpu_va = channel->channel_info.gpFifoGpuVa + (old_cpu_put * sizeof(entry->control_value));
gpu->parent->ce_hal->memset_8(&indirect_push,
uvm_gpu_address_virtual(gpfifo_gpu_va),
entry->control_value,
sizeof(entry->control_value));
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa, new_gpu_put);
}
uvm_push_set_flag(&indirect_push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_GPU);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push, channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa, new_gpu_put);
do_semaphore_release(&indirect_push,
channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffsetGpuVa,
channel->channel_info.workSubmissionToken);
status = uvm_push_end_and_wait(&indirect_push);
if (status != NV_OK)
@ -1044,9 +1280,6 @@ static NV_STATUS submit_ctrl_gpfifo_indirect(uvm_channel_t *channel,
channel->conf_computing.gpu_put = new_gpu_put;
// The above SEC2 work transferred everything
// Ring the doorbell
UVM_GPU_WRITE_ONCE(*channel->channel_info.workSubmissionOffset, channel->channel_info.workSubmissionToken);
return NV_OK;
}
@ -1059,6 +1292,7 @@ static void write_ctrl_gpfifo(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU64 ctrl_fifo_entry_valu
NvU32 cpu_put;
NvU32 new_cpu_put;
bool needs_indirect_submit = false;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
channel_pool_lock(channel->pool);
@ -1081,7 +1315,7 @@ static void write_ctrl_gpfifo(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU64 ctrl_fifo_entry_valu
--channel->current_gpfifo_count;
submit_ctrl_gpfifo(channel, entry, new_cpu_put);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(channel->pool->manager->gpu) && !uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
needs_indirect_submit = true;
channel->cpu_put = new_cpu_put;
@ -1154,16 +1388,15 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_write_ctrl_gpfifo(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU64 ctrl_fifo_
return NV_OK;
}
static NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_secure(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo_entries)
static NV_STATUS channel_reserve_and_lock(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo_entries)
{
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool = channel->pool;
// This semaphore is uvm_up() in unlock_channel_for_push() as part of the
// uvm_channel_end_push() routine. Note that different than in
// channel_reserve_in_secure_pool, we cannot pick an unlocked channel from
// the secure pool, even when there is one available and *channel is locked.
// channel_reserve_and_lock_in_pool, we cannot pick an unlocked channel from
// the pool, even when there is one available and *channel is locked.
// Not a concern given that uvm_channel_reserve() is not the common-case for
// channel reservation, and only used for channel initialization, GPFIFO
// control work submission, and testing.
@ -1178,6 +1411,8 @@ static NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve_secure(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gp
uvm_spin_loop_init(&spin);
while (1) {
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_channel_update_progress(channel);
channel_pool_lock(pool);
@ -1205,9 +1440,10 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_channel_reserve(uvm_channel_t *channel, NvU32 num_gpfifo_entries)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel))
return uvm_channel_reserve_secure(channel, num_gpfifo_entries);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return channel_reserve_and_lock(channel, num_gpfifo_entries);
if (try_claim_channel(channel, num_gpfifo_entries))
return NV_OK;
@ -1347,8 +1583,10 @@ NvU64 uvm_channel_update_completed_value(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static NV_STATUS csl_init(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure(channel));
uvm_mutex_init(&channel->csl.ctx_lock, UVM_LOCK_ORDER_LEAF);
status = uvm_rm_locked_call(nvUvmInterfaceCslInitContext(&channel->csl.ctx, channel->handle));
@ -1358,7 +1596,7 @@ static NV_STATUS csl_init(uvm_channel_t *channel)
else {
UVM_DBG_PRINT("nvUvmInterfaceCslInitContext() failed: %s, GPU %s\n",
nvstatusToString(status),
uvm_gpu_name(channel->pool->manager->gpu));
uvm_gpu_name(gpu));
}
return status;
@ -1378,16 +1616,23 @@ static void csl_destroy(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static void free_conf_computing_buffers(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel));
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_vidmem);
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem);
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->conf_computing.static_notifier_unprotected_sysmem);
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags);
uvm_kvfree(channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_sysmem);
uvm_kvfree(channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles);
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_vidmem = NULL;
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem = NULL;
channel->conf_computing.static_notifier_unprotected_sysmem = NULL;
channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags = NULL;
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_sysmem = NULL;
channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles = NULL;
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->tracking_sem.semaphore.conf_computing.encrypted_payload);
uvm_rm_mem_free(channel->tracking_sem.semaphore.conf_computing.notifier);
@ -1402,10 +1647,12 @@ static void free_conf_computing_buffers(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_semaphore(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
uvm_gpu_semaphore_t *semaphore = &channel->tracking_sem.semaphore;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = channel->pool->manager->gpu;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
NV_STATUS status;
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc_and_map_cpu(gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
sizeof(semaphore->conf_computing.last_pushed_notifier),
@ -1444,18 +1691,22 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_semaphore(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_wlc(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = channel->pool->manager->gpu;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
size_t aligned_wlc_push_size = UVM_ALIGN_UP(UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT);
NV_STATUS status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc_and_map_cpu(gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE * 2,
aligned_wlc_push_size + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE * 2,
PAGE_SIZE,
&channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// Both pushes will be targets for SEC2 decrypt operations and have to
// be aligned for SEC2. The first push location will also be a target
// for CE decrypt operation and has to be aligned for CE decrypt.
status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc(gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_GPU,
UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE * 2,
UVM_ALIGN_UP(UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT) * 2,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_vidmem);
if (status != NV_OK)
@ -1464,16 +1715,16 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_wlc(uvm_channel_t *channel)
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem_cpu =
uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem);
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem_auth_tag_cpu =
(char*)channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem_cpu + UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE;
(char*)channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem_cpu + aligned_wlc_push_size;
// The location below is only used for launch pushes but reuses
// the same sysmem allocation
channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_cpu =
(char*)channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem_cpu +
UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
aligned_wlc_push_size + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
channel->conf_computing.launch_auth_tag_gpu_va =
uvm_rm_mem_get_gpu_uvm_va(channel->conf_computing.static_pb_unprotected_sysmem, gpu) +
UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
aligned_wlc_push_size + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_sysmem = uvm_kvmalloc(UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE + UVM_PAGE_SIZE_4K);
if (!channel->conf_computing.static_pb_protected_sysmem)
@ -1484,7 +1735,7 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_wlc(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_lcic(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = channel->pool->manager->gpu;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
const size_t notifier_size = sizeof(*channel->conf_computing.static_notifier_entry_unprotected_sysmem_cpu);
NV_STATUS status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc_and_map_cpu(gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
@ -1519,21 +1770,44 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers_lcic(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static NV_STATUS alloc_conf_computing_buffers(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
status = alloc_conf_computing_buffers_semaphore(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
status = alloc_conf_computing_buffers_semaphore(channel);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel))
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel)) {
status = alloc_conf_computing_buffers_wlc(channel);
else if (uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel))
}
else if (uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel)) {
status = alloc_conf_computing_buffers_lcic(channel);
}
else {
void *push_crypto_bundles = uvm_kvmalloc_zero(sizeof(*channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles) *
channel->num_gpfifo_entries);
if (push_crypto_bundles == NULL)
return NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles = push_crypto_bundles;
status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc_and_map_cpu(gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
channel->num_gpfifo_entries * UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE,
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags);
}
return status;
}
static void channel_destroy(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(pool->num_channels > 0);
if (channel->tracking_sem.queued_value > 0) {
@ -1557,9 +1831,10 @@ static void channel_destroy(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t *channel)
uvm_kvfree(channel->gpfifo_entries);
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel)) {
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu)) {
csl_destroy(channel);
if (uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel))
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
free_conf_computing_buffers(channel);
}
@ -1646,8 +1921,6 @@ static NV_STATUS internal_channel_create(uvm_channel_t *channel)
channel_alloc_params.gpPutLoc = UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION_SYS;
}
channel_alloc_params.secure = channel->pool->secure;
status = uvm_rm_locked_call(nvUvmInterfaceChannelAllocate(channel_get_tsg(channel),
&channel_alloc_params,
&channel->handle,
@ -1669,8 +1942,7 @@ static NV_STATUS internal_channel_create(uvm_channel_t *channel)
channel_info->hwChannelId,
uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel) ? "SEC2" :
uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel) ? "WLC" :
uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel) ? "LCIC" :
uvm_channel_is_secure(channel) ? "CE (secure)" : "CE",
uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel) ? "LCIC" : "CE",
channel->pool->engine_index);
return NV_OK;
@ -1722,7 +1994,7 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_create(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t *channel
channel->tools.pending_event_count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&channel->tools.channel_list_node);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && !uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu) && uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
semaphore_pool = gpu->secure_semaphore_pool;
status = uvm_gpu_tracking_semaphore_alloc(semaphore_pool, &channel->tracking_sem);
@ -1748,7 +2020,7 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_create(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool, uvm_channel_t *channel
goto error;
}
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(channel)) {
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu)) {
status = csl_init(channel);
if (status != NV_OK)
goto error;
@ -1816,7 +2088,7 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_init(uvm_channel_t *channel)
if (uvm_gpu_has_pushbuffer_segments(gpu)) {
NvU64 gpfifo_entry;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
NvU64 pb_base = uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_base(pushbuffer);
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
@ -1836,10 +2108,8 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_init(uvm_channel_t *channel)
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(channel))
gpu->parent->ce_hal->init(&push);
else if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->init(&push);
else
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(0, "Unknown channel type!");
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->init(&push);
gpu->parent->host_hal->init(&push);
@ -1894,11 +2164,6 @@ static unsigned channel_pool_type_num_tsgs(uvm_channel_pool_type_t pool_type)
return 1;
}
static bool pool_type_is_valid(uvm_channel_pool_type_t pool_type)
{
return(is_power_of_2(pool_type) && (pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK));
}
static UVM_GPU_CHANNEL_ENGINE_TYPE pool_type_to_engine_type(uvm_channel_pool_type_t pool_type)
{
if (pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_SEC2)
@ -1970,7 +2235,7 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_pool_add(uvm_channel_manager_t *channel_manager,
unsigned num_tsgs;
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool;
UVM_ASSERT(pool_type_is_valid(pool_type));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_pool_type_is_valid(pool_type));
pool = channel_manager->channel_pools + channel_manager->num_channel_pools;
channel_manager->num_channel_pools++;
@ -2001,10 +2266,10 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_pool_add(uvm_channel_manager_t *channel_manager,
num_channels = channel_pool_type_num_channels(pool_type);
UVM_ASSERT(num_channels <= UVM_CHANNEL_MAX_NUM_CHANNELS_PER_POOL);
if (pool->secure) {
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(channel_manager->gpu)) {
// Use different order lock for SEC2 and WLC channels.
// This allows reserving a SEC2 or WLC channel for indirect work
// submission while holding a reservation for a secure channel.
// submission while holding a reservation for a channel.
uvm_lock_order_t order = uvm_channel_pool_is_sec2(pool) ? UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_SEC2_PUSH :
(uvm_channel_pool_is_wlc(pool) ? UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_WLC_PUSH :
UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_PUSH);
@ -2038,23 +2303,6 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_pool_add(uvm_channel_manager_t *channel_manager,
return status;
}
static NV_STATUS channel_pool_add_secure(uvm_channel_manager_t *channel_manager,
uvm_channel_pool_type_t pool_type,
unsigned engine_index,
uvm_channel_pool_t **pool_out)
{
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool = channel_manager->channel_pools + channel_manager->num_channel_pools;
pool->secure = true;
return channel_pool_add(channel_manager, pool_type, engine_index, pool_out);
}
bool uvm_channel_type_requires_secure_pool(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_channel_type_t channel_type)
{
// For now, all channels are secure channels
return true;
}
static bool ce_usable_for_channel_type(uvm_channel_type_t type, const UvmGpuCopyEngineCaps *cap)
{
if (!cap->supported || cap->grce)
@ -2202,13 +2450,6 @@ static NV_STATUS pick_ce_for_channel_type(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager,
if (!ce_usable_for_channel_type(type, cap))
continue;
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_is_hcc(manager->gpu)) {
// All usable CEs are secure
UVM_ASSERT(cap->secure);
// Multi-PCE LCEs are disallowed
UVM_ASSERT(hweight32(cap->cePceMask) == 1);
}
__set_bit(i, manager->ce_mask);
if (best_ce == UVM_COPY_ENGINE_COUNT_MAX) {
@ -2264,7 +2505,7 @@ out:
return status;
}
// Return the non-secure pool corresponding to the given CE index
// Return the pool corresponding to the given CE index
//
// This function cannot be used to access the proxy pool in SR-IOV heavy.
static uvm_channel_pool_t *channel_manager_ce_pool(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager, NvU32 ce)
@ -2444,7 +2685,15 @@ static void init_channel_manager_conf(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
// access through the bus, because no cache coherence message is exchanged.
if (uvm_gpu_is_coherent(gpu->parent)) {
manager->conf.gpfifo_loc = UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION_SYS;
manager->conf.gpput_loc = UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION_SYS;
// On GPUs with limited ESCHED addressing range, e.g., Volta on P9, RM
// cannot guarantee that USERD/GPPUT physical address is accessible by
// ESCHED. We set GPPUT location to vidmem where physical addresses are
// all accessible by ESCHED. We use the max_host_va as a proxy for the
// PA limitation, since all architectures with 40b VA limits also have
// 40b PA limits.
manager->conf.gpput_loc = gpu->parent->max_host_va == (1ull << 40) ? UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION_VID :
UVM_BUFFER_LOCATION_SYS;
}
else {
// By default we place GPFIFO and GPPUT on vidmem as it potentially has
@ -2467,24 +2716,17 @@ static void init_channel_manager_conf(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
static unsigned channel_manager_get_max_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
{
unsigned num_channel_pools;
unsigned num_used_ce = bitmap_weight(manager->ce_mask, UVM_COPY_ENGINE_COUNT_MAX);
// Create one CE channel pool per usable CE
num_channel_pools = num_used_ce;
num_channel_pools = bitmap_weight(manager->ce_mask, UVM_COPY_ENGINE_COUNT_MAX);
// CE proxy channel pool.
if (uvm_gpu_uses_proxy_channel_pool(manager->gpu))
num_channel_pools++;
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(manager->gpu)) {
// Create one CE secure channel pool per usable CE
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_is_hcc(manager->gpu))
num_channel_pools += num_used_ce;
// SEC2 pool, WLC pool, LCIC pool
// SEC2 pool, WLC pool, LCIC pool
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(manager->gpu))
num_channel_pools += 3;
}
return num_channel_pools;
}
@ -2516,38 +2758,6 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_manager_create_ce_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager,
return NV_OK;
}
static NV_STATUS channel_manager_create_ce_secure_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager, unsigned *preferred_ce)
{
unsigned ce;
if (!uvm_conf_computing_mode_is_hcc(manager->gpu))
return NV_OK;
for_each_set_bit(ce, manager->ce_mask, UVM_COPY_ENGINE_COUNT_MAX) {
NV_STATUS status;
unsigned type;
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool = NULL;
status = channel_pool_add_secure(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_CE, ce, &pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
for (type = 0; type < UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_CE_COUNT; type++) {
unsigned preferred = preferred_ce[type];
if (preferred != ce)
continue;
if (uvm_channel_type_requires_secure_pool(manager->gpu, type)) {
UVM_ASSERT(manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[type] == NULL);
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[type] = pool;
}
}
}
return NV_OK;
}
static NV_STATUS setup_wlc_schedule(uvm_channel_t *wlc)
{
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(wlc);
@ -2576,7 +2786,7 @@ static NV_STATUS setup_wlc_schedule(uvm_channel_t *wlc)
// "decrypt_push" represents WLC decrypt push, constructed using fake_push.
// Copied to wlc_pb_base + UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE, as the second of the two
// pushes that make the WLC fixed schedule.
NvU64 decrypt_push_protected_gpu = protected_vidmem + UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE;
NvU64 decrypt_push_protected_gpu = UVM_ALIGN_UP(protected_vidmem + UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT);
NvU64 decrypt_push_unprotected_gpu = unprotected_sysmem_gpu + gpfifo_size;
void *decrypt_push_unprotected_cpu = (char*)gpfifo_unprotected_cpu + gpfifo_size;
@ -2587,7 +2797,7 @@ static NV_STATUS setup_wlc_schedule(uvm_channel_t *wlc)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*wlc_gpfifo_entries) != sizeof(*wlc->channel_info.gpFifoEntries));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_wlc(wlc));
UVM_ASSERT(tag_offset == UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE);
UVM_ASSERT(tag_offset == UVM_ALIGN_UP(UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT));
// WLC schedule consists of two parts, the number of entries needs to be even.
// This also guarantees that the size is 16B aligned
@ -2692,11 +2902,9 @@ static NV_STATUS setup_wlc_schedule(uvm_channel_t *wlc)
// Prime the WLC by setting "PUT" two steps ahead. Reuse the current
// cpu_put value that was used during channel initialization.
// Don't update wlc->cpu_put, it will be used to track
// submitted pushes as any other channel.
do_semaphore_release(&sec2_push,
wlc->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa,
(wlc->cpu_put + 2) % wlc->num_gpfifo_entries);
// Don't update wlc->cpu_put, it will be used to track submitted pushes
// as any other channel.
update_gpput_via_sec2(&sec2_push, wlc, (wlc->cpu_put + 2) % wlc->num_gpfifo_entries);
status = uvm_push_end_and_wait(&sec2_push);
@ -2877,6 +3085,64 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_manager_setup_wlc_lcic(uvm_channel_pool_t *wlc_pool, uv
return NV_OK;
}
static NV_STATUS channel_manager_create_conf_computing_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager, unsigned *preferred_ce)
{
NV_STATUS status;
unsigned wlc_lcic_ce_index;
uvm_channel_pool_t *sec2_pool = NULL;
uvm_channel_pool_t *wlc_pool = NULL;
uvm_channel_pool_t *lcic_pool = NULL;
if (!uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(manager->gpu))
return NV_OK;
status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc(manager->gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
sizeof(UvmCslIv),
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&manager->gpu->conf_computing.iv_rm_mem);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// Create SEC2 pool. This needs to be done first, initialization of
// other channels needs SEC2.
status = channel_pool_add(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_SEC2, 0, &sec2_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_SEC2] = sec2_pool;
// Use the same CE as CPU TO GPU channels for WLC/LCIC
// Both need to use the same engine for the fixed schedule to work.
// TODO: Bug 3981928: [hcc][uvm] Optimize parameters of WLC/LCIC secure
// work launch
// Find a metric to select the best CE to use
wlc_lcic_ce_index = preferred_ce[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_CPU_TO_GPU];
// Create WLC/LCIC pools. This should be done early, CE channels use
// them for secure launch. The WLC pool must be created before the LCIC.
status = channel_pool_add(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_WLC, wlc_lcic_ce_index, &wlc_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_WLC] = wlc_pool;
status = channel_pool_add(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_LCIC, wlc_lcic_ce_index, &lcic_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
status = channel_manager_setup_wlc_lcic(wlc_pool, lcic_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// The LCIC pool must be assigned after the call to
// channel_manager_setup_wlc_lcic(). It determines WLC and LCIC channels
// are ready to be used for secure work submission.
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_LCIC] = lcic_pool;
return NV_OK;
}
static NV_STATUS channel_manager_create_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
{
NV_STATUS status;
@ -2897,62 +3163,11 @@ static NV_STATUS channel_manager_create_pools(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
if (!manager->channel_pools)
return NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(manager->gpu)) {
uvm_channel_pool_t *sec2_pool = NULL;
uvm_channel_pool_t *wlc_pool = NULL;
uvm_channel_pool_t *lcic_pool = NULL;
unsigned wlc_lcic_ce_index;
status = uvm_rm_mem_alloc(manager->gpu,
UVM_RM_MEM_TYPE_SYS,
sizeof(UvmCslIv),
UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT,
&manager->gpu->conf_computing.iv_rm_mem);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// Create SEC2 pool. This needs to be done first, initialization of
// other channels needs SEC2.
status = channel_pool_add_secure(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_SEC2, 0, &sec2_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_SEC2] = sec2_pool;
// Use the same CE as CPU TO GPU channels for WLC/LCIC
// Both need to use the same engine for the fixed schedule to work.
// TODO: Bug 3981928: [hcc][uvm] Optimize parameters of WLC/LCIC secure
// work launch
// Find a metric to select the best CE to use
wlc_lcic_ce_index = preferred_ce[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_CPU_TO_GPU];
// Create WLC/LCIC pools. This should be done early, CE channels use
// them for secure launch. The WLC pool must be created before the LCIC.
status = channel_pool_add_secure(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_WLC, wlc_lcic_ce_index, &wlc_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_WLC] = wlc_pool;
status = channel_pool_add_secure(manager, UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_LCIC, wlc_lcic_ce_index, &lcic_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
status = channel_manager_setup_wlc_lcic(wlc_pool, lcic_pool);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
// The LCIC pool must be assigned after the call to
// channel_manager_setup_wlc_lcic(). It determines WLC and LCIC channels
// are ready to be used for secure work submission.
manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_LCIC] = lcic_pool;
status = channel_manager_create_ce_secure_pools(manager, preferred_ce);
}
else {
status = channel_manager_create_ce_pools(manager, preferred_ce);
}
status = channel_manager_create_conf_computing_pools(manager, preferred_ce);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
status = channel_manager_create_ce_pools(manager, preferred_ce);
if (status != NV_OK)
return status;
@ -3048,9 +3263,7 @@ static void channel_manager_stop_wlc(uvm_channel_manager_t *manager)
// Every gpfifo entry advances the gpu put of WLC by two so the current
// value is: (cpu_put * 2) % num_gpfifo_entries and it's ahead of the
// get pointer by 2.
do_semaphore_release(&push,
channel->channel_info.gpPutGpuVa,
(channel->cpu_put * 2 - 2) % channel->num_gpfifo_entries);
update_gpput_via_sec2(&push, channel, (channel->cpu_put * 2 - 2) % channel->num_gpfifo_entries);
}
status = uvm_push_end_and_wait(&push);

View File

@ -104,16 +104,14 @@ typedef enum
// ----------------------------------
// Channel type with fixed schedules
// Work Launch Channel (WLC) is a specialized channel
// for launching work on other channels when
// Confidential Computing is enabled.
// It is paired with LCIC (below)
// Work Launch Channel (WLC) is a specialized channel for launching work on
// other channels when the Confidential Computing is feature enabled. It is
// paired with LCIC (below)
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_WLC,
// Launch Confirmation Indicator Channel (LCIC) is a
// specialized channel with fixed schedule. It gets
// triggered by executing WLC work, and makes sure that
// WLC get/put pointers are up-to-date.
// Launch Confirmation Indicator Channel (LCIC) is a specialized channel
// with fixed schedule. It gets triggered by executing WLC work, and makes
// sure that WLC get/put pointers are up-to-date.
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_LCIC,
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_COUNT,
@ -242,11 +240,9 @@ typedef struct
DECLARE_BITMAP(push_locks, UVM_CHANNEL_MAX_NUM_CHANNELS_PER_POOL);
// Counting semaphore for available and unlocked channels, it must be
// acquired before submitting work to a secure channel.
// acquired before submitting work to a channel when the Confidential
// Computing feature is enabled.
uvm_semaphore_t push_sem;
// See uvm_channel_is_secure() documentation.
bool secure;
} uvm_channel_pool_t;
struct uvm_channel_struct
@ -304,8 +300,9 @@ struct uvm_channel_struct
// its internal operation and each push may modify this state.
uvm_mutex_t push_lock;
// Every secure channel has cryptographic state in HW, which is
// mirrored here for CPU-side operations.
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, every channel has
// cryptographic state in HW, which is mirrored here for CPU-side
// operations.
UvmCslContext ctx;
bool is_ctx_initialized;
@ -355,6 +352,13 @@ struct uvm_channel_struct
// Encryption auth tags have to be located in unprotected sysmem.
void *launch_auth_tag_cpu;
NvU64 launch_auth_tag_gpu_va;
// Used to decrypt the push back to protected sysmem.
// This happens when profilers register callbacks for migration data.
uvm_push_crypto_bundle_t *push_crypto_bundles;
// Accompanying authentication tags for the crypto bundles
uvm_rm_mem_t *push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags;
} conf_computing;
// RM channel information
@ -452,46 +456,28 @@ struct uvm_channel_manager_struct
// Create a channel manager for the GPU
NV_STATUS uvm_channel_manager_create(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_channel_manager_t **manager_out);
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_ce(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool);
// A channel is secure if it has HW encryption capabilities.
//
// Secure channels are treated differently in the UVM driver. Each secure
// channel has a unique CSL context associated with it, has relatively
// restrictive reservation policies (in comparison with non-secure channels),
// it is requested to be allocated differently by RM, etc.
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_secure(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
static bool uvm_pool_type_is_valid(uvm_channel_pool_type_t pool_type)
{
return pool->secure;
}
static bool uvm_channel_is_secure(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
return uvm_channel_pool_is_secure(channel->pool);
return (is_power_of_2(pool_type) && (pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK));
}
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_sec2(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_pool_type_is_valid(pool->pool_type));
return (pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_SEC2);
}
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_secure_ce(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
return uvm_channel_pool_is_secure(pool) && uvm_channel_pool_is_ce(pool);
}
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_wlc(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_pool_type_is_valid(pool->pool_type));
return (pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_WLC);
}
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_lcic(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_pool_type_is_valid(pool->pool_type));
return (pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_LCIC);
}
@ -501,11 +487,6 @@ static bool uvm_channel_is_sec2(uvm_channel_t *channel)
return uvm_channel_pool_is_sec2(channel->pool);
}
static bool uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
return uvm_channel_pool_is_secure_ce(channel->pool);
}
static bool uvm_channel_is_wlc(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
return uvm_channel_pool_is_wlc(channel->pool);
@ -516,12 +497,9 @@ static bool uvm_channel_is_lcic(uvm_channel_t *channel)
return uvm_channel_pool_is_lcic(channel->pool);
}
bool uvm_channel_type_requires_secure_pool(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_channel_type_t channel_type);
NV_STATUS uvm_channel_secure_init(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_channel_t *channel);
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_proxy(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_pool_type_is_valid(pool->pool_type));
return pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_CE_PROXY;
}
@ -533,11 +511,7 @@ static bool uvm_channel_is_proxy(uvm_channel_t *channel)
static bool uvm_channel_pool_is_ce(uvm_channel_pool_t *pool)
{
UVM_ASSERT(pool->pool_type < UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_MASK);
if (uvm_channel_pool_is_wlc(pool) || uvm_channel_pool_is_lcic(pool))
return true;
return (pool->pool_type == UVM_CHANNEL_POOL_TYPE_CE) || uvm_channel_pool_is_proxy(pool);
return !uvm_channel_pool_is_sec2(pool);
}
static bool uvm_channel_is_ce(uvm_channel_t *channel)
@ -679,6 +653,11 @@ static uvm_gpu_t *uvm_channel_get_gpu(uvm_channel_t *channel)
return channel->pool->manager->gpu;
}
static uvm_pushbuffer_t *uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
return channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer;
}
// Index of a channel within the owning pool
static unsigned uvm_channel_index_in_pool(const uvm_channel_t *channel)
{

View File

@ -681,9 +681,10 @@ done:
}
// The following test is inspired by uvm_push_test.c:test_concurrent_pushes.
// This test verifies that concurrent pushes using the same secure channel pool
// select different channels.
NV_STATUS test_secure_channel_selection(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
// This test verifies that concurrent pushes using the same channel pool
// select different channels, when the Confidential Computing feature is
// enabled.
NV_STATUS test_conf_computing_channel_selection(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_channel_pool_t *pool;
@ -703,9 +704,6 @@ NV_STATUS test_secure_channel_selection(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
uvm_channel_type_t channel_type;
for (channel_type = 0; channel_type < UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_COUNT; channel_type++) {
if (!uvm_channel_type_requires_secure_pool(gpu, channel_type))
continue;
pool = gpu->channel_manager->pool_to_use.default_for_type[channel_type];
TEST_CHECK_RET(pool != NULL);
@ -997,7 +995,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_test_channel_sanity(UVM_TEST_CHANNEL_SANITY_PARAMS *params, struct
if (status != NV_OK)
goto done;
status = test_secure_channel_selection(va_space);
status = test_conf_computing_channel_selection(va_space);
if (status != NV_OK)
goto done;

View File

@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "uvm_conf_computing.h"
#include "uvm_kvmalloc.h"
#include "uvm_gpu.h"
#include "uvm_hal.h"
#include "uvm_mem.h"
#include "uvm_processors.h"
#include "uvm_tracker.h"
@ -60,8 +61,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_conf_computing_init_parent_gpu(const uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent)
uvm_assert_mutex_locked(&g_uvm_global.global_lock);
// TODO: Bug 2844714.
// Since we have no routine to traverse parent gpus,
// TODO: Bug 2844714: since we have no routine to traverse parent GPUs,
// find first child GPU and get its parent.
first = uvm_global_processor_mask_find_first_gpu(&g_uvm_global.retained_gpus);
if (!first)
@ -378,11 +378,12 @@ void uvm_conf_computing_log_gpu_encryption(uvm_channel_t *channel, UvmCslIv *iv)
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_mutex_lock(&channel->csl.ctx_lock);
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption(&channel->csl.ctx, iv);
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv(&channel->csl.ctx, UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT, 1, iv);
uvm_mutex_unlock(&channel->csl.ctx_lock);
// nvUvmInterfaceLogDeviceEncryption fails when a 64-bit encryption counter
// overflows. This is not supposed to happen on CC.
// TODO: Bug 4014720: If nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv returns with
// NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES then the IV needs to be rotated via
// nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv.
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
}
@ -391,11 +392,12 @@ void uvm_conf_computing_acquire_encryption_iv(uvm_channel_t *channel, UvmCslIv *
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_mutex_lock(&channel->csl.ctx_lock);
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslAcquireEncryptionIv(&channel->csl.ctx, iv);
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv(&channel->csl.ctx, UVM_CSL_OPERATION_ENCRYPT, 1, iv);
uvm_mutex_unlock(&channel->csl.ctx_lock);
// nvUvmInterfaceLogDeviceEncryption fails when a 64-bit encryption counter
// overflows. This is not supposed to happen on CC.
// TODO: Bug 4014720: If nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv returns with
// NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES then the IV needs to be rotated via
// nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv.
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
}
@ -439,8 +441,58 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_conf_computing_cpu_decrypt(uvm_channel_t *channel,
(const NvU8 *) src_cipher,
src_iv,
(NvU8 *) dst_plain,
NULL,
0,
(const NvU8 *) auth_tag_buffer);
uvm_mutex_unlock(&channel->csl.ctx_lock);
return status;
}
NV_STATUS uvm_conf_computing_fault_decrypt(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
void *dst_plain,
const void *src_cipher,
const void *auth_tag_buffer,
NvU8 valid)
{
NV_STATUS status;
// There is no dedicated lock for the CSL context associated with replayable
// faults. The mutual exclusion required by the RM CSL API is enforced by
// relying on the GPU replayable service lock (ISR lock), since fault
// decryption is invoked as part of fault servicing.
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_sem_is_locked(&parent_gpu->isr.replayable_faults.service_lock));
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_parent_gpu_replayable_fault_buffer_is_uvm_owned(parent_gpu));
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt(&parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.rm_info.replayable.cslCtx,
parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_size(parent_gpu),
(const NvU8 *) src_cipher,
NULL,
(NvU8 *) dst_plain,
&valid,
sizeof(valid),
(const NvU8 *) auth_tag_buffer);
if (status != NV_OK)
UVM_ERR_PRINT("nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt() failed: %s, GPU %s\n", nvstatusToString(status), parent_gpu->name);
return status;
}
void uvm_conf_computing_fault_increment_decrypt_iv(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU64 increment)
{
NV_STATUS status;
// See comment in uvm_conf_computing_fault_decrypt
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_sem_is_locked(&parent_gpu->isr.replayable_faults.service_lock));
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_parent_gpu_replayable_fault_buffer_is_uvm_owned(parent_gpu));
status = nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv(&parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.rm_info.replayable.cslCtx,
UVM_CSL_OPERATION_DECRYPT,
increment,
NULL);
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
}

View File

@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
// Use sizeof(UvmCslIv) to refer to the IV size.
#define UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_IV_ALIGNMENT 16
// SEC2 decrypt operation buffers are required to be 16-bytes aligned. CE
// encrypt/decrypt can be unaligned if the buffer lies in a single 32B segment.
// Otherwise, they need to be 32B aligned.
// SEC2 decrypt operation buffers are required to be 16-bytes aligned.
#define UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT 16
// CE encrypt/decrypt can be unaligned if the entire buffer lies in a single
// 32B segment. Otherwise, it needs to be 32B aligned.
#define UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT 32
#define UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_DMA_BUFFER_SIZE UVM_VA_BLOCK_SIZE
@ -175,4 +177,28 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_conf_computing_cpu_decrypt(uvm_channel_t *channel,
const UvmCslIv *src_iv,
size_t size,
const void *auth_tag_buffer);
// CPU decryption of a single replayable fault, encrypted by GSP-RM.
//
// Replayable fault decryption depends not only on the encrypted fault contents,
// and the authentication tag, but also on the plaintext valid bit associated
// with the fault.
//
// When decrypting data previously encrypted by the Copy Engine, use
// uvm_conf_computing_cpu_decrypt instead.
//
// Locking: this function must be invoked while holding the replayable ISR lock.
NV_STATUS uvm_conf_computing_fault_decrypt(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
void *dst_plain,
const void *src_cipher,
const void *auth_tag_buffer,
NvU8 valid);
// Increment the CPU-side decrypt IV of the CSL context associated with
// replayable faults. The function is a no-op if the given increment is zero.
//
// The IV associated with a fault CSL context is a 64-bit counter.
//
// Locking: this function must be invoked while holding the replayable ISR lock.
void uvm_conf_computing_fault_increment_decrypt_iv(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU64 increment);
#endif // __UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_H__

View File

@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ typedef struct uvm_channel_struct uvm_channel_t;
typedef struct uvm_user_channel_struct uvm_user_channel_t;
typedef struct uvm_push_struct uvm_push_t;
typedef struct uvm_push_info_struct uvm_push_info_t;
typedef struct uvm_push_crypto_bundle_struct uvm_push_crypto_bundle_t;
typedef struct uvm_push_acquire_info_struct uvm_push_acquire_info_t;
typedef struct uvm_pushbuffer_struct uvm_pushbuffer_t;
typedef struct uvm_gpfifo_entry_struct uvm_gpfifo_entry_t;

View File

@ -198,6 +198,12 @@ typedef struct
// Client type of the service requestor.
uvm_fault_client_type_t client_type;
// New residency ID of the faulting region.
uvm_processor_id_t residency_id;
// New residency NUMA node ID of the faulting region.
int residency_node;
} uvm_ats_fault_context_t;
struct uvm_fault_service_batch_context_struct

View File

@ -177,31 +177,34 @@ bool uvm_gpu_non_replayable_faults_pending(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu)
return has_pending_faults == NV_TRUE;
}
static NvU32 fetch_non_replayable_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
static NV_STATUS fetch_non_replayable_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 *cached_faults)
{
NV_STATUS status;
NvU32 i = 0;
NvU32 cached_faults = 0;
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *fault_cache;
NvU32 entry_size = gpu->parent->fault_buffer_hal->entry_size(gpu->parent);
uvm_non_replayable_fault_buffer_info_t *non_replayable_faults = &gpu->parent->fault_buffer_info.non_replayable;
NvU32 i;
NvU32 entry_size = parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_size(parent_gpu);
uvm_non_replayable_fault_buffer_info_t *non_replayable_faults = &parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.non_replayable;
char *current_hw_entry = (char *)non_replayable_faults->shadow_buffer_copy;
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *fault_entry = non_replayable_faults->fault_cache;
fault_cache = non_replayable_faults->fault_cache;
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_sem_is_locked(&parent_gpu->isr.non_replayable_faults.service_lock));
UVM_ASSERT(parent_gpu->non_replayable_faults_supported);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_sem_is_locked(&gpu->parent->isr.non_replayable_faults.service_lock));
UVM_ASSERT(gpu->parent->non_replayable_faults_supported);
status = nvUvmInterfaceGetNonReplayableFaults(&parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.rm_info,
current_hw_entry,
cached_faults);
status = nvUvmInterfaceGetNonReplayableFaults(&gpu->parent->fault_buffer_info.rm_info,
non_replayable_faults->shadow_buffer_copy,
&cached_faults);
UVM_ASSERT(status == NV_OK);
if (status != NV_OK) {
UVM_ERR_PRINT("nvUvmInterfaceGetNonReplayableFaults() failed: %s, GPU %s\n",
nvstatusToString(status),
parent_gpu->name);
uvm_global_set_fatal_error(status);
return status;
}
// Parse all faults
for (i = 0; i < cached_faults; ++i) {
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *fault_entry = &non_replayable_faults->fault_cache[i];
gpu->parent->fault_buffer_hal->parse_non_replayable_entry(gpu->parent, current_hw_entry, fault_entry);
for (i = 0; i < *cached_faults; ++i) {
parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->parse_non_replayable_entry(parent_gpu, current_hw_entry, fault_entry);
// The GPU aligns the fault addresses to 4k, but all of our tracking is
// done in PAGE_SIZE chunks which might be larger.
@ -226,9 +229,10 @@ static NvU32 fetch_non_replayable_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
}
current_hw_entry += entry_size;
fault_entry++;
}
return cached_faults;
return NV_OK;
}
// In SRIOV, the UVM (guest) driver does not have access to the privileged
@ -705,21 +709,28 @@ exit_no_channel:
uvm_va_space_up_read(va_space);
uvm_va_space_mm_release_unlock(va_space, mm);
if (status != NV_OK)
UVM_DBG_PRINT("Error servicing non-replayable faults on GPU: %s\n", uvm_gpu_name(gpu));
return status;
}
void uvm_gpu_service_non_replayable_fault_buffer(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
NvU32 cached_faults;
// If this handler is modified to handle fewer than all of the outstanding
// faults, then special handling will need to be added to uvm_suspend()
// to guarantee that fault processing has completed before control is
// returned to the RM.
while ((cached_faults = fetch_non_replayable_fault_buffer_entries(gpu)) > 0) {
do {
NV_STATUS status;
NvU32 i;
status = fetch_non_replayable_fault_buffer_entries(gpu->parent, &cached_faults);
if (status != NV_OK)
return;
// Differently to replayable faults, we do not batch up and preprocess
// non-replayable faults since getting multiple faults on the same
// memory region is not very likely
@ -728,10 +739,7 @@ void uvm_gpu_service_non_replayable_fault_buffer(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
for (i = 0; i < cached_faults; ++i) {
status = service_fault(gpu, &gpu->parent->fault_buffer_info.non_replayable.fault_cache[i]);
if (status != NV_OK)
break;
return;
}
}
if (status != NV_OK)
UVM_DBG_PRINT("Error servicing non-replayable faults on GPU: %s\n", uvm_gpu_name(gpu));
} while (cached_faults > 0);
}

View File

@ -486,7 +486,9 @@ static NV_STATUS cancel_fault_precise_va(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
return status;
}
static NV_STATUS push_replay_on_gpu(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_fault_replay_type_t type, uvm_fault_service_batch_context_t *batch_context)
static NV_STATUS push_replay_on_gpu(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
uvm_fault_replay_type_t type,
uvm_fault_service_batch_context_t *batch_context)
{
NV_STATUS status;
uvm_push_t push;
@ -572,6 +574,19 @@ static NV_STATUS hw_fault_buffer_flush_locked(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu)
return status;
}
static void fault_buffer_skip_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index)
{
UVM_ASSERT(parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_is_valid(parent_gpu, index));
// Flushed faults are never decrypted, but the decryption IV associated with
// replayable faults still requires manual adjustment so it is kept in sync
// with the encryption IV on the GSP-RM's side.
if (!uvm_parent_gpu_replayable_fault_buffer_is_uvm_owned(parent_gpu))
uvm_conf_computing_fault_increment_decrypt_iv(parent_gpu, 1);
parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_clear_valid(parent_gpu, index);
}
static NV_STATUS fault_buffer_flush_locked(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
uvm_gpu_buffer_flush_mode_t flush_mode,
uvm_fault_replay_type_t fault_replay,
@ -610,7 +625,7 @@ static NV_STATUS fault_buffer_flush_locked(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
// Wait until valid bit is set
UVM_SPIN_WHILE(!parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_is_valid(parent_gpu, get), &spin);
parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_clear_valid(parent_gpu, get);
fault_buffer_skip_replayable_entry(parent_gpu, get);
++get;
if (get == replayable_faults->max_faults)
get = 0;
@ -785,9 +800,9 @@ static bool fetch_fault_buffer_try_merge_entry(uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *current
// This optimization cannot be performed during fault cancel on Pascal GPUs
// (fetch_mode == FAULT_FETCH_MODE_ALL) since we need accurate tracking of all
// the faults in each uTLB in order to guarantee precise fault attribution.
static void fetch_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
uvm_fault_service_batch_context_t *batch_context,
fault_fetch_mode_t fetch_mode)
static NV_STATUS fetch_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
uvm_fault_service_batch_context_t *batch_context,
fault_fetch_mode_t fetch_mode)
{
NvU32 get;
NvU32 put;
@ -796,6 +811,7 @@ static void fetch_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
NvU32 utlb_id;
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *fault_cache;
uvm_spin_loop_t spin;
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_replayable_fault_buffer_info_t *replayable_faults = &gpu->parent->fault_buffer_info.replayable;
const bool in_pascal_cancel_path = (!gpu->parent->fault_cancel_va_supported && fetch_mode == FAULT_FETCH_MODE_ALL);
const bool may_filter = uvm_perf_fault_coalesce && !in_pascal_cancel_path;
@ -851,7 +867,9 @@ static void fetch_fault_buffer_entries(uvm_gpu_t *gpu,
smp_mb__after_atomic();
// Got valid bit set. Let's cache.
gpu->parent->fault_buffer_hal->parse_entry(gpu->parent, get, current_entry);
status = gpu->parent->fault_buffer_hal->parse_replayable_entry(gpu->parent, get, current_entry);
if (status != NV_OK)
goto done;
// The GPU aligns the fault addresses to 4k, but all of our tracking is
// done in PAGE_SIZE chunks which might be larger.
@ -918,6 +936,8 @@ done:
batch_context->num_cached_faults = fault_index;
batch_context->num_coalesced_faults = num_coalesced_faults;
return status;
}
// Sort comparator for pointers to fault buffer entries that sorts by
@ -2475,7 +2495,10 @@ static NV_STATUS cancel_faults_precise_tlb(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_fault_service_bat
batch_context->has_throttled_faults = false;
// 5) Fetch all faults from buffer
fetch_fault_buffer_entries(gpu, batch_context, FAULT_FETCH_MODE_ALL);
status = fetch_fault_buffer_entries(gpu, batch_context, FAULT_FETCH_MODE_ALL);
if (status != NV_OK)
break;
++batch_context->batch_id;
UVM_ASSERT(batch_context->num_cached_faults == batch_context->num_coalesced_faults);
@ -2612,7 +2635,10 @@ void uvm_gpu_service_replayable_faults(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
batch_context->has_fatal_faults = false;
batch_context->has_throttled_faults = false;
fetch_fault_buffer_entries(gpu, batch_context, FAULT_FETCH_MODE_BATCH_READY);
status = fetch_fault_buffer_entries(gpu, batch_context, FAULT_FETCH_MODE_BATCH_READY);
if (status != NV_OK)
break;
if (batch_context->num_cached_faults == 0)
break;

View File

@ -579,8 +579,10 @@ static void uvm_gpu_semaphore_encrypted_payload_update(uvm_channel_t *channel, u
void *auth_tag_cpu_addr = uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(semaphore->conf_computing.auth_tag);
NvU32 *gpu_notifier_cpu_addr = (NvU32 *)uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(semaphore->conf_computing.notifier);
NvU32 *payload_cpu_addr = (NvU32 *)uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(semaphore->conf_computing.encrypted_payload);
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
last_observed_notifier = semaphore->conf_computing.last_observed_notifier;
gpu_notifier = UVM_READ_ONCE(*gpu_notifier_cpu_addr);

View File

@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ struct uvm_gpu_tracking_semaphore_struct
// Create a semaphore pool for a GPU.
NV_STATUS uvm_gpu_semaphore_pool_create(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_gpu_semaphore_pool_t **pool_out);
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, pools associated with
// secure CE channels are allocated in the CPR of vidmem and as such have
// all the associated access restrictions. Because of this, they're called
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, semaphore pools
// associated with CE channels are allocated in the CPR of vidmem and as such
// have all the associated access restrictions. Because of this, they're called
// secure pools and secure semaphores are allocated out of said secure pools.
NV_STATUS uvm_gpu_semaphore_secure_pool_create(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_gpu_semaphore_pool_t **pool_out);

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@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static uvm_hal_class_ops_t fault_buffer_table[] =
.read_get = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_read_get_unsupported,
.write_get = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_write_get_unsupported,
.get_ve_id = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_get_ve_id_unsupported,
.parse_entry = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_entry_unsupported,
.parse_replayable_entry = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry_unsupported,
.entry_is_valid = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid_unsupported,
.entry_clear_valid = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_entry_clear_valid_unsupported,
.entry_size = uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_entry_size_unsupported,
@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static uvm_hal_class_ops_t fault_buffer_table[] =
.read_put = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_read_put,
.read_get = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_read_get,
.write_get = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_write_get,
.parse_entry = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_entry,
.parse_replayable_entry = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry,
.entry_is_valid = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid,
.entry_clear_valid = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_entry_clear_valid,
.entry_size = uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_entry_size,
@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static uvm_hal_class_ops_t fault_buffer_table[] =
.read_get = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_read_get,
.write_get = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_write_get,
.get_ve_id = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_get_ve_id,
.parse_entry = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_entry,
.parse_replayable_entry = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry,
.parse_non_replayable_entry = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_non_replayable_entry,
.get_fault_type = uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_get_fault_type,
}

View File

@ -485,11 +485,24 @@ typedef NvU32 (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_read_get_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
typedef void (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_write_get_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 get);
typedef NvU8 (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_get_ve_id_t)(NvU16 mmu_engine_id, uvm_mmu_engine_type_t mmu_engine_type);
// Parse the entry on the given buffer index. This also clears the valid bit of
// the entry in the buffer.
typedef void (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_parse_entry_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
// Parse the replayable entry at the given buffer index. This also clears the
// valid bit of the entry in the buffer.
typedef NV_STATUS (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
typedef bool (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index);
typedef void (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_clear_valid_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index);
typedef NvU32 (*uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_size_t)(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
@ -508,9 +521,6 @@ NvU32 uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_read_put_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent
NvU32 uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_read_get_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
void uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_write_get_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index);
NvU8 uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_get_ve_id_unsupported(NvU16 mmu_engine_id, uvm_mmu_engine_type_t mmu_engine_type);
void uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_entry_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
uvm_fault_type_t uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_get_fault_type_unsupported(const NvU32 *fault_entry);
void uvm_hal_pascal_enable_replayable_faults(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
@ -519,18 +529,14 @@ void uvm_hal_pascal_clear_replayable_faults(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32
NvU32 uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_read_put(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
NvU32 uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_read_get(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
void uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_write_get(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index);
void uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
uvm_fault_type_t uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_get_fault_type(const NvU32 *fault_entry);
NvU32 uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_read_put(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
NvU32 uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_read_get(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
void uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_write_get(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index);
NvU8 uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_get_ve_id(NvU16 mmu_engine_id, uvm_mmu_engine_type_t mmu_engine_type);
void uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry);
uvm_fault_type_t uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_get_fault_type(const NvU32 *fault_entry);
void uvm_hal_turing_disable_replayable_faults(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu);
@ -772,7 +778,7 @@ struct uvm_fault_buffer_hal_struct
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_read_get_t read_get;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_write_get_t write_get;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_get_ve_id_t get_ve_id;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_parse_entry_t parse_entry;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry_t parse_replayable_entry;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid_t entry_is_valid;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_clear_valid_t entry_clear_valid;
uvm_hal_fault_buffer_entry_size_t entry_size;

View File

@ -128,6 +128,13 @@ static uvm_gpu_address_t uvm_gpu_address_virtual(NvU64 va)
return address;
}
static uvm_gpu_address_t uvm_gpu_address_virtual_unprotected(NvU64 va)
{
uvm_gpu_address_t address = uvm_gpu_address_virtual(va);
address.is_unprotected = true;
return address;
}
// Create a physical GPU address
static uvm_gpu_address_t uvm_gpu_address_physical(uvm_aperture_t aperture, NvU64 pa)
{

View File

@ -2575,7 +2575,7 @@ static NV_STATUS dmamap_src_sysmem_pages(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
continue;
}
if (folio_test_swapcache(page_folio(src_page))) {
if (PageSwapCache(src_page)) {
// TODO: Bug 4050579: Remove this when swap cached pages can be
// migrated.
if (service_context) {

View File

@ -61,7 +61,11 @@ void uvm_hal_hopper_arch_init_properties(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu)
// GH180.
parent_gpu->ce_phys_vidmem_write_supported = !uvm_gpu_is_coherent(parent_gpu);
parent_gpu->peer_copy_mode = g_uvm_global.peer_copy_mode;
// TODO: Bug 4174553: [HGX-SkinnyJoe][GH180] channel errors discussion/debug
// portion for the uvm tests became nonresponsive after
// some time and then failed even after reboot
parent_gpu->peer_copy_mode = uvm_gpu_is_coherent(parent_gpu) ?
UVM_GPU_PEER_COPY_MODE_VIRTUAL : g_uvm_global.peer_copy_mode;
// All GR context buffers may be mapped to 57b wide VAs. All "compute" units
// accessing GR context buffers support the 57-bit VA range.

View File

@ -491,7 +491,6 @@ void uvm_hal_hopper_ce_encrypt(uvm_push_t *push,
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_is_hcc(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_push_is_fake(push) || uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(auth_tag.address, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT));
if (!src.is_virtual)
@ -540,7 +539,6 @@ void uvm_hal_hopper_ce_decrypt(uvm_push_t *push,
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_is_hcc(gpu));
UVM_ASSERT(!push->channel || uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(auth_tag.address, UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT));
// The addressing mode (and aperture, if applicable) of the source and

View File

@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ void uvm_hal_hopper_sec2_decrypt(uvm_push_t *push, NvU64 dst_va, NvU64 src_va, N
NvU32 *csl_sign_init = push->next;
// Check that the provided alignment matches HW
BUILD_BUG_ON(UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SEC2_BUF_ALIGNMENT != (1 << HWSHIFT(CBA2, DECRYPT_COPY_DST_ADDR_LO, DATA)));
BUILD_BUG_ON(UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT < (1 << HWSHIFT(CBA2, DECRYPT_COPY_DST_ADDR_LO, DATA)));
BUILD_BUG_ON(UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_BUF_ALIGNMENT % (1 << HWSHIFT(CBA2, DECRYPT_COPY_DST_ADDR_LO, DATA)) != 0);

View File

@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ static inline const struct cpumask *uvm_cpumask_of_node(int node)
#define VM_MIXEDMAP 0x00000000
#endif
#if !defined(MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY)
#define MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY 5
#endif
//
// printk.h already defined pr_fmt, so we have to redefine it so the pr_*
// routines pick up our version

View File

@ -279,13 +279,14 @@
// Operations not allowed while holding the lock:
// - GPU memory allocation which can evict memory (would require nesting
// block locks)
//
// - GPU DMA Allocation pool lock (gpu->conf_computing.dma_buffer_pool.lock)
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CONF_COMPUTING_DMA_BUFFER_POOL
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
// Exclusive lock (mutex)
//
// Protects:
// - Protect the state of the uvm_conf_computing_dma_buffer_pool_t
// when the Confidential Computing feature is enabled on the system.
//
// - Chunk mapping lock (gpu->root_chunk_mappings.bitlocks and
// gpu->sysmem_mappings.bitlock)
@ -321,22 +322,25 @@
// Operations not allowed while holding this lock
// - GPU memory allocation which can evict
//
// - Secure channel CSL channel pool semaphore
// - CE channel CSL channel pool semaphore
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_PUSH
// Semaphore per SEC2 channel pool
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
// Semaphore per CE channel pool
//
// The semaphore controls concurrent pushes to secure channels. Secure work
// submission depends on channel availability in GPFIFO entries (as in any
// other channel type) but also on channel locking. Each secure channel has a
// lock to enforce ordering of pushes. The channel's CSL lock is taken on
// channel reservation until uvm_push_end. Secure channels are stateful
// channels and the CSL lock protects their CSL state/context.
// The semaphore controls concurrent pushes to CE channels that are not WCL
// channels. Secure work submission depends on channel availability in
// GPFIFO entries (as in any other channel type) but also on channel
// locking. Each channel has a lock to enforce ordering of pushes. The
// channel's CSL lock is taken on channel reservation until uvm_push_end.
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, channels are
// stateful, and the CSL lock protects their CSL state/context.
//
// Operations allowed while holding this lock
// - Pushing work to CE secure channels
// - Pushing work to CE channels (except for WLC channels)
//
// - WLC CSL channel pool semaphore
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_WLC_PUSH
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
// Semaphore per WLC channel pool
//
// The semaphore controls concurrent pushes to WLC channels. WLC work
@ -346,8 +350,8 @@
// channel reservation until uvm_push_end. SEC2 channels are stateful
// channels and the CSL lock protects their CSL state/context.
//
// This lock ORDER is different and sits below generic secure channel CSL
// lock and above SEC2 CSL lock. This reflects the dual nature of WLC
// This lock ORDER is different and sits below the generic channel CSL
// lock and above the SEC2 CSL lock. This reflects the dual nature of WLC
// channels; they use SEC2 indirect work launch during initialization,
// and after their schedule is initialized they provide indirect launch
// functionality to other CE channels.
@ -357,6 +361,7 @@
//
// - SEC2 CSL channel pool semaphore
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_SEC2_CSL_PUSH
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
// Semaphore per SEC2 channel pool
//
// The semaphore controls concurrent pushes to SEC2 channels. SEC2 work
@ -366,9 +371,9 @@
// channel reservation until uvm_push_end. SEC2 channels are stateful
// channels and the CSL lock protects their CSL state/context.
//
// This lock ORDER is different and lower than the generic secure channel
// lock to allow secure work submission to use a SEC2 channel to submit
// work before releasing the CSL lock of the originating secure channel.
// This lock ORDER is different and lower than UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CSL_PUSH
// to allow secure work submission to use a SEC2 channel to submit
// work before releasing the CSL lock of the originating channel.
//
// Operations allowed while holding this lock
// - Pushing work to SEC2 channels
@ -408,16 +413,18 @@
//
// - WLC Channel lock
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_WLC_CHANNEL
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
// Spinlock (uvm_spinlock_t)
//
// Lock protecting the state of WLC channels in a channel pool. This lock
// is separate from the above generic channel lock to allow for indirect
// worklaunch pushes while holding the main channel lock.
// (WLC pushes don't need any of the pushbuffer locks described above)
// is separate from the generic channel lock (UVM_LOCK_ORDER_CHANNEL)
// to allow for indirect worklaunch pushes while holding the main channel
// lock (WLC pushes don't need any of the pushbuffer locks described
// above)
//
// - Tools global VA space list lock (g_tools_va_space_list_lock)
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_TOOLS_VA_SPACE_LIST
// Reader/writer lock (rw_sempahore)
// Reader/writer lock (rw_semaphore)
//
// This lock protects the list of VA spaces used when broadcasting
// UVM profiling events.
@ -437,9 +444,10 @@
//
// - Tracking semaphores
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_SECURE_SEMAPHORE
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, CE semaphores are
// encrypted, and require to take the CSL lock (UVM_LOCK_ORDER_LEAF) to
// decrypt the payload.
// Condition: The Confidential Computing feature is enabled
//
// CE semaphore payloads are encrypted, and require to take the CSL lock
// (UVM_LOCK_ORDER_LEAF) to decrypt the payload.
//
// - Leaf locks
// Order: UVM_LOCK_ORDER_LEAF

View File

@ -68,11 +68,12 @@ uvm_fault_type_t uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_get_fault_type_unsupported(const N
return UVM_FAULT_TYPE_COUNT;
}
void uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_entry_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
{
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(false, "fault_buffer_parse_entry is not supported on GPU: %s.\n", parent_gpu->name);
return NV_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
bool uvm_hal_maxwell_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid_unsupported(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index)

View File

@ -392,12 +392,6 @@ static NV_STATUS uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem(NvU64 size, uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_mem_t **me
return uvm_mem_alloc(&params, mem_out);
}
// Helper for allocating protected vidmem with the default page size
static NV_STATUS uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem_protected(NvU64 size, uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_mem_t **mem_out)
{
return uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem(size, gpu, mem_out);
}
// Helper for allocating sysmem and mapping it on the CPU
static NV_STATUS uvm_mem_alloc_sysmem_and_map_cpu_kernel(NvU64 size, struct mm_struct *mm, uvm_mem_t **mem_out)
{

View File

@ -134,6 +134,22 @@ static NV_STATUS block_migrate_map_unmapped_pages(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
// first map operation
uvm_page_mask_complement(&va_block_context->caller_page_mask, &va_block->maybe_mapped_pages);
if (uvm_va_block_is_hmm(va_block) && !UVM_ID_IS_CPU(dest_id)) {
// Do not map pages that are already resident on the CPU. This is in
// order to avoid breaking system-wide atomic operations on HMM. HMM's
// implementation of system-side atomic operations involves restricting
// mappings to one processor (CPU or a GPU) at a time. If we were to
// grant a GPU a mapping to system memory, this gets into trouble
// because, on the CPU side, Linux can silently upgrade PTE permissions
// (move from read-only, to read-write, without any MMU notifiers
// firing), thus breaking the model by allowing simultaneous read-write
// access from two separate processors. To avoid that, just don't map
// such pages at all, when migrating.
uvm_page_mask_andnot(&va_block_context->caller_page_mask,
&va_block_context->caller_page_mask,
uvm_va_block_resident_mask_get(va_block, UVM_ID_CPU));
}
// Only map those pages that are not mapped anywhere else (likely due
// to a first touch or a migration). We pass
// UvmEventMapRemoteCauseInvalid since the destination processor of a
@ -944,17 +960,18 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_api_migrate(UVM_MIGRATE_PARAMS *params, struct file *filp)
if (type == UVM_API_RANGE_TYPE_ATS) {
uvm_migrate_args_t uvm_migrate_args =
{
.va_space = va_space,
.mm = mm,
.start = params->base,
.length = params->length,
.dst_id = (dest_gpu ? dest_gpu->id : UVM_ID_CPU),
.dst_node_id = (int)params->cpuNumaNode,
.populate_permissions = UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_INHERIT,
.touch = false,
.skip_mapped = false,
.user_space_start = &params->userSpaceStart,
.user_space_length = &params->userSpaceLength,
.va_space = va_space,
.mm = mm,
.start = params->base,
.length = params->length,
.dst_id = (dest_gpu ? dest_gpu->id : UVM_ID_CPU),
.dst_node_id = (int)params->cpuNumaNode,
.populate_permissions = UVM_POPULATE_PERMISSIONS_INHERIT,
.touch = false,
.skip_mapped = false,
.populate_on_cpu_alloc_failures = false,
.user_space_start = &params->userSpaceStart,
.user_space_length = &params->userSpaceLength,
};
status = uvm_migrate_pageable(&uvm_migrate_args);

View File

@ -507,6 +507,22 @@ static NV_STATUS migrate_vma_copy_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
return NV_OK;
}
void migrate_vma_cleanup_pages(unsigned long *dst, unsigned long npages)
{
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
struct page *dst_page = migrate_pfn_to_page(dst[i]);
if (!dst_page)
continue;
unlock_page(dst_page);
__free_page(dst_page);
dst[i] = 0;
}
}
void uvm_migrate_vma_alloc_and_copy(struct migrate_vma *args, migrate_vma_state_t *state)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = args->vma;
@ -531,6 +547,10 @@ void uvm_migrate_vma_alloc_and_copy(struct migrate_vma *args, migrate_vma_state_
if (state->status == NV_OK)
state->status = tracker_status;
// Mark all pages as not migrating if we're failing
if (state->status != NV_OK)
migrate_vma_cleanup_pages(args->dst, state->num_pages);
}
void uvm_migrate_vma_alloc_and_copy_helper(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@ -802,7 +822,7 @@ static NV_STATUS migrate_pageable_vma_region(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
// If the destination is the CPU, signal user-space to retry with a
// different node. Otherwise, just try to populate anywhere in the
// system
if (UVM_ID_IS_CPU(uvm_migrate_args->dst_id)) {
if (UVM_ID_IS_CPU(uvm_migrate_args->dst_id) && !uvm_migrate_args->populate_on_cpu_alloc_failures) {
*next_addr = start + find_first_bit(state->scratch2_mask, num_pages) * PAGE_SIZE;
return NV_ERR_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
}
@ -961,13 +981,10 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_migrate_pageable(uvm_migrate_args_t *uvm_migrate_args)
// We only check that dst_node_id is a valid node in the system and it
// doesn't correspond to a GPU node. This is fine because
// alloc_pages_node will clamp the allocation to
// cpuset_current_mems_allowed, and uvm_migrate_pageable is only called
// from process context (uvm_migrate) when dst_id is CPU. UVM bottom
// half never calls uvm_migrate_pageable when dst_id is CPU. So, assert
// that we're in a user thread. However, this would need to change if we
// wanted to call this function from a bottom half with CPU dst_id.
UVM_ASSERT(!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
// cpuset_current_mems_allowed when uvm_migrate_pageable is called from
// process context (uvm_migrate) when dst_id is CPU. UVM bottom half
// calls uvm_migrate_pageable with CPU dst_id only when the VMA memory
// policy is set to dst_node_id and dst_node_id is not NUMA_NO_NODE.
if (!nv_numa_node_has_memory(dst_node_id) ||
uvm_va_space_find_gpu_with_memory_node_id(va_space, dst_node_id) != NULL)
return NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;

View File

@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ typedef struct
uvm_populate_permissions_t populate_permissions;
bool touch : 1;
bool skip_mapped : 1;
bool populate_on_cpu_alloc_failures : 1;
NvU64 *user_space_start;
NvU64 *user_space_length;
} uvm_migrate_args_t;

View File

@ -214,9 +214,9 @@ static UvmFaultMetadataPacket *get_fault_buffer_entry_metadata(uvm_parent_gpu_t
return fault_entry_metadata + index;
}
void uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
{
NvU32 *fault_entry;
NvU64 addr_hi, addr_lo;
@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ void uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_parse_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
// Automatically clear valid bit for the entry in the fault buffer
uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_entry_clear_valid(parent_gpu, index);
return NV_OK;
}
bool uvm_hal_pascal_fault_buffer_entry_is_valid(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index)

View File

@ -1455,7 +1455,18 @@ static uvm_perf_thrashing_hint_t get_hint_for_migration_thrashing(va_space_thras
hint.type = UVM_PERF_THRASHING_HINT_TYPE_NONE;
closest_resident_id = uvm_va_block_page_get_closest_resident(va_block, page_index, requester);
UVM_ASSERT(UVM_ID_IS_VALID(closest_resident_id));
if (uvm_va_block_is_hmm(va_block)) {
// HMM pages always start out resident on the CPU but may not be
// recorded in the va_block state because hmm_range_fault() or
// similar functions haven't been called to get an accurate snapshot
// of the Linux state. We can assume pages are CPU resident for the
// purpose of deciding where to migrate to reduce thrashing.
if (UVM_ID_IS_INVALID(closest_resident_id))
closest_resident_id = UVM_ID_CPU;
}
else {
UVM_ASSERT(UVM_ID_IS_VALID(closest_resident_id));
}
if (thrashing_processors_can_access(va_space, page_thrashing, preferred_location)) {
// The logic in uvm_va_block_select_residency chooses the preferred

View File

@ -391,11 +391,13 @@ uvm_gpu_address_t uvm_push_inline_data_end(uvm_push_inline_data_t *data)
inline_data_address = (NvU64) (uintptr_t)(push->next + 1);
}
else {
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
// Offset of the inlined data within the push.
inline_data_address = (push->next - push->begin + 1) * UVM_METHOD_SIZE;
// Add GPU VA of the push begin
inline_data_address += uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(channel->pool->manager->pushbuffer, push);
inline_data_address += uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(pushbuffer, push);
}
// This will place a noop right before the inline data that was written.
@ -438,10 +440,8 @@ NvU64 *uvm_push_timestamp(uvm_push_t *push)
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(push->channel))
gpu->parent->ce_hal->semaphore_timestamp(push, address.address);
else if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(push->channel))
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->semaphore_timestamp(push, address.address);
else
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(0, "Semaphore release timestamp on an unsupported channel.\n");
gpu->parent->sec2_hal->semaphore_timestamp(push, address.address);
return timestamp;
}

View File

@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ typedef enum
UVM_PUSH_FLAG_COUNT,
} uvm_push_flag_t;
struct uvm_push_crypto_bundle_struct {
// Initialization vector used to decrypt the push
UvmCslIv iv;
// Size of the pushbuffer that is encrypted/decrypted
NvU32 push_size;
};
struct uvm_push_struct
{
// Location of the first method of the push
@ -369,11 +377,6 @@ static bool uvm_push_has_space(uvm_push_t *push, NvU32 free_space)
NV_STATUS uvm_push_begin_fake(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_push_t *push);
void uvm_push_end_fake(uvm_push_t *push);
static bool uvm_push_is_fake(uvm_push_t *push)
{
return !push->channel;
}
// Begin an inline data fragment in the push
//
// The inline data will be ignored by the GPU, but can be referenced from

View File

@ -40,10 +40,9 @@
static NvU32 get_push_begin_size(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel)) {
// SEC2 channels allocate CSL signature buffer at the beginning.
// SEC2 channels allocate CSL signature buffer at the beginning.
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
return UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_SIGN_BUF_MAX_SIZE + UVM_METHOD_SIZE;
}
return 0;
}
@ -51,10 +50,14 @@ static NvU32 get_push_begin_size(uvm_channel_t *channel)
// This is the storage required by a semaphore release.
static NvU32 get_push_end_min_size(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(channel)) {
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel)) {
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a Secure CE channel.
// Note that Secure CE semaphore release pushes two memset and one
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_channel_get_gpu(channel);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu)) {
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(channel)) {
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a CE channel when
// the Confidential Computing feature is enabled.
//
// Note that CE semaphore release pushes two memset and one
// encryption method on top of the regular release.
// Memset size
// -------------
@ -75,43 +78,44 @@ static NvU32 get_push_end_min_size(uvm_channel_t *channel)
//
// TOTAL : 144 Bytes
// Same as CE + LCIC GPPut update + LCIC doorbell
return 24 + 144 + 24 + 24;
}
else if (uvm_channel_is_secure_ce(channel)) {
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel)) {
// Same as CE + LCIC GPPut update + LCIC doorbell
return 24 + 144 + 24 + 24;
}
return 24 + 144;
}
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a CE channel.
return 24;
}
else if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel)) {
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel));
// A perfectly aligned inline buffer in SEC2 semaphore release.
// We add UVM_METHOD_SIZE because of the NOP method to reserve
// UVM_CSL_SIGN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE_BYTES (the inline buffer.)
return 48 + UVM_CSL_SIGN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE_BYTES + UVM_METHOD_SIZE;
}
return 0;
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a CE channel.
return 24;
}
static NvU32 get_push_end_max_size(uvm_channel_t *channel)
{
if (uvm_channel_is_ce(channel)) {
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel)) {
// WLC pushes are always padded to UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE
return UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE;
}
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a CE channel.
return get_push_end_min_size(channel);
}
else if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel)) {
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a SEC2 channel.
// Note that SEC2 semaphore release uses an inline buffer with alignment
// requirements. This is the "worst" case semaphore_release storage.
return 48 + UVM_CSL_SIGN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE_BYTES + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT;
}
// WLC pushes are always padded to UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE
if (uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel))
return UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE;
return 0;
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a SEC2 channel.
// Note that SEC2 semaphore release uses an inline buffer with alignment
// requirements. This is the "worst" case semaphore_release storage.
if (uvm_channel_is_sec2(channel))
return 48 + UVM_CSL_SIGN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE_BYTES + UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_ALIGNMENT;
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_ce(channel));
// Space (in bytes) used by uvm_push_end() on a CE channel.
return get_push_end_min_size(channel);
}
static NV_STATUS test_push_end_size(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
@ -294,10 +298,19 @@ static NV_STATUS test_concurrent_pushes(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_gpu_t *gpu;
NvU32 i;
uvm_push_t *pushes;
uvm_tracker_t tracker = UVM_TRACKER_INIT();
uvm_channel_type_t channel_type = UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_GPU_INTERNAL;
uvm_tracker_t tracker;
// When the Confidential Computing feature is enabled, a channel reserved at
// the start of a push cannot be reserved again until that push ends. The
// test is waived, because the number of pushes it starts per pool exceeds
// the number of channels in the pool, so it would block indefinitely.
gpu = uvm_va_space_find_first_gpu(va_space);
if ((gpu != NULL) && uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return NV_OK;
uvm_tracker_init(&tracker);
// As noted above, this test does unsafe things that would be detected by
// lock tracking, opt-out.
@ -310,16 +323,11 @@ static NV_STATUS test_concurrent_pushes(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
}
for_each_va_space_gpu(gpu, va_space) {
NvU32 i;
// A secure channels reserved at the start of a push cannot be reserved
// again until that push ends. The test would block indefinitely
// if secure pools are not skipped, because the number of pushes started
// per pool exceeds the number of channels in the pool.
if (uvm_channel_type_requires_secure_pool(gpu, channel_type))
goto done;
for (i = 0; i < UVM_PUSH_MAX_CONCURRENT_PUSHES; ++i) {
uvm_push_t *push = &pushes[i];
status = uvm_push_begin(gpu->channel_manager, channel_type, push, "concurrent push %u", i);
status = uvm_push_begin(gpu->channel_manager, UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_GPU_INTERNAL, push, "concurrent push %u", i);
TEST_CHECK_GOTO(status == NV_OK, done);
}
for (i = 0; i < UVM_PUSH_MAX_CONCURRENT_PUSHES; ++i) {
@ -776,15 +784,6 @@ static NV_STATUS test_timestamp_on_gpu(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
NvU32 i;
NvU64 last_stamp = 0;
// TODO: Bug 3988992: [UVM][HCC] RFE - Support encrypted semaphore for secure CE channels
// This test is waived when Confidential Computing is enabled because it
// assumes that CPU can directly read the result of a semaphore timestamp
// operation. Instead the operation needs to be follower up by an encrypt
// -decrypt trip to be accessible to CPU. This will be cleaner and simpler
// once encrypted semaphores are available.
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return NV_OK;
for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
status = uvm_push_begin(gpu->channel_manager, UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_GPU_INTERNAL, &push, "Releasing a timestamp");
if (status != NV_OK)

View File

@ -449,21 +449,68 @@ static uvm_pushbuffer_chunk_t *gpfifo_to_chunk(uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer, uvm
return chunk;
}
void uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *gpfifo)
static void decrypt_push(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *gpfifo)
{
NV_STATUS status;
NvU32 auth_tag_offset;
void *auth_tag_cpu_va;
void *push_protected_cpu_va;
void *push_unprotected_cpu_va;
NvU32 pushbuffer_offset = gpfifo->pushbuffer_offset;
NvU32 push_info_index = gpfifo->push_info - channel->push_infos;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
uvm_push_crypto_bundle_t *crypto_bundle = channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles + push_info_index;
if (channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundles == NULL)
return;
// When the crypto bundle is used, the push size cannot be zero
if (crypto_bundle->push_size == 0)
return;
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_wlc(channel));
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_channel_is_lcic(channel));
push_protected_cpu_va = (char *)get_base_cpu_va(pushbuffer) + pushbuffer_offset;
push_unprotected_cpu_va = (char *)uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(pushbuffer->memory_unprotected_sysmem) + pushbuffer_offset;
auth_tag_offset = push_info_index * UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
auth_tag_cpu_va = (char *)uvm_rm_mem_get_cpu_va(channel->conf_computing.push_crypto_bundle_auth_tags) +
auth_tag_offset;
status = uvm_conf_computing_cpu_decrypt(channel,
push_protected_cpu_va,
push_unprotected_cpu_va,
&crypto_bundle->iv,
crypto_bundle->push_size,
auth_tag_cpu_va);
// A decryption failure here is not fatal because it does not
// prevent UVM from running fine in the future and cannot be used
// maliciously to leak information or otherwise derail UVM from its
// regular duties.
UVM_ASSERT_MSG_RELEASE(status == NV_OK, "Pushbuffer decryption failure: %s\n", nvstatusToString(status));
// Avoid reusing the bundle across multiple pushes
crypto_bundle->push_size = 0;
}
void uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *gpfifo)
{
uvm_pushbuffer_chunk_t *chunk;
uvm_push_info_t *push_info = gpfifo->push_info;
bool need_to_update_chunk = false;
uvm_push_info_t *push_info = gpfifo->push_info;
uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer = uvm_channel_get_pushbuffer(channel);
UVM_ASSERT(gpfifo->type == UVM_GPFIFO_ENTRY_TYPE_NORMAL);
chunk = gpfifo_to_chunk(pushbuffer, gpfifo);
if (push_info->on_complete != NULL)
if (push_info->on_complete != NULL) {
decrypt_push(channel, gpfifo);
push_info->on_complete(push_info->on_complete_data);
push_info->on_complete = NULL;
push_info->on_complete_data = NULL;
push_info->on_complete = NULL;
push_info->on_complete_data = NULL;
}
uvm_spin_lock(&pushbuffer->lock);

View File

@ -161,22 +161,22 @@
// * WFI: 8B
// Total: 64B
//
// Push space needed for secure work launch is 224B. The push is constructed
// Push space needed for secure work launch is 364B. The push is constructed
// in 'internal_channel_submit_work_indirect' and 'uvm_channel_end_push'
// * CE decrypt (of indirect PB): 56B
// * 2*semaphore release (indirect GPFIFO entry): 2*24B
// * memset_8 (indirect GPFIFO entry): 44B
// * semaphore release (indirect GPPUT): 24B
// * semaphore release (indirect doorbell): 24B
// Appendix added in 'uvm_channel_end_push':
// * semaphore release (WLC tracking): 168B
// * semaphore increment (memcopy): 24B
// * semaphore release (payload): 24B
// * notifier memset: 40B
// * payload encryption: 64B
// * notifier memset: 40B
// * semaphore increment (LCIC GPPUT): 24B
// * semaphore release (LCIC doorbell): 24B
// Total: 368B
#define UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE (368)
// Total: 364B
#define UVM_MAX_WLC_PUSH_SIZE (364)
// Push space needed for static LCIC schedule, as initialized in
// 'setup_lcic_schedule':
@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
// * semaphore increment (WLC GPPUT): 24B
// * semaphore increment (WLC GPPUT): 24B
// * semaphore increment (LCIC tracking): 160B
// * semaphore increment (memcopy): 24B
// * semaphore increment (payload): 24B
// * notifier memcopy: 36B
// * payload encryption: 64B
// * notifier memcopy: 36B
@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_pushbuffer_begin_push(uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer, uvm_push_t *pu
// Complete a pending push
// Updates the chunk state the pending push used
void uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *gpfifo);
void uvm_pushbuffer_mark_completed(uvm_channel_t *channel, uvm_gpfifo_entry_t *gpfifo);
// Get the GPU VA for an ongoing push
NvU64 uvm_pushbuffer_get_gpu_va_for_push(uvm_pushbuffer_t *pushbuffer, uvm_push_t *push);

View File

@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ done:
typedef enum
{
MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA,
MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_PROTECTED,
MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_VIDMEM_PROTECTED
} mem_alloc_type_t;
@ -269,14 +270,20 @@ static NV_STATUS alloc_and_init_mem(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, uvm_mem_t **mem, size_t size
*mem = NULL;
if (type == MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_VIDMEM_PROTECTED) {
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem_protected(size, gpu, mem));
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_vidmem(size, gpu, mem));
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_gpu_kernel(*mem, gpu), err);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(ce_memset_gpu(gpu, *mem, size, 0xdead), err);
}
else {
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_sysmem_dma(size, gpu, NULL, mem));
if (type == MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA) {
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_sysmem_dma(size, gpu, NULL, mem));
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_gpu_kernel(*mem, gpu), err);
}
else {
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_mem_alloc_sysmem(size, NULL, mem));
}
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_cpu_kernel(*mem), err);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_mem_map_gpu_kernel(*mem, gpu), err);
write_range_cpu(*mem, size, 0xdeaddead);
}
@ -341,9 +348,9 @@ static NV_STATUS cpu_decrypt(uvm_channel_t *channel,
return NV_OK;
}
// gpu_encrypt uses a secure CE for encryption (instead of SEC2). SEC2 does not
// support encryption. The following function is copied from uvm_ce_test.c and
// adapted to SEC2 tests.
// gpu_encrypt uses the Copy Engine for encryption, instead of SEC2. SEC2 does
// not support encryption. The following function is copied from uvm_ce_test.c
// and adapted to SEC2 tests.
static void gpu_encrypt(uvm_push_t *push,
uvm_mem_t *dst_mem,
uvm_mem_t *src_mem,
@ -405,48 +412,6 @@ static void gpu_decrypt(uvm_push_t *push,
}
}
// This test only uses sysmem so that we can use the CPU for encryption and SEC2
// for decryption, i.e., the test doesn't depend on any other GPU engine for
// the encryption operation (refer to test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip()). This is not
// how SEC2 is used in the driver. The intended SEC2 usage is to decrypt from
// unprotected sysmem to protected vidmem, which is tested in
// test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip().
static NV_STATUS test_cpu_to_gpu_sysmem(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, size_t copy_size, size_t size)
{
NV_STATUS status = NV_OK;
uvm_mem_t *src_plain = NULL;
uvm_mem_t *cipher = NULL;
uvm_mem_t *dst_plain = NULL;
uvm_mem_t *auth_tag_mem = NULL;
size_t auth_tag_buffer_size = (size / copy_size) * UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
uvm_push_t push;
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &src_plain, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &dst_plain, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &cipher, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &auth_tag_mem, auth_tag_buffer_size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
write_range_cpu(src_plain, size, uvm_get_stale_thread_id());
write_range_cpu(dst_plain, size, 0xA5A5A5A5);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_push_begin(gpu->channel_manager, UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_SEC2, &push, "enc(cpu)_dec(gpu)"), out);
cpu_encrypt(push.channel, cipher, src_plain, auth_tag_mem, size, copy_size);
gpu_decrypt(&push, dst_plain, cipher, auth_tag_mem, size, copy_size);
uvm_push_end_and_wait(&push);
TEST_CHECK_GOTO(mem_match(src_plain, dst_plain), out);
out:
uvm_mem_free(auth_tag_mem);
uvm_mem_free(cipher);
uvm_mem_free(dst_plain);
uvm_mem_free(src_plain);
return status;
}
// This test depends on the CE for the encryption, so we assume tests from
// uvm_ce_test.c have successfully passed.
static NV_STATUS test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, size_t copy_size, size_t size)
@ -461,19 +426,16 @@ static NV_STATUS test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, size_t copy_size, siz
size_t auth_tag_buffer_size = (size / copy_size) * UVM_CONF_COMPUTING_AUTH_TAG_SIZE;
uvm_push_t push;
UvmCslIv *decrypt_iv;
uvm_tracker_t tracker;
decrypt_iv = uvm_kvmalloc_zero((size / copy_size) * sizeof(UvmCslIv));
if (!decrypt_iv)
return NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
uvm_tracker_init(&tracker);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &src_plain, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &src_plain, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_PROTECTED), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &src_cipher, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &dst_cipher, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &dst_plain, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_VIDMEM_PROTECTED), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &dst_plain_cpu, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &dst_plain_cpu, size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_PROTECTED), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(alloc_and_init_mem(gpu, &auth_tag_mem, auth_tag_buffer_size, MEM_ALLOC_TYPE_SYSMEM_DMA), out);
write_range_cpu(src_plain, size, uvm_get_stale_thread_id());
@ -483,14 +445,12 @@ static NV_STATUS test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip(uvm_gpu_t *gpu, size_t copy_size, siz
cpu_encrypt(push.channel, src_cipher, src_plain, auth_tag_mem, size, copy_size);
gpu_decrypt(&push, dst_plain, src_cipher, auth_tag_mem, size, copy_size);
uvm_push_end(&push);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_tracker_add_push(&tracker, &push), out);
// Wait for SEC2 before launching the CE part.
// SEC2 is only allowed to release semaphores in unprotected sysmem,
// and CE can only acquire semaphores in protected vidmem.
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_push_end_and_wait(&push), out);
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_push_begin_acquire(gpu->channel_manager,
UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_GPU_TO_CPU,
&tracker,
&push,
"enc(gpu)_dec(cpu)"),
TEST_NV_CHECK_GOTO(uvm_push_begin(gpu->channel_manager, UVM_CHANNEL_TYPE_GPU_TO_CPU, &push, "enc(gpu)_dec(cpu)"),
out);
gpu_encrypt(&push, dst_cipher, dst_plain, decrypt_iv, auth_tag_mem, size, copy_size);
@ -521,8 +481,6 @@ out:
uvm_kvfree(decrypt_iv);
uvm_tracker_deinit(&tracker);
return status;
}
@ -545,7 +503,6 @@ static NV_STATUS test_encryption_decryption(uvm_gpu_t *gpu)
UVM_ASSERT(size % copy_sizes[i] == 0);
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(test_cpu_to_gpu_sysmem(gpu, copy_sizes[i], size));
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(test_cpu_to_gpu_roundtrip(gpu, copy_sizes[i], size));
}

View File

@ -229,6 +229,24 @@ static void unmap_user_pages(struct page **pages, void *addr, NvU64 size)
uvm_kvfree(pages);
}
// This must be called with the mmap_lock held in read mode or better.
static NV_STATUS check_vmas(struct mm_struct *mm, NvU64 start_va, NvU64 size)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
NvU64 addr = start_va;
NvU64 region_end = start_va + size;
do {
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (!vma || !(addr >= vma->vm_start) || uvm_file_is_nvidia_uvm(vma->vm_file))
return NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
addr = vma->vm_end;
} while (addr < region_end);
return NV_OK;
}
// Map virtual memory of data from [user_va, user_va + size) of current process into kernel.
// Sets *addr to kernel mapping and *pages to the array of struct pages that contain the memory.
static NV_STATUS map_user_pages(NvU64 user_va, NvU64 size, void **addr, struct page ***pages)
@ -237,7 +255,6 @@ static NV_STATUS map_user_pages(NvU64 user_va, NvU64 size, void **addr, struct p
long ret = 0;
long num_pages;
long i;
struct vm_area_struct **vmas = NULL;
*addr = NULL;
*pages = NULL;
@ -254,22 +271,30 @@ static NV_STATUS map_user_pages(NvU64 user_va, NvU64 size, void **addr, struct p
goto fail;
}
vmas = uvm_kvmalloc(sizeof(struct vm_area_struct *) * num_pages);
if (vmas == NULL) {
status = NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
// Although uvm_down_read_mmap_lock() is preferable due to its participation
// in the UVM lock dependency tracker, it cannot be used here. That's
// because pin_user_pages() may fault in HMM pages which are GPU-resident.
// When that happens, the UVM page fault handler would record another
// mmap_read_lock() on the same thread as this one, leading to a false
// positive lock dependency report.
//
// Therefore, use the lower level nv_mmap_read_lock() here.
nv_mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
status = check_vmas(current->mm, user_va, size);
if (status != NV_OK) {
nv_mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
goto fail;
}
nv_mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
ret = NV_PIN_USER_PAGES(user_va, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, *pages, vmas);
ret = NV_PIN_USER_PAGES(user_va, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, *pages, NULL);
nv_mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
if (ret != num_pages) {
status = NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++) {
if (page_count((*pages)[i]) > MAX_PAGE_COUNT || uvm_file_is_nvidia_uvm(vmas[i]->vm_file)) {
if (page_count((*pages)[i]) > MAX_PAGE_COUNT) {
status = NV_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
@ -279,15 +304,12 @@ static NV_STATUS map_user_pages(NvU64 user_va, NvU64 size, void **addr, struct p
if (*addr == NULL)
goto fail;
uvm_kvfree(vmas);
return NV_OK;
fail:
if (*pages == NULL)
return status;
uvm_kvfree(vmas);
if (ret > 0)
uvm_put_user_pages_dirty(*pages, ret);
else if (ret < 0)

View File

@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ static NV_STATUS test_tracker_completion(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
gpu = uvm_va_space_find_first_gpu(va_space);
TEST_CHECK_RET(gpu != NULL);
// TODO: Bug 4008734: [UVM][HCC] Extend secure tracking semaphore mechanism
// to all semaphore
// This test allocates semaphore in vidmem and then releases it from the CPU
// SEC2 channels cannot target semaphores in vidmem. Moreover, CPU cannot
// directly release values to vidmem for CE channels.
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu))
return NV_OK;
TEST_NV_CHECK_RET(uvm_gpu_semaphore_alloc(gpu->semaphore_pool, &sema));
uvm_tracker_init(&tracker);

View File

@ -2083,12 +2083,6 @@ static uvm_processor_id_t block_page_get_closest_resident_in_mask(uvm_va_block_t
return id;
}
// HMM va_blocks don't know if a page is CPU resident until either
// migrate_vma_setup() or hmm_range_fault() is called. If a page isn't
// resident anywhere, assume it is CPU resident.
if (uvm_va_block_is_hmm(va_block))
return UVM_ID_CPU;
return UVM_ID_INVALID;
}
@ -2888,7 +2882,7 @@ static uvm_va_block_region_t block_phys_contig_region(uvm_va_block_t *block,
{
if (UVM_ID_IS_CPU(resident_id)) {
uvm_cpu_chunk_t *chunk = uvm_cpu_chunk_get_chunk_for_page(block, page_index);
return uvm_va_block_region(page_index, page_index + uvm_cpu_chunk_num_pages(chunk));
return uvm_cpu_chunk_block_region(block, chunk, page_index);
}
else {
uvm_chunk_size_t chunk_size;
@ -3061,7 +3055,7 @@ static NV_STATUS conf_computing_copy_pages_finish(uvm_va_block_t *block,
void *auth_tag_buffer_base = uvm_mem_get_cpu_addr_kernel(dma_buffer->auth_tag);
void *staging_buffer_base = uvm_mem_get_cpu_addr_kernel(dma_buffer->alloc);
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel));
UVM_ASSERT(uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(push->gpu));
if (UVM_ID_IS_GPU(copy_state->dst.id))
return NV_OK;
@ -3112,7 +3106,7 @@ static void block_copy_push(uvm_va_block_t *block,
uvm_push_set_flag(push, UVM_PUSH_FLAG_NEXT_MEMBAR_NONE);
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel)) {
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(gpu)) {
if (UVM_ID_IS_CPU(copy_state->src.id))
conf_computing_block_copy_push_cpu_to_gpu(block, copy_state, region, push);
else
@ -3140,19 +3134,18 @@ static NV_STATUS block_copy_end_push(uvm_va_block_t *block,
// at that point.
uvm_push_end(push);
if ((push_status == NV_OK) && uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel))
if ((push_status == NV_OK) && uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(push->gpu))
push_status = conf_computing_copy_pages_finish(block, copy_state, push);
tracker_status = uvm_tracker_add_push_safe(copy_tracker, push);
if (push_status == NV_OK)
push_status = tracker_status;
if (uvm_channel_is_secure(push->channel)) {
uvm_gpu_t *gpu = uvm_push_get_gpu(push);
if (uvm_conf_computing_mode_enabled(push->gpu)) {
uvm_tracker_t local_tracker = UVM_TRACKER_INIT();
uvm_tracker_overwrite_with_push(&local_tracker, push);
uvm_conf_computing_dma_buffer_free(&gpu->conf_computing.dma_buffer_pool,
uvm_conf_computing_dma_buffer_free(&push->gpu->conf_computing.dma_buffer_pool,
copy_state->dma_buffer,
&local_tracker);
copy_state->dma_buffer = NULL;
@ -7189,6 +7182,7 @@ static NV_STATUS block_map_gpu_to(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
}
static void map_get_allowed_destinations(uvm_va_block_t *block,
uvm_va_block_context_t *va_block_context,
const uvm_va_policy_t *policy,
uvm_processor_id_t id,
uvm_processor_mask_t *allowed_mask)
@ -7200,7 +7194,10 @@ static void map_get_allowed_destinations(uvm_va_block_t *block,
uvm_processor_mask_zero(allowed_mask);
uvm_processor_mask_set(allowed_mask, policy->preferred_location);
}
else if ((uvm_va_policy_is_read_duplicate(policy, va_space) || uvm_id_equal(policy->preferred_location, id)) &&
else if ((uvm_va_policy_is_read_duplicate(policy, va_space) ||
(uvm_id_equal(policy->preferred_location, id) &&
!is_uvm_fault_force_sysmem_set() &&
!uvm_hmm_must_use_sysmem(block, va_block_context))) &&
uvm_va_space_processor_has_memory(va_space, id)) {
// When operating under read-duplication we should only map the local
// processor to cause fault-and-duplicate of remote pages.
@ -7285,7 +7282,7 @@ NV_STATUS uvm_va_block_map(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
// Map per resident location so we can more easily detect physically-
// contiguous mappings.
map_get_allowed_destinations(va_block, va_block_context->policy, id, &allowed_destinations);
map_get_allowed_destinations(va_block, va_block_context, va_block_context->policy, id, &allowed_destinations);
for_each_closest_id(resident_id, &allowed_destinations, id, va_space) {
if (UVM_ID_IS_CPU(id)) {
@ -9614,15 +9611,9 @@ static uvm_prot_t compute_new_permission(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
if (uvm_processor_mask_empty(&revoke_processors))
new_prot = UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE;
}
if (logical_prot == UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE_ATOMIC) {
// HMM allocations with logical read/write/atomic permission can be
// upgraded without notifying the driver so assume read/write/atomic
// even if the fault is only for reading.
if (new_prot == UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE ||
(UVM_ID_IS_CPU(fault_processor_id) && uvm_va_block_is_hmm(va_block))) {
if (uvm_processor_mask_test(&va_space->has_native_atomics[uvm_id_value(new_residency)], fault_processor_id))
new_prot = UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE_ATOMIC;
}
if (logical_prot == UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE_ATOMIC && new_prot == UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE) {
if (uvm_processor_mask_test(&va_space->has_native_atomics[uvm_id_value(new_residency)], fault_processor_id))
new_prot = UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE_ATOMIC;
}
return new_prot;
@ -9859,8 +9850,6 @@ out:
return status == NV_OK ? tracker_status : status;
}
// TODO: Bug 1750144: check logical permissions from HMM to know what's the
// maximum allowed.
uvm_prot_t uvm_va_block_page_compute_highest_permission(uvm_va_block_t *va_block,
uvm_processor_id_t processor_id,
uvm_page_index_t page_index)
@ -9937,14 +9926,18 @@ uvm_prot_t uvm_va_block_page_compute_highest_permission(uvm_va_block_t *va_block
// Exclude the processor for which the mapping protections are being computed
uvm_processor_mask_clear(&write_mappings, processor_id);
// At this point, any processor with atomic mappings either has native atomics support to the
// processor with the resident copy or has disabled system-wide atomics. If the requesting
// processor has disabled system-wide atomics or has native atomics to that processor, we can
// map with ATOMIC privileges. Likewise, if there are no other processors with WRITE or ATOMIC
// mappings, we can map with ATOMIC privileges.
// At this point, any processor with atomic mappings either has native
// atomics support to the processor with the resident copy or has
// disabled system-wide atomics. If the requesting processor has
// disabled system-wide atomics or has native atomics to that processor,
// we can map with ATOMIC privileges. Likewise, if there are no other
// processors with WRITE or ATOMIC mappings, we can map with ATOMIC
// privileges. For HMM, don't allow GPU atomic access to remote mapped
// system memory even if there are no write mappings since CPU access
// can be upgraded without notification.
if (!uvm_processor_mask_test(&va_space->system_wide_atomics_enabled_processors, processor_id) ||
uvm_processor_mask_test(&va_space->has_native_atomics[uvm_id_value(residency)], processor_id) ||
uvm_processor_mask_empty(&write_mappings)) {
(uvm_processor_mask_empty(&write_mappings) && !uvm_va_block_is_hmm(va_block))) {
return UVM_PROT_READ_WRITE_ATOMIC;
}

View File

@ -418,15 +418,6 @@ void uvm_va_space_destroy(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
uvm_global_processor_mask_t retained_gpus;
LIST_HEAD(deferred_free_list);
// Normally we'd expect this to happen as part of uvm_mm_release()
// but if userspace never initialized uvm_mm_fd that won't happen.
// We don't have to take the va_space_mm spinlock and update state
// here because we know no other thread can be in or subsequently
// call uvm_api_mm_initialize successfully because the UVM
// file-descriptor has been released.
if (va_space->va_space_mm.state == UVM_VA_SPACE_MM_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)
uvm_va_space_mm_unregister(va_space);
// Remove the VA space from the global list before we start tearing things
// down so other threads can't see the VA space in a partially-valid state.
uvm_mutex_lock(&g_uvm_global.va_spaces.lock);
@ -532,7 +523,14 @@ void uvm_va_space_destroy(uvm_va_space_t *va_space)
uvm_deferred_free_object_list(&deferred_free_list);
// MM FD teardown should already have destroyed va_space_mm
// Normally we'd expect this to happen as part of uvm_mm_release()
// but if userspace never initialized uvm_mm_fd that won't happen.
// We don't have to take the va_space_mm spinlock and update state
// here because we know no other thread can be in or subsequently
// call uvm_api_mm_initialize successfully because the UVM
// file-descriptor has been released.
if (va_space->va_space_mm.state == UVM_VA_SPACE_MM_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)
uvm_va_space_mm_unregister(va_space);
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_va_space_mm_alive(&va_space->va_space_mm));
uvm_mutex_lock(&g_uvm_global.global_lock);

View File

@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
#include "uvm_global.h"
#include "uvm_gpu.h"
#include "uvm_hal.h"
#include "uvm_push.h"
#include "uvm_conf_computing.h"
#include "nv_uvm_types.h"
#include "hwref/volta/gv100/dev_fault.h"
#include "hwref/volta/gv100/dev_fb.h"
#include "clc369.h"
@ -246,6 +247,20 @@ static NvU32 *get_fault_buffer_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index)
return fault_entry;
}
// See uvm_pascal_fault_buffer.c::get_fault_buffer_entry_metadata
static UvmFaultMetadataPacket *get_fault_buffer_entry_metadata(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu, NvU32 index)
{
UvmFaultMetadataPacket *fault_entry_metadata;
UVM_ASSERT(index < parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.replayable.max_faults);
UVM_ASSERT(!uvm_parent_gpu_replayable_fault_buffer_is_uvm_owned(parent_gpu));
fault_entry_metadata = parent_gpu->fault_buffer_info.rm_info.replayable.bufferMetadata;
UVM_ASSERT(fault_entry_metadata != NULL);
return fault_entry_metadata + index;
}
static void parse_fault_entry_common(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 *fault_entry,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
@ -323,24 +338,47 @@ static void parse_fault_entry_common(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
UVM_ASSERT_MSG(replayable_fault_enabled, "Fault with REPLAYABLE_FAULT_EN bit unset\n");
}
void uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
NV_STATUS uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,
NvU32 index,
uvm_fault_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry)
{
fault_buffer_entry_c369_t entry;
NvU32 *fault_entry;
BUILD_BUG_ON(NVC369_BUF_SIZE > UVM_GPU_MMU_MAX_FAULT_PACKET_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(entry) > UVM_GPU_MMU_MAX_FAULT_PACKET_SIZE);
// Valid bit must be set before this function is called
UVM_ASSERT(parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_is_valid(parent_gpu, index));
fault_entry = get_fault_buffer_entry(parent_gpu, index);
// When Confidential Computing is enabled, faults are encrypted by RM, so
// they need to be decrypted before they can be parsed
if (!uvm_parent_gpu_replayable_fault_buffer_is_uvm_owned(parent_gpu)) {
NV_STATUS status;
UvmFaultMetadataPacket *fault_entry_metadata = get_fault_buffer_entry_metadata(parent_gpu, index);
status = uvm_conf_computing_fault_decrypt(parent_gpu,
&entry,
fault_entry,
fault_entry_metadata->authTag,
fault_entry_metadata->valid);
if (status != NV_OK) {
uvm_global_set_fatal_error(status);
return status;
}
fault_entry = (NvU32 *) &entry;
}
parse_fault_entry_common(parent_gpu, fault_entry, buffer_entry);
UVM_ASSERT(buffer_entry->is_replayable);
// Automatically clear valid bit for the entry in the fault buffer
parent_gpu->fault_buffer_hal->entry_clear_valid(parent_gpu, index);
return NV_OK;
}
void uvm_hal_volta_fault_buffer_parse_non_replayable_entry(uvm_parent_gpu_t *parent_gpu,

View File

@ -939,6 +939,12 @@ nvswitch_os_get_os_version
NvU32 *pBuildNum
);
NvlStatus
nvswitch_os_get_pid
(
NvU32 *pPid
);
void
nvswitch_lib_smbpbi_log_sxid
(

View File

@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_AEAD_H
#define CRYPTLIB_AEAD_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Authenticated Encryption with Associated data (AEAD) Cryptography Primitives
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_AEAD_GCM_SUPPORT
/**
* Performs AEAD AES-GCM authenticated encryption on a data buffer and additional authenticated
* data.
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 16 or 32, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be encrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] tag_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the authentication tag output.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the encryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD AES-GCM authenticated encryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD AES-GCM authenticated encryption failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag_out, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
/**
* Performs AEAD AES-GCM authenticated decryption on a data buffer and additional authenticated
* data.
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 16 or 32, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* If data verification fails, false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be decrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] tag Pointer to a buffer that contains the authentication tag.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the decryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD AES-GCM authenticated decryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD AES-GCM authenticated decryption failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_AEAD_GCM_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SUPPORT
/**
* Performs AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated encryption on a data buffer and additional
* authenticated data.
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 32, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be encrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] tag_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the authentication tag output.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the encryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated encryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated encryption failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt(
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, const uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_size, const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size, uint8_t *tag_out,
size_t tag_size, uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
/**
* Performs AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated decryption on a data buffer and additional authenticated data (AAD).
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 32, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* If data verification fails, false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be decrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] tag Pointer to a buffer that contains the authentication tag.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the decryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated decryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD ChaCha20Poly1305 authenticated decryption failed.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_chacha20_poly1305_decrypt(
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, const uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_size, const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size, const uint8_t *tag,
size_t tag_size, uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_AEAD_SM4_SUPPORT
/**
* Performs AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated encryption on a data buffer and additional authenticated
* data.
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be encrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] tag_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the authentication tag output.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the encryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated encryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated encryption failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_sm4_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag_out, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
/**
* Performs AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated decryption on a data buffer and additional authenticated
* data.
*
* iv_size must be 12, otherwise false is returned.
* key_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
* tag_size must be 16, otherwise false is returned.
*
* If data verification fails, false is returned.
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the encryption key.
* @param[in] key_size Size of the encryption key in bytes.
* @param[in] iv Pointer to the IV value.
* @param[in] iv_size Size of the IV value in bytes.
* @param[in] a_data Pointer to the additional authenticated data.
* @param[in] a_data_size Size of the additional authenticated data in bytes.
* @param[in] data_in Pointer to the input data buffer to be decrypted.
* @param[in] data_in_size Size of the input data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] tag Pointer to a buffer that contains the authentication tag.
* @param[in] tag_size Size of the authentication tag in bytes.
* @param[out] data_out Pointer to a buffer that receives the decryption output.
* @param[out] data_out_size Size of the output data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated decryption succeeded.
* @retval false AEAD SM4-GCM authenticated decryption failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_aead_sm4_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_AEAD_SM4_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_AEAD_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_CERT_H
#define CRYPTLIB_CERT_H
/**
* Retrieve the tag and length of the tag.
*
* @param ptr The position in the ASN.1 data.
* @param end End of data.
* @param length The variable that will receive the length.
* @param tag The expected tag.
*
* @retval true Get tag successful.
* @retval false Failed to get tag or tag not match.
**/
extern bool libspdm_asn1_get_tag(uint8_t **ptr, const uint8_t *end, size_t *length, uint32_t tag);
/**
* Retrieve the subject bytes from one X.509 certificate.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If subject_size is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] cert_subject Pointer to the retrieved certificate subject bytes.
* @param[in, out] subject_size The size in bytes of the cert_subject buffer on input,
* and the size of buffer returned cert_subject on output.
*
* @retval true The certificate subject retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Invalid certificate, or the subject_size is too small for the result.
* The subject_size will be updated with the required size.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_subject_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *cert_subject,
size_t *subject_size);
/**
* Retrieve the version from one X.509 certificate.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If cert_size is 0, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] version Pointer to the retrieved version integer.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_version(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size, size_t *version);
/**
* Retrieve the serialNumber from one X.509 certificate.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If cert_size is 0, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] serial_number Pointer to the retrieved certificate serial_number bytes.
* @param[in, out] serial_number_size The size in bytes of the serial_number buffer on input,
* and the size of buffer returned serial_number on output.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_serial_number(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *serial_number,
size_t *serial_number_size);
/**
* Retrieve the issuer bytes from one X.509 certificate.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If issuer_size is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] cert_issuer Pointer to the retrieved certificate subject bytes.
* @param[in, out] issuer_size The size in bytes of the cert_issuer buffer on input,
* and the size of buffer returned cert_issuer on output.
*
* @retval true The certificate issuer retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Invalid certificate, or the issuer_size is too small for the result.
* The issuer_size will be updated with the required size.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_issuer_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *cert_issuer,
size_t *issuer_size);
/**
* Retrieve Extension data from one X.509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[in] oid Object identifier buffer
* @param[in] oid_size Object identifier buffer size
* @param[out] extension_data Extension bytes.
* @param[in, out] extension_data_size Extension bytes size.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_extension_data(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
const uint8_t *oid, size_t oid_size,
uint8_t *extension_data,
size_t *extension_data_size);
/**
* Retrieve the Validity from one X.509 certificate
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If CertIssuerSize is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] from notBefore Pointer to date_time object.
* @param[in,out] from_size notBefore date_time object size.
* @param[out] to notAfter Pointer to date_time object.
* @param[in,out] to_size notAfter date_time object size.
*
* Note: libspdm_x509_compare_date_time to compare date_time oject
* x509SetDateTime to get a date_time object from a date_time_str
*
* @retval true The certificate Validity retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Invalid certificate, or Validity retrieve failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_validity(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *from, size_t *from_size, uint8_t *to,
size_t *to_size);
/**
* Format a date_time object into DataTime buffer
*
* If date_time_str is NULL, then return false.
* If date_time_size is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] date_time_str date_time string like YYYYMMDDhhmmssZ
* Ref: https://www.w3.org/TR/NOTE-datetime
* Z stand for UTC time
* @param[out] date_time Pointer to a date_time object.
* @param[in,out] date_time_size date_time object buffer size.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_set_date_time(const char *date_time_str, void *date_time,
size_t *date_time_size);
/**
* Compare date_time1 object and date_time2 object.
*
* If date_time1 is NULL, then return -2.
* If date_time2 is NULL, then return -2.
* If date_time1 == date_time2, then return 0
* If date_time1 > date_time2, then return 1
* If date_time1 < date_time2, then return -1
*
* @param[in] date_time1 Pointer to a date_time Ojbect
* @param[in] date_time2 Pointer to a date_time Object
*
* @retval 0 If date_time1 == date_time2
* @retval 1 If date_time1 > date_time2
* @retval -1 If date_time1 < date_time2
**/
extern int32_t libspdm_x509_compare_date_time(const void *date_time1, const void *date_time2);
/**
* Retrieve the key usage from one X.509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] usage Key usage (LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_*)
*
* @retval true The certificate key usage retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Invalid certificate, or usage is NULL
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size, size_t *usage);
/**
* Retrieve the Extended key usage from one X.509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] usage Key usage bytes.
* @param[in, out] usage_size Key usage buffer sizs in bytes.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_extended_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert,
size_t cert_size, uint8_t *usage,
size_t *usage_size);
/**
* Retrieve the basic constraints from one X.509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] basic_constraints Basic constraints bytes.
* @param[in, out] basic_constraints_size Basic constraints buffer sizs in bytes.
*
* @retval true
* @retval false
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_extended_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert,
size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *basic_constraints,
size_t *basic_constraints_size);
/**
* Verify one X509 certificate was issued by the trusted CA.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If ca_cert is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate to be verified.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[in] ca_cert Pointer to the DER-encoded trusted CA certificate.
* @param[in] ca_cert_size Size of the CA Certificate in bytes.
*
* @retval true The certificate was issued by the trusted CA.
* @retval false Invalid certificate or the certificate was not issued by the given
* trusted CA.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_verify_cert(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
const uint8_t *ca_cert, size_t ca_cert_size);
/**
* Verify one X509 certificate was issued by the trusted CA.
*
* @param[in] cert_chain One or more ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 certificates
* where the first certificate is signed by the Root
* Certificate or is the Root Cerificate itself. and
* subsequent cerificate is signed by the preceding
* cerificate.
* @param[in] cert_chain_length Total length of the certificate chain, in bytes.
*
* @param[in] root_cert Trusted Root Certificate buffer.
*
* @param[in] root_cert_length Trusted Root Certificate buffer length.
*
* @retval true All cerificates were issued by the first certificate in X509Certchain.
* @retval false Invalid certificate or the certificate was not issued by the given
* trusted CA.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain(const uint8_t *root_cert, size_t root_cert_length,
const uint8_t *cert_chain,
size_t cert_chain_length);
/**
* Get one X509 certificate from cert_chain.
*
* @param[in] cert_chain One or more ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 certificates
* where the first certificate is signed by the Root
* Certificate or is the Root Cerificate itself. and
* subsequent cerificate is signed by the preceding
* cerificate.
* @param[in] cert_chain_length Total length of the certificate chain, in bytes.
*
* @param[in] cert_index Index of certificate. If index is -1 indecate the
* last certificate in cert_chain.
*
* @param[out] cert The certificate at the index of cert_chain.
* @param[out] cert_length The length certificate at the index of cert_chain.
*
* @retval true Success.
* @retval false Failed to get certificate from certificate chain.
**/
extern bool libspdm_x509_get_cert_from_cert_chain(const uint8_t *cert_chain,
size_t cert_chain_length,
const int32_t cert_index, const uint8_t **cert,
size_t *cert_length);
#if (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
/**
* Retrieve the RSA public key from one DER-encoded X509 certificate.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] rsa_context Pointer to new-generated RSA context which contain the retrieved
* RSA public key component. Use libspdm_rsa_free() function to free the
* resource.
*
* @retval true RSA public key was retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Fail to retrieve RSA public key from X509 certificate.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **rsa_context);
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */
#if LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT
/**
* Retrieve the EC public key from one DER-encoded X509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] ec_context Pointer to new-generated EC DSA context which contain the retrieved
* EC public key component. Use libspdm_ec_free() function to free the
* resource.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If ec_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @retval true EC public key was retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Fail to retrieve EC public key from X509 certificate.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_ec_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **ec_context);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT */
#if (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT)
/**
* Retrieve the Ed public key from one DER-encoded X509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] ecd_context Pointer to new-generated Ed DSA context which contain the retrieved
* Ed public key component. Use libspdm_ecd_free() function to free the
* resource.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If ecd_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @retval true Ed public key was retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Fail to retrieve Ed public key from X509 certificate.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_ecd_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **ecd_context);
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT) */
#if LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT
/**
* Retrieve the sm2 public key from one DER-encoded X509 certificate.
*
* @param[in] cert Pointer to the DER-encoded X509 certificate.
* @param[in] cert_size Size of the X509 certificate in bytes.
* @param[out] sm2_context Pointer to new-generated sm2 context which contain the retrieved
* sm2 public key component. Use sm2_free() function to free the
* resource.
*
* If cert is NULL, then return false.
* If sm2_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @retval true sm2 public key was retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Fail to retrieve sm2 public key from X509 certificate.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **sm2_context);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_GET_CSR_CAP
/**
* Generate a CSR.
*
* @param[in] hash_nid hash algo for sign
* @param[in] asym_nid asym algo for sign
*
* @param[in] requester_info requester info to gen CSR
* @param[in] requester_info_length The len of requester info
*
* @param[in] context Pointer to asymmetric context
* @param[in] subject_name Subject name: should be break with ',' in the middle
* example: "C=AA,CN=BB"
*
* Subject names should contain a comma-separated list of OID types and values:
* The valid OID type name is in:
* {"CN", "commonName", "C", "countryName", "O", "organizationName","L",
* "OU", "organizationalUnitName", "ST", "stateOrProvinceName", "emailAddress",
* "serialNumber", "postalAddress", "postalCode", "dnQualifier", "title",
* "SN","givenName","GN", "initials", "pseudonym", "generationQualifier", "domainComponent", "DC"}.
* Note: The object of C and countryName should be CSR Supported Country Codes
*
* @param[in] csr_len For input, csr_len is the size of store CSR buffer.
* For output, csr_len is CSR len for DER format
* @param[in] csr_pointer For input, csr_pointer is buffer address to store CSR.
* For output, csr_pointer is address for stored CSR.
* The csr_pointer address will be changed.
*
* @retval true Success.
* @retval false Failed to gen CSR.
**/
extern bool libspdm_gen_x509_csr(size_t hash_nid, size_t asym_nid,
uint8_t *requester_info, size_t requester_info_length,
void *context, char *subject_name,
size_t *csr_len, uint8_t **csr_pointer);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_GET_CSR_CAP */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_CERT_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_DH_H
#define CRYPTLIB_DH_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Primitives
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_FFDHE_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one Diffie-Hellman context for subsequent use with the NID.
*
* @param nid cipher NID
*
* @return Pointer to the Diffie-Hellman context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_dh_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
* If the interface is not supported, libspdm_dh_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_dh_new_by_nid(size_t nid);
/**
* Release the specified DH context.
*
* @param[in] dh_context Pointer to the DH context to be released.
**/
void libspdm_dh_free(void *dh_context);
/**
* Generates DH public key.
*
* This function generates random secret exponent, and computes the public key, which is
* returned via parameter public_key and public_key_size. DH context is updated accordingly.
* If the public_key buffer is too small to hold the public key, false is returned and
* public_key_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the public key.
*
* If dh_context is NULL, then return false.
* If public_key_size is NULL, then return false.
* If public_key_size is large enough but public_key is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* For FFDHE2048, the public_size is 256.
* For FFDHE3072, the public_size is 384.
* For FFDHE4096, the public_size is 512.
*
* @param[in, out] dh_context Pointer to the DH context.
* @param[out] public_key Pointer to the buffer to receive generated public key.
* @param[in, out] public_key_size On input, the size of public_key buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in public_key buffer in
* bytes.
*
* @retval true DH public key generation succeeded.
* @retval false DH public key generation failed.
* @retval false public_key_size is not large enough.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_dh_generate_key(void *dh_context, uint8_t *public_key, size_t *public_key_size);
/**
* Computes exchanged common key.
*
* Given peer's public key, this function computes the exchanged common key, based on its own
* context including value of prime modulus and random secret exponent.
*
* If dh_context is NULL, then return false.
* If peer_public_key is NULL, then return false.
* If key_size is NULL, then return false.
* If key is NULL, then return false.
* If key_size is not large enough, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* For FFDHE2048, the peer_public_size and key_size is 256.
* For FFDHE3072, the peer_public_size and key_size is 384.
* For FFDHE4096, the peer_public_size and key_size is 512.
*
* @param[in, out] dh_context Pointer to the DH context.
* @param[in] peer_public_key Pointer to the peer's public key.
* @param[in] peer_public_key_size size of peer's public key in bytes.
* @param[out] key Pointer to the buffer to receive generated key.
* @param[in, out] key_size On input, the size of key buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in key buffer in
* bytes.
*
* @retval true DH exchanged key generation succeeded.
* @retval false DH exchanged key generation failed.
* @retval false key_size is not large enough.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_dh_compute_key(void *dh_context, const uint8_t *peer_public_key,
size_t peer_public_key_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_FFDHE_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_DH_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_EC_H
#define CRYPTLIB_EC_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Elliptic Curve Primitives
*=====================================================================================*/
#if (LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT)
/**
* Allocates and Initializes one Elliptic Curve context for subsequent use with the NID.
*
* @param nid cipher NID
*
* @return Pointer to the Elliptic Curve context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_ec_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_ec_new_by_nid(size_t nid);
/**
* Release the specified EC context.
*
* @param[in] ec_context Pointer to the EC context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_ec_free(void *ec_context);
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT) */
#if LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT
/**
* Generates EC key and returns EC public key (X, Y).
*
* This function generates random secret, and computes the public key (X, Y), which is
* returned via parameter public, public_size.
* X is the first half of public with size being public_size / 2,
* Y is the second half of public with size being public_size / 2.
* EC context is updated accordingly.
* If the public buffer is too small to hold the public X, Y, false is returned and
* public_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the public X, Y.
*
* For P-256, the public_size is 64. first 32-byte is X, second 32-byte is Y.
* For P-384, the public_size is 96. first 48-byte is X, second 48-byte is Y.
* For P-521, the public_size is 132. first 66-byte is X, second 66-byte is Y.
*
* If ec_context is NULL, then return false.
* If public_size is NULL, then return false.
* If public_size is large enough but public is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] ec_context Pointer to the EC context.
* @param[out] public Pointer to the buffer to receive generated public X,Y.
* @param[in, out] public_size On input, the size of public buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in public buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true EC public X,Y generation succeeded.
* @retval false EC public X,Y generation failed.
* @retval false public_size is not large enough.
**/
extern bool libspdm_ec_generate_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_key, size_t *public_key_size);
/**
* Computes exchanged common key.
*
* Given peer's public key (X, Y), this function computes the exchanged common key,
* based on its own context including value of curve parameter and random secret.
* X is the first half of peer_public with size being peer_public_size / 2,
* Y is the second half of peer_public with size being peer_public_size / 2.
*
* If ec_context is NULL, then return false.
* If peer_public is NULL, then return false.
* If peer_public_size is 0, then return false.
* If key is NULL, then return false.
* If key_size is not large enough, then return false.
*
* For P-256, the peer_public_size is 64. first 32-byte is X, second 32-byte is Y.
* The key_size is 32.
* For P-384, the peer_public_size is 96. first 48-byte is X, second 48-byte is Y.
* The key_size is 48.
* For P-521, the peer_public_size is 132. first 66-byte is X, second 66-byte is Y.
* The key_size is 66.
*
* @param[in, out] ec_context Pointer to the EC context.
* @param[in] peer_public Pointer to the peer's public X,Y.
* @param[in] peer_public_size Size of peer's public X,Y in bytes.
* @param[out] key Pointer to the buffer to receive generated key.
* @param[in, out] key_size On input, the size of key buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in key buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true EC exchanged key generation succeeded.
* @retval false EC exchanged key generation failed.
* @retval false key_size is not large enough.
**/
extern bool libspdm_ec_compute_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *peer_public,
size_t peer_public_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT
/**
* Carries out the EC-DSA signature.
*
* This function carries out the EC-DSA signature.
* If the signature buffer is too small to hold the contents of signature, false
* is returned and sig_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the signature.
*
* If ec_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. hash_nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256,
* SHA3_384, SHA3_512.
* If sig_size is large enough but signature is NULL, then return false.
*
* For P-256, the sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
* For P-384, the sig_size is 96. first 48-byte is R, second 48-byte is S.
* For P-521, the sig_size is 132. first 66-byte is R, second 66-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] ec_context Pointer to EC context for signature generation.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be signed.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[out] signature Pointer to buffer to receive EC-DSA signature.
* @param[in, out] sig_size On input, the size of signature buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in signature buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true signature successfully generated in EC-DSA.
* @retval false signature generation failed.
* @retval false sig_size is too small.
**/
extern bool libspdm_ecdsa_sign(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
uint8_t *signature, size_t *sig_size);
/**
* Verifies the EC-DSA signature.
*
* If ec_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If signature is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. hash_nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256,
* SHA3_384, SHA3_512.
*
* For P-256, the sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
* For P-384, the sig_size is 96. first 48-byte is R, second 48-byte is S.
* For P-521, the sig_size is 132. first 66-byte is R, second 66-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] ec_context Pointer to EC context for signature verification.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be checked.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[in] signature Pointer to EC-DSA signature to be verified.
* @param[in] sig_size Size of signature in bytes.
*
* @retval true Valid signature encoded in EC-DSA.
* @retval false Invalid signature or invalid EC context.
**/
extern bool libspdm_ecdsa_verify(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_EC_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_ECD_H
#define CRYPTLIB_ECD_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Edwards-Curve Primitives
*=====================================================================================*/
#if (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT)
/**
* Allocates and Initializes one Edwards-Curve context for subsequent use with the NID.
*
* @param nid cipher NID
*
* @return Pointer to the Edwards-Curve context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_ecd_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_ecd_new_by_nid(size_t nid);
/**
* Release the specified Ed context.
*
* @param[in] ecd_context Pointer to the Ed context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_ecd_free(void *ecd_context);
/**
* Carries out the Ed-DSA signature.
*
* This function carries out the Ed-DSA signature.
* If the signature buffer is too small to hold the contents of signature, false
* is returned and sig_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the signature.
*
* If ecd_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message is NULL, then return false.
* hash_nid must be NULL.
* If sig_size is large enough but signature is NULL, then return false.
*
* For ed25519, context must be NULL and context_size must be 0.
* For ed448, context must be maximum of 255 octets.
*
* For ed25519, the sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
* For ed448, the sig_size is 114. first 57-byte is R, second 57-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] ecd_context Pointer to Ed context for signature generation.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] context The EDDSA signing context.
* @param[in] context_size Size of EDDSA signing context.
* @param[in] message Pointer to octet message to be signed (before hash).
* @param[in] size size of the message in bytes.
* @param[out] signature Pointer to buffer to receive Ed-DSA signature.
* @param[in, out] sig_size On input, the size of signature buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in signature buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true signature successfully generated in Ed-DSA.
* @retval false signature generation failed.
* @retval false sig_size is too small.
**/
extern bool libspdm_eddsa_sign(const void *ecd_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_size,
const uint8_t *message, size_t size, uint8_t *signature,
size_t *sig_size);
/**
* Verifies the Ed-DSA signature.
*
* If ecd_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message is NULL, then return false.
* If signature is NULL, then return false.
* hash_nid must be NULL.
*
* For ed25519, context must be NULL and context_size must be 0.
* For ed448, context must be maximum of 255 octets.
*
* For ed25519, the sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
* For ed448, the sig_size is 114. first 57-byte is R, second 57-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] ecd_context Pointer to Ed context for signature verification.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] context The EDDSA signing context.
* @param[in] context_size Size of EDDSA signing context.
* @param[in] message Pointer to octet message to be checked (before hash).
* @param[in] size Size of the message in bytes.
* @param[in] signature Pointer to Ed-DSA signature to be verified.
* @param[in] sig_size Size of signature in bytes.
*
* @retval true Valid signature encoded in Ed-DSA.
* @retval false Invalid signature or invalid Ed context.
**/
extern bool libspdm_eddsa_verify(const void *ecd_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *context, size_t context_size,
const uint8_t *message, size_t size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size);
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT) */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_ECD_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_HASH_H
#define CRYPTLIB_HASH_H
/* SHA-256 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
/* SHA-384 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE 48
/* SHA-512 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE 64
/* SHA3-256 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
/* SHA3-384 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE 48
/* SHA3-512 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE 64
/* SM3_256 digest size in bytes. */
#define LIBSPDM_SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
/*=====================================================================================
* One-way cryptographic hash SHA2 primitives.
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA-256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, sha256_new() returns NULL. *
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha256_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha256_free(void *sha256_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed to by sha256_context as SHA-256 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha256_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha256_context Pointer to SHA-256 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA-256 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-256 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha256_init(void *sha256_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA-256 context.
*
* If sha256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha256_context Pointer to SHA-256 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha256_context Pointer to new SHA-256 context.
*
* @retval true SHA-256 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-256 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha256_duplicate(const void *sha256_context, void *new_sha256_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA-256 context.
*
* This function performs SHA-256 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA-256 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha256_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha256_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha256_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha256_context Pointer to the SHA-256 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA-256 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-256 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha256_update(void *sha256_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA-256 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA-256 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA-256 context cannot
* be used again. SHA-256 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha256_init(),
* and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha256_final(). Behavior with invalid SHA-256 context
* is undefined.
*
* If sha256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha256_context Pointer to the SHA-256 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-256 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha256_final(void *sha256_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA-256 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA-256 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-256 digest value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha256_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA-384 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sha384_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha384_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha384_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha384_free(void *sha384_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed to by sha384_context as SHA-384 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha384_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha384_context Pointer to SHA-384 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA-384 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-384 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha384_init(void *sha384_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA-384 context.
*
* If sha384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha384_context Pointer to SHA-384 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha384_context Pointer to new SHA-384 context.
*
* @retval true SHA-384 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-384 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha384_duplicate(const void *sha384_context, void *new_sha384_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA-384 context.
*
* This function performs SHA-384 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA-384 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha384_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha384_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha384_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha384_context Pointer to the SHA-384 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA-384 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-384 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha384_update(void *sha384_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA-384 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA-384 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA-384 context cannot
* be used again. SHA-384 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha384_init(),
* and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha384_final(). Behavior with invalid SHA-384 context
* is undefined.
*
* If sha384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha384_context Pointer to the SHA-384 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-384 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha384_final(void *sha384_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA-384 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA-384 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-384 digest value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha384_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA-512 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sha512_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha512_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha512_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha512_free(void *sha512_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by sha512_context as SHA-512 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha512_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha512_context Pointer to SHA-512 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA-512 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-512 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha512_init(void *sha512_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA-512 context.
*
* If sha512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha512_context Pointer to SHA-512 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha512_context Pointer to new SHA-512 context.
*
* @retval true SHA-512 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-512 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha512_duplicate(const void *sha512_context, void *new_sha512_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA-512 context.
*
* This function performs SHA-512 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA-512 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha512_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha512_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha512_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha512_context Pointer to the SHA-512 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA-512 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-512 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha512_update(void *sha512_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA-512 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA-512 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA-512 context cannot
* be used again. SHA-512 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha512_init(),
* and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha512_final(). Behavior with invalid SHA-512 context
* is undefined.
*
* If sha512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha512_context Pointer to the SHA-512 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-512 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha512_final(void *sha512_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA-512 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA-512 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA-512 digest value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA-512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha512_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT */
/*=====================================================================================
* One-way cryptographic hash SHA3 primitives.
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA3-256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sha3_256_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha3_256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha3_256_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha3_256_free(void *sha3_256_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by sha3_256_context as SHA3-256 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha3_256_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha3_256_context Pointer to SHA3-256 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA3-256 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-256 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_256_init(void *sha3_256_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA3-256 context.
*
* If sha3_256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha3_256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha3_256_context Pointer to SHA3-256 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha3_256_context Pointer to new SHA3-256 context.
*
* @retval true SHA3-256 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-256 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_256_duplicate(const void *sha3_256_context, void *new_sha3_256_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA3-256 context.
*
* This function performs SHA3-256 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA3-256 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha3_256_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_256_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_256_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_256_context Pointer to the SHA3-256 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA3-256 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-256 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_256_update(void *sha3_256_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA3-256 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA3-256 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA3-512 context cannot
* be used again. SHA3-256 context should be already correctly initialized by
* libspdm_sha3_256_init(), and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_256_final().
* Behavior with invalid SHA3-256 context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_256_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_256_context Pointer to the SHA3-256 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-256 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_256_final(void *sha3_256_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA3-256 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA3-256 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-256 digest value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_256_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA3-384 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sha3_384_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha3_384_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha3_384_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha3_384_free(void *sha3_384_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by sha3_384_context as SHA3-384 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha3_384_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha3_384_context Pointer to SHA3-384 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA3-384 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-384 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_384_init(void *sha3_384_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA3-384 context.
*
* If sha3_384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha3_384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha3_384_context Pointer to SHA3-384 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha3_384_context Pointer to new SHA3-384 context.
*
* @retval true SHA3-384 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-384 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_384_duplicate(const void *sha3_384_context, void *new_sha3_384_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA3-384 context.
*
* This function performs SHA3-384 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA3-384 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha3_384_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_384_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_384_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_384_context Pointer to the SHA3-384 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA3-384 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-384 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_384_update(void *sha3_384_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA3-384 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA3-384 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA3-384 context cannot
* be used again. SHA3-384 context should be already correctly initialized by
* libspdm_sha3_384_init(), and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_384_final().
* Behavior with invalid SHA3-384 context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_384_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_384_context Pointer to the SHA3-384 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-384 digest computation failed.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_384_final(void *sha3_384_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA3-384 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA3-384 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-384 digest value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_384_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SHA3-512 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sha3_512_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sha3_512_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sha3_512_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sha3_512_free(void *sha3_512_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by sha3_512_context as SHA3-512 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sha3_512_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sha3_512_context Pointer to SHA3-512 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SHA3-512 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-512 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_512_init(void *sha3_512_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SHA3-512 context.
*
* If sha3_512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sha3_512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sha3_512_context Pointer to SHA3-512 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sha3_512_context Pointer to new SHA3-512 context.
*
* @retval true SHA3-512 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-512 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_512_duplicate(const void *sha3_512_context, void *new_sha3_512_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SHA3-512 context.
*
* This function performs SHA3-512 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SHA3-512 context should be already correctly initialized by libspdm_sha3_512_init(), and must not
* have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_512_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_512_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_512_context Pointer to the SHA3-512 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SHA3-512 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-512 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_512_update(void *sha3_512_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SHA3-512 digest value.
*
* This function completes SHA3-512 hash computation and populates the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SHA3-512 context cannot
* be used again. SHA3-512 context should be already correctly initialized by
* libspdm_sha3_512_init(), and must not have been finalized by libspdm_sha3_512_final().
* Behavior with invalid SHA3-512 context is undefined.
*
* If sha3_512_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sha3_512_context Pointer to the SHA3-512 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-512 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_512_final(void *sha3_512_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SHA3-512 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SHA3-512 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SHA3-512 digest value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true SHA3-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SHA3-512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sha3_512_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT */
/*=====================================================================================
* One-Way Cryptographic hash SM3 Primitives
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HASH_CTX context for subsequent SM3-256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HASH_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_sm3_256_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sm3_256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HASH_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] sm3_context Pointer to the HASH_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sm3_256_free(void *sm3_context);
/**
* Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by sm3_context as SM3 hash context for
* subsequent use.
*
* If sm3_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] sm3_context Pointer to SM3 context being initialized.
*
* @retval true SM3 context initialization succeeded.
* @retval false SM3 context initialization failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm3_256_init(void *sm3_context);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing SM3 context.
*
* If sm3_context is NULL, then return false.
* If new_sm3_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] sm3_context Pointer to SM3 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_sm3_context Pointer to new SM3 context.
*
* @retval true SM3 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false SM3 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm3_256_duplicate(const void *sm3_context, void *new_sm3_context);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates SM3 context.
*
* This function performs SM3 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* SM3 context should be already correctly initialized by sm3_init(), and should not be finalized
* by sm3_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If sm3_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sm3_context Pointer to the SM3 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true SM3 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false SM3 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm3_256_update(void *sm3_context, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the SM3 digest value.
*
* This function completes SM3 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the SM3 context cannot
* be used again. SM3 context should be already correctly initialized by sm3_init(), and should not
* be finalized by sm3_final(). Behavior with invalid SM3 context is undefined.
*
* If sm3_context is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sm3_context Pointer to the SM3 context.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SM3 digest value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SM3 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SM3 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm3_256_final(void *sm3_context, uint8_t *hash_value);
/**
* Computes the SM3 message digest of an input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the SM3 message digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[out] hash_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the SM3 digest value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true SM3 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false SM3 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm3_256_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_HASH_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_HKDF_H
#define CRYPTLIB_HKDF_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Key Derivation Function Primitives
*=====================================================================================*/
#if LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA-256 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive prk value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of prk bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha256_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA256 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha256_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA384 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha384_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA384 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha384_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA512 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha512_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA512 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha512_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA3_256 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_256_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA3_256 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_256_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA3_384 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_384_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA3_384 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_384_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SHA3_512 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_512_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SHA3_512 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sha3_512_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Derive SM3_256 HMAC-based Extract key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] salt Pointer to the salt value.
* @param[in] salt_size Salt size in bytes.
* @param[out] prk_out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] prk_out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sm3_256_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size);
/**
* Derive SM3_256 HMAC-based Expand key Derivation Function (HKDF).
*
* @param[in] prk Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] prk_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[in] info Pointer to the application specific info.
* @param[in] info_size Info size in bytes.
* @param[out] out Pointer to buffer to receive hkdf value.
* @param[in] out_size Size of hkdf bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Hkdf generated successfully.
* @retval false Hkdf generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hkdf_sm3_256_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_HKDF_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_MAC_H
#define CRYPTLIB_MAC_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Message Authentication Code (MAC) Primitives
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha256_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha256_free(void *hmac_sha256_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha256_update().
*
* If hmac_sha256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA256 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_set_key(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA256 context.
*
* If hmac_sha256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA256 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA256 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA256 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA256 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha256_ctx, void *new_hmac_sha256_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA256 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA256 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha256_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha256_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA256 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA256 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA256 data digest failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_update(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA256 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA256 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA256 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha256_new(), and should
* not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha256_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA256 context is
* undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA256 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_final(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA256 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA256 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA384 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha384_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha384_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha384_free(void *hmac_sha384_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha384_update().
*
* If hmac_sha384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA384 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_set_key(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA384 context.
*
* If hmac_sha384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA384 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA384 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA384 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA384 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha384_ctx, void *new_hmac_sha384_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA384 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA384 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA384 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha384_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha384_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA384 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA384 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA384 data digest failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_update(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA384 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA384 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA384 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA384 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha384_new(), and should
* not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha384_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA384 context is
* undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA384 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_final(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA384 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA384 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA512 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha512_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha512_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha512_free(void *hmac_sha512_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha512_update().
*
* If hmac_sha512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA512 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_set_key(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA512 context.
*
* If hmac_sha512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA512 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA512 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA512 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA512 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha512_ctx, void *new_hmac_sha512_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA512 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA512 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA512 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha512_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha512_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA512 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA512 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA512 data digest failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_update(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA512 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA512 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA512 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA512 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha512_new(), and should
* not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha512_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA512 context is
* undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA512 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_final(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA512 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA512 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA3-256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_free(void *hmac_sha3_256_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_update().
*
* If hmac_sha3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_set_key(void *hmac_sha3_256_ctx,
const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
*
* If hmac_sha3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-256 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-256 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-256 context copy failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha3_256_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha3_256_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA3-256 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA3-256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-256 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-256 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_update(void *hmac_sha3_256_ctx,
const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA3-256 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA3-256 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA3-256 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA3-256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_new(), and
* should not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA3-256
* context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-256 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-256 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_final(void *hmac_sha3_256_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA3-256 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA3-256 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_256_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA3-384 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_free(void *hmac_sha3_384_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_update().
*
* If hmac_sha3_384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_set_key(void *hmac_sha3_384_ctx,
const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
*
* If hmac_sha3_384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha3_384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-384 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-384 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-384 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha3_384_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha3_384_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA3-384 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA3-384 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-384 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-384 data digest failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_update(void *hmac_sha3_384_ctx, const void *data,
size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA3-384 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA3-384 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA3-384 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA3-384 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_new(), and
* should not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA3-384
* context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_384_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_384_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-384 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_final(void *hmac_sha3_384_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA3-384 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA3-384 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-384 digest
* value (48 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-384 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-384 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_384_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SHA3-512 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_free(void *hmac_sha3_512_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_update().
*
* If hmac_sha3_512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_set_key(void *hmac_sha3_512_ctx,
const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
*
* If hmac_sha3_512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sha3_512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SHA3-512 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-512 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-512 context copy failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha3_512_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha3_512_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SHA3-512 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SHA3-512 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-512 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-512 data digest failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_update(void *hmac_sha3_512_ctx,
const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SHA3-512 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SHA3-512 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SHA3-512 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SHA3-512 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_new(), and
* should not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SHA3-512
* context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sha3_512_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sha3_512_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SHA3-512 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_final(void *hmac_sha3_512_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SHA3-512 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SHA3-512 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SHA3-512 digest
* value (64 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SHA3-512 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SHA3-512 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sha3_512_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and initializes one HMAC_CTX context for subsequent HMAC-SM3-256 use.
*
* @return Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified HMAC_CTX context.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC_CTX context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_free(void *hmac_sm3_256_ctx);
/**
* Set user-supplied key for subsequent use. It must be done before any
* calling to libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_update().
*
* If hmac_sm3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[out] hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SM3-256 context.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
*
* @retval true The key is set successfully.
* @retval false The key is set unsuccessfully.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_set_key(void *hmac_sm3_256_ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
/**
* Makes a copy of an existing HMAC-SM3-256 context.
*
* If hmac_sm3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If new_hmac_sm3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in] hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to HMAC-SM3-256 context being copied.
* @param[out] new_hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to new HMAC-SM3-256 context.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SM3-256 context copy succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SM3-256 context copy failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_duplicate(const void *hmac_sm3_256_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sm3_256_ctx);
/**
* Digests the input data and updates HMAC-SM3-256 context.
*
* This function performs HMAC-SM3-256 digest on a data buffer of the specified size.
* It can be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
* HMAC-SM3-256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_new(), and should not be
* finalized by libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_final(). Behavior with invalid context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sm3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SM3-256 context.
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true HMAC-SM3-256 data digest succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SM3-256 data digest failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_update(void *hmac_sm3_256_ctx, const void *data, size_t data_size);
/**
* Completes computation of the HMAC-SM3-256 digest value.
*
* This function completes HMAC-SM3-256 hash computation and retrieves the digest value into
* the specified memory. After this function has been called, the HMAC-SM3-256 context cannot
* be used again. HMAC-SM3-256 context should be initialized by libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_new(), and
* should not be finalized by libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_final(). Behavior with invalid HMAC-SM3-256
* context is undefined.
*
* If hmac_sm3_256_ctx is NULL, then return false.
* If hmac_value is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] hmac_sm3_256_ctx Pointer to the HMAC-SM3-256 context.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SM3-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SM3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SM3-256 digest computation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_final(void *hmac_sm3_256_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value);
/**
* Computes the HMAC-SM3-256 digest of a input data buffer.
*
* This function performs the HMAC-SM3-256 digest of a given data buffer, and places
* the digest value into the specified memory.
*
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be digested.
* @param[in] data_size Size of data buffer in bytes.
* @param[in] key Pointer to the user-supplied key.
* @param[in] key_size Key size in bytes.
* @param[out] hmac_value Pointer to a buffer that receives the HMAC-SM3-256 digest
* value (32 bytes).
*
* @retval true HMAC-SM3-256 digest computation succeeded.
* @retval false HMAC-SM3-256 digest computation failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_hmac_sm3_256_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_MAC_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_RNG_H
#define CRYPTLIB_RNG_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Random Number Generation Primitive
*=====================================================================================*/
/**
* Generates a random byte stream of the specified size. If initialization, testing, or seeding of
* the (pseudo)random number generator is required it should be done before this function is called.
*
* If output is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[out] output Pointer to buffer to receive random value.
* @param[in] size Size of random bytes to generate.
*
* @retval true Random byte stream generated successfully.
* @retval false Generation of random byte stream failed.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_random_bytes(uint8_t *output, size_t size);
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_RNG_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_RSA_H
#define CRYPTLIB_RSA_H
/*=====================================================================================
* RSA Cryptography Primitives
*=====================================================================================
*/
#if (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
/* RSA key Tags Definition used in libspdm_rsa_set_key() function for key component
* identification.
*/
typedef enum {
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_N, /*< RSA public Modulus (N)*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_E, /*< RSA public exponent (e)*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_D, /*< RSA Private exponent (d)*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_P, /*< RSA secret prime factor of Modulus (p)*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_Q, /*< RSA secret prime factor of Modules (q)*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_DP, /*< p's CRT exponent (== d mod (p - 1))*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_DQ, /*< q's CRT exponent (== d mod (q - 1))*/
LIBSPDM_RSA_KEY_Q_INV /*< The CRT coefficient (== 1/q mod p)*/
} libspdm_rsa_key_tag_t;
/**
* Allocates and initializes one RSA context for subsequent use.
*
* @return Pointer to the RSA context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, libspdm_rsa_new() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_rsa_new(void);
/**
* Release the specified RSA context.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to the RSA context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_rsa_free(void *rsa_context);
/**
* Sets the tag-designated key component into the established RSA context.
*
* This function sets the tag-designated RSA key component into the established
* RSA context from the user-specified non-negative integer (octet string format
* represented in RSA PKCS#1).
* If big_number is NULL, then the specified key component in RSA context is cleared.
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context being set.
* @param[in] key_tag tag of RSA key component being set.
* @param[in] big_number Pointer to octet integer buffer.
* If NULL, then the specified key component in RSA
* context is cleared.
* @param[in] bn_size Size of big number buffer in bytes.
* If big_number is NULL, then it is ignored.
*
* @retval true RSA key component was set successfully.
* @retval false Invalid RSA key component tag.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_set_key(void *rsa_context, const libspdm_rsa_key_tag_t key_tag,
const uint8_t *big_number, size_t bn_size);
/**
* Gets the tag-designated RSA key component from the established RSA context.
*
* This function retrieves the tag-designated RSA key component from the
* established RSA context as a non-negative integer (octet string format
* represented in RSA PKCS#1).
* If specified key component has not been set or has been cleared, then returned
* bn_size is set to 0.
* If the big_number buffer is too small to hold the contents of the key, false
* is returned and bn_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the key.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If bn_size is NULL, then return false.
* If bn_size is large enough but big_number is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context being set.
* @param[in] key_tag Tag of RSA key component being set.
* @param[out] big_number Pointer to octet integer buffer.
* @param[in, out] bn_size On input, the size of big number buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in big number buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true RSA key component was retrieved successfully.
* @retval false Invalid RSA key component tag.
* @retval false bn_size is too small.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_get_key(void *rsa_context, const libspdm_rsa_key_tag_t key_tag,
uint8_t *big_number, size_t *bn_size);
/**
* Generates RSA key components.
*
* This function generates RSA key components. It takes RSA public exponent E and
* length in bits of RSA modulus N as input, and generates all key components.
* If public_exponent is NULL, the default RSA public exponent (0x10001) will be used.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context being set.
* @param[in] modulus_length Length of RSA modulus N in bits.
* @param[in] public_exponent Pointer to RSA public exponent.
* @param[in] public_exponent_size Size of RSA public exponent buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true RSA key component was generated successfully.
* @retval false Invalid RSA key component tag.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_generate_key(void *rsa_context, size_t modulus_length,
const uint8_t *public_exponent,
size_t public_exponent_size);
/**
* Validates key components of RSA context.
* NOTE: This function performs integrity checks on all the RSA key material, so
* the RSA key structure must contain all the private key data.
*
* This function validates key components of RSA context in following aspects:
* - Whether p is a prime
* - Whether q is a prime
* - Whether n = p * q
* - Whether d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context to check.
*
* @retval true RSA key components are valid.
* @retval false RSA key components are not valid.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_check_key(void *rsa_context);
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */
#if LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT
/**
* Carries out the RSA-SSA signature generation with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding scheme.
*
* This function carries out the RSA-SSA signature generation with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding scheme
* defined in RSA PKCS#1. If the signature buffer is too small to hold the contents of signature,
* false is returned and sig_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the signature.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. hash_nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256,
* SHA3_384, SHA3_512.
* If sig_size is large enough but signature is NULL, then return false.
* If this interface is not supported, then return false.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context for signature generation.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be signed.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[out] signature Pointer to buffer to receive RSA PKCS1-v1_5 signature.
* @param[in, out] sig_size On input, the size of signature buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in signature buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true signature successfully generated in PKCS1-v1_5.
* @retval false signature generation failed.
* @retval false sig_size is too small.
* @retval false This interface is not supported.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_pkcs1_sign_with_nid(void *rsa_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash,
size_t hash_size, uint8_t *signature,
size_t *sig_size);
/**
* Verifies the RSA-SSA signature with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding scheme defined in RSA PKCS#1.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If signature is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. hash_nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256,
* SHA3_384, SHA3_512.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context for signature verification.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be checked.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[in] signature Pointer to RSA PKCS1-v1_5 signature to be verified.
* @param[in] sig_size Size of signature in bytes.
*
* @retval true Valid signature encoded in PKCS1-v1_5.
* @retval false Invalid signature or invalid RSA context.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_pkcs1_verify_with_nid(void *rsa_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash,
size_t hash_size, const uint8_t *signature,
size_t sig_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT
/**
* Carries out the RSA-SSA signature generation with EMSA-PSS encoding scheme.
*
* This function carries out the RSA-SSA signature generation with EMSA-PSS encoding scheme defined
* in RSA PKCS#1 v2.2.
*
* The salt length is same as digest length.
*
* If the signature buffer is too small to hold the contents of signature, false
* is returned and sig_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the signature.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256, SHA3_384,
* SHA3_512.
* If sig_size is large enough but signature is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context for signature generation.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be signed.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[out] signature Pointer to buffer to receive RSA-SSA PSS signature.
* @param[in, out] sig_size On input, the size of signature buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in signature buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true signature successfully generated in RSA-SSA PSS.
* @retval false signature generation failed.
* @retval false sig_size is too small.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_pss_sign(void *rsa_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
uint8_t *signature, size_t *sig_size);
/**
* Verifies the RSA-SSA signature with EMSA-PSS encoding scheme defined in
* RSA PKCS#1 v2.2.
*
* The salt length is same as digest length.
*
* If rsa_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message_hash is NULL, then return false.
* If signature is NULL, then return false.
* If hash_size need match the hash_nid. nid could be SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA3_256, SHA3_384,
* SHA3_512.
*
* @param[in] rsa_context Pointer to RSA context for signature verification.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] message_hash Pointer to octet message hash to be checked.
* @param[in] hash_size Size of the message hash in bytes.
* @param[in] signature Pointer to RSA-SSA PSS signature to be verified.
* @param[in] sig_size Size of signature in bytes.
*
* @retval true Valid signature encoded in RSA-SSA PSS.
* @retval false Invalid signature or invalid RSA context.
**/
extern bool libspdm_rsa_pss_verify(void *rsa_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_RSA_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_SM2_H
#define CRYPTLIB_SM2_H
/*=====================================================================================
* Shang-Mi2 Primitives
*=====================================================================================*/
#if LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and Initializes one Shang-Mi2 context for subsequent use.
*
* @param nid cipher NID
*
* @return Pointer to the Shang-Mi2 context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, sm2_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sm2_dsa_new_by_nid(size_t nid);
/**
* Release the specified sm2 context.
*
* @param[in] sm2_context Pointer to the sm2 context to be released.
**/
extern void libspdm_sm2_dsa_free(void *sm2_context);
/**
* Carries out the SM2 signature, based upon GB/T 32918.2-2016: SM2 - Part2.
*
* This function carries out the SM2 signature.
* If the signature buffer is too small to hold the contents of signature, false
* is returned and sig_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the signature.
*
* If sm2_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message is NULL, then return false.
* hash_nid must be SM3_256.
* If sig_size is large enough but signature is NULL, then return false.
*
* The id_a_size must be smaller than 2^16-1.
* The sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] sm2_context Pointer to sm2 context for signature generation.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] id_a The ID-A of the signing context.
* @param[in] id_a_size Size of ID-A signing context.
* @param[in] message Pointer to octet message to be signed (before hash).
* @param[in] size Size of the message in bytes.
* @param[out] signature Pointer to buffer to receive SM2 signature.
* @param[in, out] sig_size On input, the size of signature buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in signature buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true signature successfully generated in SM2.
* @retval false signature generation failed.
* @retval false sig_size is too small.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_dsa_sign(const void *sm2_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *id_a, size_t id_a_size,
const uint8_t *message, size_t size,
uint8_t *signature, size_t *sig_size);
/**
* Verifies the SM2 signature, based upon GB/T 32918.2-2016: SM2 - Part2.
*
* If sm2_context is NULL, then return false.
* If message is NULL, then return false.
* If signature is NULL, then return false.
* hash_nid must be SM3_256.
*
* The id_a_size must be smaller than 2^16-1.
* The sig_size is 64. first 32-byte is R, second 32-byte is S.
*
* @param[in] sm2_context Pointer to SM2 context for signature verification.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID
* @param[in] id_a The ID-A of the signing context.
* @param[in] id_a_size Size of ID-A signing context.
* @param[in] message Pointer to octet message to be checked (before hash).
* @param[in] size Size of the message in bytes.
* @param[in] signature Pointer to SM2 signature to be verified.
* @param[in] sig_size Size of signature in bytes.
*
* @retval true Valid signature encoded in SM2.
* @retval false Invalid signature or invalid sm2 context.
*
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_dsa_verify(const void *sm2_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *id_a, size_t id_a_size,
const uint8_t *message, size_t size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT */
#if LIBSPDM_SM2_KEY_EXCHANGE_SUPPORT
/**
* Allocates and Initializes one Shang-Mi2 context for subsequent use.
*
* @param nid cipher NID
*
* @return Pointer to the Shang-Mi2 context that has been initialized.
* If the allocations fails, sm2_new_by_nid() returns NULL.
**/
extern void *libspdm_sm2_key_exchange_new_by_nid(size_t nid);
/**
* Release the specified sm2 context.
*
* @param[in] sm2_context Pointer to the sm2 context to be released.
*
**/
extern void libspdm_sm2_key_exchange_free(void *sm2_context);
/**
* Initialize the specified sm2 context.
*
* @param[in] sm2_context Pointer to the sm2 context to be released.
* @param[in] hash_nid hash NID, only SM3 is valid.
* @param[in] id_a The ID-A of the key exchange context.
* @param[in] id_a_size Size of ID-A key exchange context.
* @param[in] id_b The ID-B of the key exchange context.
* @param[in] id_b_size Size of ID-B key exchange context.
* @param[in] is_initiator If the caller is initiator.
*
* @retval true sm2 context is initialized.
* @retval false sm2 context is not initialized.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_key_exchange_init(const void *sm2_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *id_a, size_t id_a_size,
const uint8_t *id_b, size_t id_b_size,
bool is_initiator);
/**
* Generates sm2 key and returns sm2 public key (X, Y), based upon GB/T 32918.3-2016: SM2 - Part3.
*
* This function generates random secret, and computes the public key (X, Y), which is
* returned via parameter public, public_size.
* X is the first half of public with size being public_size / 2,
* Y is the second half of public with size being public_size / 2.
* sm2 context is updated accordingly.
* If the public buffer is too small to hold the public X, Y, false is returned and
* public_size is set to the required buffer size to obtain the public X, Y.
*
* The public_size is 64. first 32-byte is X, second 32-byte is Y.
*
* If sm2_context is NULL, then return false.
* If public_size is NULL, then return false.
* If public_size is large enough but public is NULL, then return false.
*
* @param[in, out] sm2_context Pointer to the sm2 context.
* @param[out] public_data Pointer to the buffer to receive generated public X,Y.
* @param[in, out] public_size On input, the size of public buffer in bytes.
* On output, the size of data returned in public buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true sm2 public X,Y generation succeeded.
* @retval false sm2 public X,Y generation failed.
* @retval false public_size is not large enough.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_key_exchange_generate_key(void *sm2_context, uint8_t *public_data,
size_t *public_size);
/**
* Computes exchanged common key, based upon GB/T 32918.3-2016: SM2 - Part3.
*
* Given peer's public key (X, Y), this function computes the exchanged common key,
* based on its own context including value of curve parameter and random secret.
* X is the first half of peer_public with size being peer_public_size / 2,
* Y is the second half of peer_public with size being peer_public_size / 2.
*
* If sm2_context is NULL, then return false.
* If peer_public is NULL, then return false.
* If peer_public_size is 0, then return false.
* If key is NULL, then return false.
*
* The id_a_size and id_b_size must be smaller than 2^16-1.
* The peer_public_size is 64. first 32-byte is X, second 32-byte is Y.
* The key_size must be smaller than 2^32-1, limited by KDF function.
*
* @param[in, out] sm2_context Pointer to the sm2 context.
* @param[in] peer_public Pointer to the peer's public X,Y.
* @param[in] peer_public_size Size of peer's public X,Y in bytes.
* @param[out] key Pointer to the buffer to receive generated key.
* @param[in] key_size On input, the size of key buffer in bytes.
*
* @retval true sm2 exchanged key generation succeeded.
* @retval false sm2 exchanged key generation failed.
**/
extern bool libspdm_sm2_key_exchange_compute_key(void *sm2_context,
const uint8_t *peer_public,
size_t peer_public_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size);
#endif /* LIBSPDM_SM2_KEY_EXCHANGE_SUPPORT */
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_SM2_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H
#define LIBSPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H
#ifndef LIBSPDM_CONFIG
#include "library/spdm_lib_config.h"
#else
#include LIBSPDM_CONFIG
#endif
#if defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP) && \
!defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP)
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#pragma message("LIBSPDM_ENABLE_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP is deprecated. Use " \
"LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP instead. This warning will be removed in a " \
"future release.")
#else
#warning LIBSPDM_ENABLE_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP is deprecated. Use \
LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP instead. This warning will be removed in a \
future release.
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
#endif /* defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP) */
#if defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CHUNK_CAP) && !defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP)
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#pragma message("LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CHUNK_CAP is deprecated. Use LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP " \
"instead. This warning will be removed in a future release.")
#else
#warning LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CHUNK_CAP is deprecated. Use LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP \
instead. This warning will be removed in a future release.
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
#endif /* defined(LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CHUNK_CAP) */
#if defined(MDEPKG_NDEBUG) && !defined(LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE)
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#pragma message("MDEPKG_NDEBUG is deprecated. Use LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE " \
"instead. This warning will be removed in a future release.")
#else
#warning MDEPKG_NDEBUG is deprecated. Use LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE \
instead. This warning will be removed in a future release.
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
#endif /* defined(MDEPKG_NDEBUG) */
#if defined(LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE)
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ASSERT_ENABLE
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_BLOCK_ENABLE
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ASSERT_ENABLE (LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE)
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE (LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE)
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_BLOCK_ENABLE (LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE)
#elif defined(MDEPKG_NDEBUG)
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ASSERT_ENABLE
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE
#undef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_BLOCK_ENABLE
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ASSERT_ENABLE 0
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE 0
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_BLOCK_ENABLE 0
#endif /* defined(LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE) */
#if LIBSPDM_CHECK_MACRO
#include "internal/libspdm_macro_check.h"
#endif /* LIBSPDM_CHECK_MACRO */
#endif /* LIBSPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H */

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef __INTERNAL_CRYPT_LIB_H__
#define __INTERNAL_CRYPT_LIB_H__
/*
* This code uses Linux Kernel Crypto API extensively. Web page written by
* Stephan Mueller and Marek Vasut is a good starting reference on how linux
* kernel provides crypto api.
*/
#include "conftest.h"
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
// Check if ECDH/ECDSA are there, on some platforms they might not be...
#ifndef AUTOCONF_INCLUDED
#if defined(NV_GENERATED_AUTOCONF_H_PRESENT)
#include <generated/autoconf.h>
#else
#include <linux/autoconf.h>
#endif
#endif
#if \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA_MODULE)) && \
(defined(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) || defined(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER_MODULE))
#define NV_CONFIG_CRYPTO_PRESENT 1
#endif
/*
* It is possible that we don't have access to all the functions we have. This
* could be either because we are running non-gpl kernel, because kernel is too
* old or even just user disabled. If we should use LKCA, include headers, else
* define stubs to return errors.
*/
#if defined(NV_CRYPTO_PRESENT) && defined (NV_CONFIG_CRYPTO_PRESENT)
#define USE_LKCA 1
#endif
#ifdef USE_LKCA
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sm3.h>
// HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE is available since 4.20.
// This value is accurate as of 6.1
#ifndef HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE
#define HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE 64
#endif
#else
// Just stub everything out
struct shash_desc;
struct crypto_shash;
#define crypto_shash_setkey(...) -ENOMEM
#define crypto_shash_init(...) -ENOMEM
#define crypto_shash_update(...) -ENOMEM
#define crypto_shash_update(...) -ENOMEM
#define crypto_shash_final(...) -ENOMEM
#endif
#define CHAR_BIT 8U
#undef SIZE_MAX
#define SIZE_MAX 8
#include "library/cryptlib.h"
#define LIBSPDM_ASSERT(...)
struct lkca_aead_ctx;
int lkca_aead_alloc(struct lkca_aead_ctx **ctx, char const *alg);
void lkca_aead_free(struct lkca_aead_ctx *ctx);
int lkca_aead_ex(struct lkca_aead_ctx *ctx,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size,
bool enc);
int libspdm_aead(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size,
bool enc, char const *alg);
void *lkca_hash_new(const char* alg_name);
void lkca_hash_free(struct shash_desc *ctx);
bool lkca_hash_duplicate(struct shash_desc *dst, struct shash_desc const *src);
bool lkca_hash_all(const char* alg_name, const void *data,
size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
bool lkca_hmac_duplicate(struct shash_desc *dst, struct shash_desc const *src);
bool lkca_hmac_set_key(struct shash_desc *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
bool lkca_hmac_all(const char* alg_name, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value);
bool lkca_hkdf_extract_and_expand(const char *alg_name,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
bool lkca_hkdf_expand(const char *alg_name,
const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size);
bool lkca_ecdsa_set_priv_key(void *context, uint8_t *key, size_t key_size);
bool lkca_ec_set_pub_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *public_key,
size_t public_key_size);
bool lkca_ec_get_pub_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_key,
size_t *public_key_size);
bool lkca_ec_generate_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_data,
size_t *public_size);
bool lkca_ec_compute_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *peer_public,
size_t peer_public_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size);
bool lkca_ecdsa_verify(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size);
#endif

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
/** @file
* Defines base cryptographic library APIs.
* The Base Cryptographic Library provides implementations of basic cryptography
* primitives (hash Serials, HMAC, AES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic Curve, etc) for security
* functionality enabling.
**/
#ifndef CRYPTLIB_H
#define CRYPTLIB_H
#include "internal/libspdm_lib_config.h"
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_NULL 0x0000
/* Hash */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA256 0x0001
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA384 0x0002
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA512 0x0003
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA3_256 0x0004
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA3_384 0x0005
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA3_512 0x0006
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SM3_256 0x0007
/* Signing */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSASSA2048 0x0101
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSASSA3072 0x0102
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSASSA4096 0x0103
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSAPSS2048 0x0104
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSAPSS3072 0x0105
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_RSAPSS4096 0x0106
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_ECDSA_NIST_P256 0x0107
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_ECDSA_NIST_P384 0x0108
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_ECDSA_NIST_P521 0x0109
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SM2_DSA_P256 0x010A
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_EDDSA_ED25519 0x010B
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_EDDSA_ED448 0x010C
/* Key Exchange */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_FFDHE2048 0x0201
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_FFDHE3072 0x0202
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_FFDHE4096 0x0203
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP256R1 0x0204
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP384R1 0x0205
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP521R1 0x0206
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SM2_KEY_EXCHANGE_P256 0x0207
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_CURVE_X25519 0x0208
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_CURVE_X448 0x0209
/* AEAD */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_AES_128_GCM 0x0301
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_AES_256_GCM 0x0302
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_CHACHA20_POLY1305 0x0303
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SM4_128_GCM 0x0304
/* X.509 v3 key usage extension flags. */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x80 /* bit 0 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION 0x40 /* bit 1 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT 0x20 /* bit 2 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT 0x10 /* bit 3 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x08 /* bit 4 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN 0x04 /* bit 5 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN 0x02 /* bit 6 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY 0x01 /* bit 7 */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY 0x8000 /* bit 8 */
/* These constants comply with the DER encoded ASN.1 type tags. */
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_INTEGER 0x02
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_NULL 0x05
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_OID 0x06
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_SET 0x11
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING 0x13
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_T61_STRING 0x14
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_IA5_STRING 0x16
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_UTC_TIME 0x17
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME 0x18
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING 0x1C
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_BMP_STRING 0x1E
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_PRIMITIVE 0x00
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK 0xC0
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_TAG_PC_MASK 0x20
#define LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK 0x1F
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_hash.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_mac.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_aead.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_cert.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_hkdf.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_rsa.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_ec.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_dh.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_ecd.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_sm2.h"
#include "hal/library/cryptlib/cryptlib_rng.h"
#endif /* CRYPTLIB_H */

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/**
* Copyright Notice:
* Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
**/
#ifndef SPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H
#define SPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H
/* Enables assertions and debug printing. When `LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE` is defined it overrides or
* sets the values of `LIBSPDM_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE`, `LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ASSERT_ENABLE`, and
* `LIBSPDM_BLOCK_ENABLE` to the value of `LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE`.
*
* Note that if this file is used with CMake and `DTARGET=Release` is defined, then all debugging
* is disabled.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE
#define LIBSPDM_DEBUG_ENABLE 1
#endif
/* The SPDM specification allows a Responder to return up to 256 version entries in the `VERSION`
* response to the Requester, including duplicate entries. For a Requester this value specifies the
* maximum number of entries that libspdm will tolerate in a `VERSION` response before returning an
* error. A similiar macro, `SPDM_MAX_VERSION_COUNT`, exists for the Responder. However this macro
* is not meant to be configured by the Integrator.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_VERSION_COUNT
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_VERSION_COUNT 5
#endif
/* This value specifies the maximum size, in bytes, of the `PSK_EXCHANGE.RequesterContext` and,
* if supported by the Responder, `PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP.ResponderContext` fields. The fields are
* typically random or monotonically increasing numbers.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_PSK_CONTEXT_LENGTH
#define LIBSPDM_PSK_CONTEXT_LENGTH LIBSPDM_MAX_HASH_SIZE
#endif
/* This value specifies the maximum size, in bytes, of the `PSK_EXCHANGE.PSKHint` field.*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_PSK_MAX_HINT_LENGTH
#define LIBSPDM_PSK_MAX_HINT_LENGTH 16
#endif
/* libspdm allows an Integrator to specify multiple root certificates as trust anchors when
* verifying certificate chains from an endpoint. This value specifies the maximum number of root
* certificates that libspdm can support.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_ROOT_CERT_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_ROOT_CERT_SUPPORT 10
#endif
/* If the Responder supports it a Requester is allowed to establish multiple secure sessions with
* the Responder. This value specifies the maximum number of sessions libspdm can support.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_SESSION_COUNT
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_SESSION_COUNT 4
#endif
/* This value specifies the maximum size, in bytes, of a certificate chain that can be stored in a
* libspdm context.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_CERT_CHAIN_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_CERT_CHAIN_SIZE 0x1000
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_MEASUREMENT_RECORD_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_MEASUREMENT_RECORD_SIZE 0x1000
#endif
/* Partial certificates can be retrieved from a Requester or Responder and through multiple messages
* the complete certificate chain can be constructed. This value specifies the maximum size,
* in bytes, of a partial certificate that can be sent or received.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_CERT_CHAIN_BLOCK_LEN
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_CERT_CHAIN_BLOCK_LEN 1024
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_BUFFER_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_BUFFER_SIZE 0x1200
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE 0x100 /* to hold message_a before negotiate*/
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_MEDIUM_BUFFER_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_MEDIUM_BUFFER_SIZE 0x300 /* to hold message_k before finished_key is ready*/
#endif
/* If the Responder replies with a Busy `ERROR` response to a request then the Requester is free to
* retry sending the request. This value specifies the maximum number of times libspdm will retry
* sending the request before returning an error. If its value is 0 then libspdm will not send any
* retry requests.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_REQUEST_RETRY_TIMES
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_REQUEST_RETRY_TIMES 3
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_SESSION_STATE_CALLBACK_NUM
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_SESSION_STATE_CALLBACK_NUM 4
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_CONNECTION_STATE_CALLBACK_NUM
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_CONNECTION_STATE_CALLBACK_NUM 4
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_KEY_UPDATE_CALLBACK_NUM
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_KEY_UPDATE_CALLBACK_NUM 4
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_CSR_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_CSR_SIZE 0x1000
#endif
/* To ensure integrity in communication between the Requester and the Responder libspdm calculates
* cryptographic digests and signatures over multiple requests and responses. This value specifies
* whether libspdm will use a running calculation over the transcript, where requests and responses
* are discarded as they are cryptographically consumed, or whether libspdm will buffer the entire
* transcript before calculating the digest or signature.
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_RECORD_TRANSCRIPT_DATA_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_RECORD_TRANSCRIPT_DATA_SUPPORT 0
#endif
/* Cryptography Configuration
* In each category, at least one should be selected.
* NOTE: Not all combination can be supported. E.g. Don't mix NIST algo with SMx.*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_ECDSA_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SM2_DSA_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED25519_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_EDDSA_ED448_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_FFDHE_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_FFDHE_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_ECDHE_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SM2_KEY_EXCHANGE_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SM2_KEY_EXCHANGE_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_AEAD_GCM_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_AEAD_GCM_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_AEAD_SM4_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_AEAD_SM4_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA256_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA384_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA512_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_256_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_384_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SHA3_512_SUPPORT 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT
#define LIBSPDM_SM3_256_SUPPORT 1
#endif
/* Code space optimization for Optional request/response messages.*/
/* Consumers of libspdm may wish to not fully implement all of the optional
* SPDM request/response messages. Therefore we have provided these
* SPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_***_CAP compile time switches as an optimization
* disable the code (#if 0) related to said optional capability, thereby
* reducing the code space used in the image.*/
/* A single switch may enable/disable a single capability or group of related
* capabilities.*/
/* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CERT_CAP - Enable/Disable single CERT capability.
* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHAL_CAP - Enable/Disable single CHAL capability.
* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILTIY_MEAS_CAP - Enable/Disables multiple MEAS capabilities:
* (MEAS_CAP_NO_SIG, MEAS_CAP_SIG, MEAS_FRESH_CAP)*/
/* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_KEY_EX_CAP - Enable/Disable single Key Exchange capability.
* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_PSK_EX_CAP - Enable/Disable PSK_EX and PSK_FINISH.*/
/* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_MUT_AUTH_CAP - Enable/Disable mutual authentication.
* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_ENCAP_CAP - Enable/Disable encapsulated message.*/
/* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_GET_CSR_CAP - Enable/Disable get csr capability.
* LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP - Enable/Disable set certificate capability. */
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CERT_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CERT_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHAL_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHAL_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_MEAS_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_MEAS_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_KEY_EX_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_KEY_EX_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_PSK_EX_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_PSK_EX_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_HBEAT_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_HBEAT_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_MUT_AUTH_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_MUT_AUTH_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_ENCAP_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_ENCAP_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_GET_CSR_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_GET_CSR_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_SET_CERTIFICATE_CAP 1
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP 1
#endif
/*
* MinDataTransferSize = 42
*
* H = HashLen = HmacLen = [32, 64]
* S = SigLen = [64, 512]
* D = ExchangeDataLen = [64, 512]
* R = RequesterContextLen >= 32
* R = ResponderContextLen >= 0
* O = OpaqueDataLen <= 1024
*
* Max Chunk No = 1, if (message size <= 42)
* Max Chunk No = [(message size + 4) / 30] roundup, if (message size > 42)
*
* +==========================+==========================================+=========+
* | Command | Size |MaxChunk |
* +==========================+==========================================+=========+
* | GET_VERSION | 4 | 1 |
* | VERSION {1.0, 1.1, 1.2} | 6 + 2 * 3 = 12 | 1 |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | GET_CAPABILITIES 1.2 | 20 | 1 |
* | CAPABILITIES 1.2 | 20 | 1 |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | ERROR | 4 | 1 |
* | ERROR(ResponseTooLarge) | 4 + 4 = 8 | 1 |
* | ERROR(LargeResponse) | 4 + 1 = 5 | 1 |
* | ERROR(ResponseNotReady) | 4 + 4 = 8 | 1 |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | CHUNK_SEND header | 12 + L0 (0 or 4) | 1 |
* | CHUNK_RESPONSE header | 12 + L0 (0 or 4) | 1 |
* +==========================+==========================================+=========+
* | NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS 1.2 | 32 + 4 * 4 = 48 | 2 |
* | ALGORITHMS 1.2 | 36 + 4 * 4 = 52 | 2 |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | GET_DIGESTS 1.2 | 4 | 1 |
* | DIGESTS 1.2 | 4 + H * SlotNum = [36, 516] | [1, 18] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | GET_CERTIFICATE 1.2 | 8 | 1 |
* | CERTIFICATE 1.2 | 8 + PortionLen | [1, ] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | CHALLENGE 1.2 | 40 | 1 |
* | CHALLENGE_AUTH 1.2 | 38 + H * 2 + S [+ O] = [166, 678] | [6, 23] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | GET_MEASUREMENTS 1.2 | 5 + Nounce (0 or 32) | 1 |
* | MEASUREMENTS 1.2 | 42 + MeasRecLen (+ S) [+ O] = [106, 554] | [4, 19] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | KEY_EXCHANGE 1.2 | 42 + D [+ O] = [106, 554] | [4, 19] |
* | KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP 1.2 | 42 + D + H + S (+ H) [+ O] = [234, 1194] | [8, 40] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | FINISH 1.2 | 4 (+ S) + H = [100, 580] | [4, 20] |
* | FINISH_RSP 1.2 | 4 (+ H) = [36, 69] | [1, 3] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | PSK_EXCHANGE 1.2 | 12 [+ PSKHint] + R [+ O] = 44 | 2 |
* | PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP 1.2 | 12 + R + H (+ H) [+ O] = [108, 172] | [4, 6] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | PSK_FINISH 1.2 | 4 + H = [36, 68] | [1, 3] |
* | PSK_FINISH_RSP 1.2 | 4 | 1 |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | GET_CSR 1.2 | 8 + RequesterInfoLen [+ O] | [1, ] |
* | CSR 1.2 | 8 + CSRLength | [1, ] |
* +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+---------+
* | SET_CERTIFICATE 1.2 | 4 + CertChainLen | [1, ] |
* | SET_CERTIFICATE_RSP 1.2 | 4 | 1 |
* +==========================+==========================================+=========+
*/
/* Maximum size of a large SPDM message.
* If chunk is unsupported, it must be same as LIBSPDM_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE.
* If chunk is supported, it must be larger than LIBSPDM_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE.
* It matches MaxSPDMmsgSize in SPDM specification. */
#ifndef LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_BUFFER_SIZE
#endif
/* Maximum size of a single SPDM message.
* It matches DataTransferSize in SPDM specification. */
#ifndef LIBSPDM_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE LIBSPDM_MAX_MESSAGE_BUFFER_SIZE
#endif
/* Required sender/receive buffer in device io.
* NOTE: This is transport specific. Below configuration is just an example.
* +-------+--------+---------------------------+------+--+------+---+--------+-----+
* | TYPE |TransHdr| EncryptionHeader |AppHdr| |Random|MAC|AlignPad|FINAL|
* | | |SessionId|SeqNum|Len|AppLen| | | | | | |
* +-------+--------+---------------------------+------+ +------+---+--------+-----+
* | MCTP | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | 32 | 12| 0 | 56 |
* |PCI_DOE| 8 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | | 0 | 12| 3 | 31 |
* +-------+--------+---------------------------+------+--+------+---+--------+-----+
*/
#ifndef LIBSPDM_TRANSPORT_ADDITIONAL_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_TRANSPORT_ADDITIONAL_SIZE 64
#endif
#ifndef LIBSPDM_SENDER_RECEIVE_BUFFER_SIZE
#define LIBSPDM_SENDER_RECEIVE_BUFFER_SIZE (LIBSPDM_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE + \
LIBSPDM_TRANSPORT_ADDITIONAL_SIZE)
#endif
/* Required scratch buffer size for libspdm internal usage.
* It may be used to hold the encrypted/decrypted message and/or last sent/received message.
* It may be used to hold the large request/response and intermediate send/receive buffer
* in case of chunking.
*
* If chunking is not supported, it may be just LIBSPDM_SENDER_RECEIVE_BUFFER_SIZE.
* If chunking is supported, it should be at least below.
*
* +---------------+--------------+--------------------------+------------------------------+
* |SECURE_MESSAGE |LARGE_MESSAGE | SENDER_RECEIVER | LARGE_SENDER_RECEIVER |
* +---------------+--------------+--------------------------+------------------------------+
* |<-Secure msg ->|<-Large msg ->|<-Snd/Rcv buf for chunk ->|<-Snd/Rcv buf for large msg ->|
*
* The value is NOT configurable.
* The value MAY be changed in different libspdm version.
* It is exposed here, just in case the libspdm consumer wants to configure the setting at build time.
*/
#if LIBSPDM_ENABLE_CAPABILITY_CHUNK_CAP
/* first section */
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_OFFSET 0
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY (LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE)
/* second section */
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_MESSAGE_OFFSET (LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY)
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY (LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE)
/* third section */
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SENDER_RECEIVER_OFFSET \
(LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY)
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SENDER_RECEIVER_CAPACITY (LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE)
/* fourth section */
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_SENDER_RECEIVER_OFFSET \
(LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SENDER_RECEIVER_CAPACITY)
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_SENDER_RECEIVER_CAPACITY (LIBSPDM_MAX_SPDM_MSG_SIZE)
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SIZE (LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SECURE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_MESSAGE_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SENDER_RECEIVER_CAPACITY + \
LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_LARGE_SENDER_RECEIVER_CAPACITY \
)
#else
#define LIBSPDM_SCRATCH_BUFFER_SIZE (LIBSPDM_SENDER_RECEIVE_BUFFER_SIZE)
#endif
/* Enable message logging.
* See https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/doc/user_guide.md#message-logging
* for more information */
#ifndef LIBSPDM_ENABLE_MSG_LOG
#define LIBSPDM_ENABLE_MSG_LOG 1
#endif
/* Enable macro checking during compilation. */
#ifndef LIBSPDM_CHECK_MACRO
#define LIBSPDM_CHECK_MACRO 0
#endif
#endif /* SPDM_LIB_CONFIG_H */

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@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
#include "nvspdm_cryptlib_extensions.h"
#ifdef USE_LKCA
#define BUFFER_SIZE (2 * 1024 * 1024)
#define AUTH_TAG_SIZE 16
struct lkca_aead_ctx
{
struct crypto_aead *aead;
struct aead_request *req;
char *a_data_buffer;
char *in_buffer;
char *out_buffer;
char tag[AUTH_TAG_SIZE];
};
#endif
int libspdm_aead_prealloc(void **context, char const *alg)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return -ENODEV;
#else
struct lkca_aead_ctx *ctx;
ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx == NULL) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->aead = crypto_alloc_aead(alg, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, 0);
if (IS_ERR(ctx->aead)) {
pr_notice("could not allocate AEAD algorithm\n");
kfree(ctx);
return -ENODEV;
}
ctx->req = aead_request_alloc(ctx->aead, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx->req == NULL) {
pr_info("could not allocate skcipher request\n");
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead);
kfree(ctx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ctx->a_data_buffer = kmalloc(BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx->a_data_buffer == NULL) {
aead_request_free(ctx->req);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead);
kfree(ctx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ctx->in_buffer = kmalloc(BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx->in_buffer == NULL) {
kfree(ctx->a_data_buffer);
aead_request_free(ctx->req);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead);
kfree(ctx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ctx->out_buffer = kmalloc(BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctx->out_buffer == NULL) {
kfree(ctx->a_data_buffer);
kfree(ctx->in_buffer);
aead_request_free(ctx->req);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead);
kfree(ctx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
*context = ctx;
return 0;
#endif
}
void libspdm_aead_free(void *context)
{
#ifdef USE_LKCA
struct lkca_aead_ctx *ctx = context;
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead);
aead_request_free(ctx->req);
kfree(ctx->a_data_buffer);
kfree(ctx->in_buffer);
kfree(ctx->out_buffer);
kfree(ctx);
#endif
}
#define SG_AEAD_AAD 0
#define SG_AEAD_TEXT 1
#define SG_AEAD_SIG 2
// Number of fields in AEAD scatterlist
#define SG_AEAD_LEN 3
#ifdef USE_LKCA
// This function doesn't do any allocs, it uses temp buffers instead
static int lkca_aead_internal(struct crypto_aead *aead,
struct aead_request *req,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
struct scatterlist sg_in[],
struct scatterlist sg_out[],
size_t a_data_size,
size_t data_in_size,
size_t *data_out_size,
size_t tag_size,
bool enc)
{
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int rc = 0;
if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, key_size)) {
pr_info("key could not be set\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) != iv_size) {
pr_info("iv could not be set\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
aead_request_set_ad(req, a_data_size);
aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &wait);
if (enc) {
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, data_in_size, (u8 *) iv);
rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req), &wait);
} else {
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, data_in_size + tag_size, (u8 *) iv);
rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
}
if (rc != 0) {
pr_info("Encryption FAILED\n");
}
*data_out_size = data_in_size;
return rc;
}
#endif
int libspdm_aead_prealloced(void *context,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size,
bool enc)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return -ENODEV;
#else
int rc = 0;
struct scatterlist sg_in[SG_AEAD_LEN];
struct scatterlist sg_out[SG_AEAD_LEN];
struct lkca_aead_ctx *ctx = context;
sg_init_table(sg_in, SG_AEAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg_out, SG_AEAD_LEN);
if (!virt_addr_valid(a_data)) {
if (a_data_size > BUFFER_SIZE) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_AAD], ctx->a_data_buffer, a_data_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_AAD], ctx->a_data_buffer, a_data_size);
memcpy(ctx->a_data_buffer, a_data, a_data_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data, a_data_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data, a_data_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(data_in)) {
if (data_in_size > BUFFER_SIZE) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_TEXT], ctx->in_buffer, data_in_size);
memcpy(ctx->in_buffer, data_in, data_in_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_in, data_in_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(data_out)) {
if (data_in_size > BUFFER_SIZE) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_TEXT], ctx->out_buffer, data_in_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_out, data_in_size);
}
// Tag is small enough that memcpy is cheaper than checking if page is virtual
if(tag_size > AUTH_TAG_SIZE) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_SIG], ctx->tag, tag_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_SIG], ctx->tag, tag_size);
if(!enc)
memcpy(ctx->tag, tag, tag_size);
rc = lkca_aead_internal(ctx->aead, ctx->req, key, key_size, iv, iv_size,
sg_in, sg_out, a_data_size, data_in_size,
data_out_size, tag_size, enc);
if (enc) {
memcpy(tag, ctx->tag, tag_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(data_out)) {
memcpy(data_out, ctx->out_buffer, data_in_size);
}
return rc;
#endif
}
int libspdm_aead(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size,
bool enc, char const *alg)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return -ENODEV;
#else
struct crypto_aead *aead = NULL;
struct aead_request *req = NULL;
struct scatterlist sg_in[SG_AEAD_LEN];
struct scatterlist sg_out[SG_AEAD_LEN];
uint8_t *a_data_shadow = NULL;
uint8_t *data_in_shadow = NULL;
uint8_t *data_out_shadow = NULL;
uint8_t *tag_shadow = NULL;
int rc = 0;
aead = crypto_alloc_aead(alg, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, 0);
if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
pr_notice("could not allocate AEAD algorithm\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
if (req == NULL) {
pr_info("could not allocate skcipher request\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_init_table(sg_in, SG_AEAD_LEN);
sg_init_table(sg_out, SG_AEAD_LEN);
if (!virt_addr_valid(a_data)) {
a_data_shadow = kmalloc(a_data_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (a_data_shadow == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data_shadow, a_data_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data_shadow, a_data_size);
memcpy(a_data_shadow, a_data, a_data_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data, a_data_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_AAD], a_data, a_data_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(data_in)) {
data_in_shadow = kmalloc(data_in_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data_in_shadow == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_in_shadow, data_in_size);
memcpy(data_in_shadow, data_in, data_in_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_in, data_in_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(data_out)) {
data_out_shadow = kmalloc(data_in_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data_out_shadow == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_out_shadow, data_in_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_TEXT], data_out, data_in_size);
}
if (!virt_addr_valid(tag)) {
tag_shadow = kmalloc(tag_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tag_shadow == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_SIG], tag_shadow, tag_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_SIG], tag_shadow, tag_size);
if(!enc)
memcpy(tag_shadow, tag, tag_size);
} else {
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[SG_AEAD_SIG], tag, tag_size);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[SG_AEAD_SIG], tag, tag_size);
}
rc = lkca_aead_internal(aead, req, key, key_size, iv, iv_size,
sg_in, sg_out, a_data_size, data_in_size,
data_out_size, tag_size, enc);
if (enc && (tag_shadow != NULL))
memcpy((uint8_t *) tag, tag_shadow, tag_size);
if (data_out_shadow != NULL)
memcpy(data_out, data_out_shadow, data_in_size);
out:
if (a_data_shadow != NULL)
kfree(a_data_shadow);
if (data_in_shadow != NULL)
kfree(data_in_shadow);
if (data_out != NULL)
kfree(data_out_shadow);
if (tag != NULL)
kfree(tag_shadow);
if (aead != NULL)
crypto_free_aead(aead);
if (req != NULL)
aead_request_free(req);
return rc;
#endif
}
// Wrapper to make look like libspdm
bool libspdm_aead_gcm_prealloc(void **context)
{
return libspdm_aead_prealloc(context, "gcm(aes)") == 0;
}
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_encrypt_prealloc(void *context,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag_out, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (data_in_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (a_data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (iv_size != 12) {
return false;
}
switch (key_size) {
case 16:
case 24:
case 32:
break;
default:
return false;
}
if ((tag_size < 12) || (tag_size > 16)) {
return false;
}
if (data_out_size != NULL) {
if ((*data_out_size > INT_MAX) ||
(*data_out_size < data_in_size)) {
return false;
}
}
ret = libspdm_aead_prealloced(context, key, key_size, iv, iv_size,
a_data, a_data_size, data_in, data_in_size,
tag_out, tag_size, data_out, data_out_size, true);
*data_out_size = data_in_size;
return ret == 0;
}
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_decrypt_prealloc(void *context,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size)
{
int ret;
if (data_in_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (a_data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (iv_size != 12) {
return false;
}
switch (key_size) {
case 16:
case 24:
case 32:
break;
default:
return false;
}
if ((tag_size < 12) || (tag_size > 16)) {
return false;
}
if (data_out_size != NULL) {
if ((*data_out_size > INT_MAX) ||
(*data_out_size < data_in_size)) {
return false;
}
}
ret = libspdm_aead_prealloced(context, key, key_size, iv, iv_size,
a_data, a_data_size, data_in, data_in_size,
(uint8_t *) tag, tag_size, data_out, data_out_size, false);
*data_out_size = data_in_size;
return ret == 0;
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* Prototypes and checks taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag_out, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (data_in_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (a_data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (iv_size != 12) {
return false;
}
switch (key_size) {
case 16:
case 24:
case 32:
break;
default:
return false;
}
if ((tag_size < 12) || (tag_size > 16)) {
return false;
}
if (data_out_size != NULL) {
if ((*data_out_size > INT_MAX) ||
(*data_out_size < data_in_size)) {
return false;
}
}
ret = libspdm_aead(key, key_size, iv, iv_size, a_data, a_data_size,
data_in, data_in_size, tag_out, tag_size,
data_out, data_out_size, true, "gcm(aes)");
*data_out_size = data_in_size;
return ret == 0;
}
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size)
{
int ret;
if (data_in_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (a_data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
if (iv_size != 12) {
return false;
}
switch (key_size) {
case 16:
case 24:
case 32:
break;
default:
return false;
}
if ((tag_size < 12) || (tag_size > 16)) {
return false;
}
if (data_out_size != NULL) {
if ((*data_out_size > INT_MAX) ||
(*data_out_size < data_in_size)) {
return false;
}
}
ret = libspdm_aead(key, key_size, iv, iv_size, a_data, a_data_size,
data_in, data_in_size, tag, tag_size,
data_out, data_out_size, false, "gcm(aes)");
*data_out_size = data_in_size;
return ret == 0;
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2022 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* Comments, prototypes and checks taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
static bool lkca_ecdsa_sign(void *ec_context,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
uint8_t *signature, size_t *sig_size)
{
return false;
}
bool libspdm_ec_set_pub_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *public_key,
size_t public_key_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || public_key == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_ec_set_pub_key(ec_context, public_key, public_key_size);
}
bool libspdm_ec_get_pub_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_key,
size_t *public_key_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || public_key_size == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (public_key == NULL && *public_key_size != 0) {
return false;
}
return lkca_ec_get_pub_key(ec_context, public_key, public_key_size);
}
bool libspdm_ec_check_key(const void *ec_context)
{
/* TBD*/
return true;
}
bool libspdm_ec_generate_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_data,
size_t *public_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || public_size == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (public_data == NULL && *public_size != 0) {
return false;
}
return lkca_ec_generate_key(ec_context, public_data, public_size);
}
bool libspdm_ec_compute_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *peer_public,
size_t peer_public_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || peer_public == NULL || key_size == NULL ||
key == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (peer_public_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_ec_compute_key(ec_context, peer_public, peer_public_size, key,
key_size);
}
bool libspdm_ecdsa_sign(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
uint8_t *signature, size_t *sig_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || message_hash == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (signature == NULL) {
return false;
}
switch (hash_nid) {
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA256:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA384:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA512:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
return lkca_ecdsa_sign(ec_context, message_hash, hash_size, signature, sig_size);
}
bool libspdm_ecdsa_verify(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size)
{
if (ec_context == NULL || message_hash == NULL || signature == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (sig_size > INT_MAX || sig_size == 0) {
return false;
}
switch (hash_nid) {
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA256:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA384:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
case LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SHA512:
if (hash_size != LIBSPDM_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
return lkca_ecdsa_verify(ec_context, hash_nid, message_hash, hash_size,
signature, sig_size);
}

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@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
#ifdef USE_LKCA
#include <linux/module.h>
MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: ecdh_generic,ecdsa_generic");
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
#include <crypto/internal/ecc.h>
struct ecc_ctx {
unsigned int curve_id;
u64 priv_key[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; // In big endian
struct {
// ecdsa wants byte preceding pub_key to be set to '4'
u64 pub_key_prefix;
u64 pub_key[2 * ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
};
bool pub_key_set;
bool priv_key_set;
char const *name;
int size;
};
#endif
void *libspdm_ec_new_by_nid(size_t nid)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return NULL;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx;
if ((nid != LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP256R1) && (nid != LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP384R1)){
return NULL;
}
ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx) {
return NULL;
}
if (nid == LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP256R1) {
ctx->curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
ctx->size = 64;
ctx->name = "ecdsa-nist-p256";
} else {
ctx->curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384;
ctx->size = 96;
ctx->name = "ecdsa-nist-p384";
}
ctx->pub_key_set = false;
ctx->priv_key_set = false;
return ctx;
#endif
}
void libspdm_ec_free(void *ec_context)
{
#ifdef USE_LKCA
kfree(ec_context);
#endif
}
bool lkca_ecdsa_set_priv_key(void *context, uint8_t *key, size_t key_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = context;
unsigned int ndigits = ctx->size / 16;
if (key_size != (ctx->size / 2)) {
return false;
}
memcpy(ctx->priv_key, key, key_size);
// XXX: if this fails, do we want to retry generating new key?
if(ecc_make_pub_key(ctx->curve_id, ndigits, ctx->priv_key, ctx->pub_key)) {
return false;
}
ctx->pub_key_set = true;
ctx->priv_key_set = true;
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_ec_set_pub_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *public_key,
size_t public_key_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = ec_context;
struct ecc_point pub_key;
unsigned int ndigits;
if (public_key_size != ctx->size) {
return false;
}
// We can reuse pub_key for now
ndigits = ctx->size / 16;
pub_key = ECC_POINT_INIT(ctx->pub_key, ctx->pub_key + ndigits, ndigits);
ecc_swap_digits(public_key, ctx->pub_key, ndigits);
ecc_swap_digits(((u64 *)public_key) + ndigits, ctx->pub_key + ndigits, ndigits);
if(ecc_is_pubkey_valid_full(ecc_get_curve(ctx->curve_id), &pub_key)) {
return false;
}
memcpy(ctx->pub_key, public_key, public_key_size);
ctx->pub_key_set = true;
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_ec_get_pub_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_key,
size_t *public_key_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = ec_context;
if (*public_key_size < ctx->size) {
*public_key_size = ctx->size;
return false;
}
*public_key_size = ctx->size;
memcpy(public_key, ctx->pub_key, ctx->size);
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_ec_generate_key(void *ec_context, uint8_t *public_data,
size_t *public_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = ec_context;
unsigned int ndigits = ctx->size / 16;
if(ecc_gen_privkey(ctx->curve_id, ndigits, ctx->priv_key)) {
return false;
}
// XXX: if this fails, do we want to retry generating new key?
if(ecc_make_pub_key(ctx->curve_id, ndigits, ctx->priv_key, ctx->pub_key)) {
return false;
}
memcpy(public_data, ctx->pub_key, ctx->size);
*public_size = ctx->size;
ctx->priv_key_set = true;
ctx->pub_key_set = true;
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_ec_compute_key(void *ec_context, const uint8_t *peer_public,
size_t peer_public_size, uint8_t *key,
size_t *key_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = ec_context;
if (peer_public_size != ctx->size) {
return false;
}
if (!ctx->priv_key_set) {
return false;
}
if ((ctx->size / 2) > *key_size) {
return false;
}
if (crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(ctx->curve_id, ctx->size / 16,
(const u64 *) ctx->priv_key,
(const u64 *) peer_public,
(u64 *) key)) {
return false;
}
*key_size = ctx->size / 2;
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_ecdsa_verify(void *ec_context, size_t hash_nid,
const uint8_t *message_hash, size_t hash_size,
const uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = ec_context;
// Roundabout way
u64 ber_max_len = 3 + 2 * (4 + (ECC_MAX_BYTES));
u64 ber_len = 0;
u8 *ber = NULL;
u8 *pub_key;
struct akcipher_request *req = NULL;
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = NULL;
struct scatterlist sg;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int err;
if (sig_size != ctx->size) {
return false;
}
if(ctx->pub_key_set == false){
return false;
}
tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(ctx->name, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_info("ALLOC FAILED\n");
return false;
}
pub_key = (u8 *) ctx->pub_key;
pub_key--; // Go back into byte of pub_key_prefix
*pub_key = 4; // And set it to 4 to placate kernel
if ((err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, pub_key, ctx->size + 1)) != 0) {
pr_info("SET PUB KEY FAILED: %d\n", -err);
goto failTfm;
}
req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
pr_info("REQUEST ALLOC FAILED\n");
goto failTfm;
}
// We concatenate signature and hash and ship it to kernel
ber = kmalloc(ber_max_len + hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ber == NULL) {
goto failReq;
}
// XXX: NOTE THIS WILL WORK ONLY FOR 256 AND 384 bits. For larger keys
// length field will be longer than 1 byte and I haven't taken care of that!
// Signature
ber[ber_len++] = 0x30;
ber[ber_len++] = 2 * (2 + ctx->size / 2);
ber[ber_len++] = 0x02;
if (signature[0] > 127) {
ber[ber_len++] = ctx->size / 2 + 1;
ber[1]++;
ber[ber_len++] = 0;
} else {
ber[ber_len++] = ctx->size / 2;
}
memcpy(ber + ber_len, signature, sig_size / 2);
ber_len += sig_size / 2;
ber[ber_len++] = 0x02;
if (signature[sig_size / 2] > 127) {
ber[ber_len++] = ctx->size / 2 + 1;
ber[1]++;
ber[ber_len++] = 0;
} else {
ber[ber_len++] = ctx->size / 2;
}
memcpy(ber + ber_len, signature + sig_size / 2, sig_size / 2);
ber_len += sig_size / 2;
// Just append hash, for scatterlists it can't be on stack anyway
memcpy(ber + ber_len, message_hash, hash_size);
sg_init_one(&sg, ber, ber_len + hash_size);
akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &wait);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, ber_len, hash_size);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &wait);
if (err != 0){
pr_info("Verify FAILED %d\n", -err);
}
kfree(ber);
failReq:
akcipher_request_free(req);
failTfm:
crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
return err == 0;
#endif
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
// RFC 5869 has some very non-intuitive points, reading it is advised
static bool lkca_hkdf_expand_only(struct crypto_shash *alg,
const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
int ret;
int i;
uint8_t ctr = 1;
uint8_t tmp[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, alg);
desc->tfm = alg;
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, prk, prk_size);
if (ret != 0) {
pr_info("key size mismatch %ld\n", prk_size);
return false;
}
for (i = 0, ctr = 1; i < out_size; i += prk_size, ctr++) {
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret) {
return false;
}
if (i != 0) {
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, out + i - prk_size, prk_size);
if (ret) {
return false;
}
}
if (info_size > 0) {
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, info_size);
if (ret) {
return false;
}
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &ctr, 1);
if (ret)
return false;
if ((out_size - i) < prk_size) {
ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmp);
if (ret) {
return false;
}
memcpy(out + i, tmp, out_size - i);
memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
} else {
ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, out + i);
if (ret) {
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_hkdf_extract_and_expand(const char *alg_name,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
int ret = 0;
struct crypto_shash *alg;
uint8_t prk[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
if (key == NULL || salt == NULL || info == NULL || out == NULL ||
key_size > sizeof(prk) || salt_size > INT_MAX || info_size > INT_MAX ||
out_size > (sizeof(prk) * 255)) {
return false;
}
alg = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(alg, salt, salt_size);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(alg, key, key_size, prk);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
ret = !lkca_hkdf_expand_only(alg, prk, crypto_shash_digestsize(alg), info, info_size, out, out_size);
out:
crypto_free_shash(alg);
return ret == 0;
#endif
}
bool lkca_hkdf_expand(const char *alg_name,
const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
bool ret = false;
struct crypto_shash *alg;
if (prk == NULL || info == NULL || out == NULL || prk_size > (512 / 8) ||
info_size > INT_MAX || (out_size > (prk_size * 255))) {
return false;
}
alg = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
return false;
}
ret = lkca_hkdf_expand_only(alg, prk, prk_size, info, info_size, out, out_size);
crypto_free_shash(alg);
return ret;
#endif
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* Prototypes and checks taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha256_extract_and_expand(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_extract_and_expand("hmac(sha256)", key, key_size,
salt, salt_size, info, info_size,
out, out_size);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha256_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size)
{
if (prk_out_size != (256 / 8))
return false;
return libspdm_hmac_sha256_all(key, key_size, salt, salt_size, prk_out);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha256_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_expand("hmac(sha256)", prk, prk_size, info, info_size,
out, out_size);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha384_extract_and_expand(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_extract_and_expand("hmac(sha384)", key, key_size,
salt, salt_size, info, info_size,
out, out_size);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha384_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size)
{
if (prk_out_size != (384 / 8))
return false;
return libspdm_hmac_sha384_all(key, key_size, salt, salt_size, prk_out);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha384_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_expand("hmac(sha384)", prk, prk_size, info, info_size,
out, out_size);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha512_extract_and_expand(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_extract_and_expand("hmac(sha512)", key, key_size,
salt, salt_size, info, info_size, out,
out_size);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha512_extract(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_size,
uint8_t *prk_out, size_t prk_out_size)
{
if (prk_out_size != (512 / 8))
return false;
return libspdm_hmac_sha512_all(key, key_size, salt, salt_size, prk_out);
}
bool libspdm_hkdf_sha512_expand(const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_size,
const uint8_t *info, size_t info_size,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_size)
{
return lkca_hkdf_expand("hmac(sha512)", prk, prk_size, info, info_size,
out, out_size);
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* Prototypes and checks taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
void *libspdm_hmac_sha256_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("hmac(sha256)");
}
void libspdm_hmac_sha256_free(void *hmac_sha256_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(hmac_sha256_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_set_key(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size)
{
if (hmac_sha256_ctx == NULL)
return false;
return lkca_hmac_set_key(hmac_sha256_ctx, key, key_size);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha256_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha256_ctx)
{
if (hmac_sha256_ctx == NULL || new_hmac_sha256_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_duplicate(new_hmac_sha256_ctx, hmac_sha256_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_update(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha256_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(hmac_sha256_ctx, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_final(void *hmac_sha256_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha256_ctx == NULL || hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(hmac_sha256_ctx, hmac_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha256_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
if (hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_all("hmac(sha256)", key, key_size, data, data_size, hmac_value);
}
void *libspdm_hmac_sha384_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("hmac(sha384)");
}
void libspdm_hmac_sha384_free(void *hmac_sha384_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(hmac_sha384_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_set_key(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size)
{
if (hmac_sha384_ctx == NULL)
return false;
return lkca_hmac_set_key(hmac_sha384_ctx, key, key_size);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha384_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha384_ctx)
{
if (hmac_sha384_ctx == NULL || new_hmac_sha384_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_duplicate(new_hmac_sha384_ctx, hmac_sha384_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_update(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha384_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(hmac_sha384_ctx, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_final(void *hmac_sha384_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha384_ctx == NULL || hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(hmac_sha384_ctx, hmac_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha384_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
if (hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_all("hmac(sha384)", key, key_size, data, data_size, hmac_value);
}
void *libspdm_hmac_sha512_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("hmac(sha512)");
}
void libspdm_hmac_sha512_free(void *hmac_sha512_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(hmac_sha512_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_set_key(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_size)
{
if (hmac_sha512_ctx == NULL)
return false;
return lkca_hmac_set_key(hmac_sha512_ctx, key, key_size);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_duplicate(const void *hmac_sha512_ctx,
void *new_hmac_sha512_ctx)
{
if (new_hmac_sha512_ctx == NULL || new_hmac_sha512_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_duplicate(new_hmac_sha512_ctx, hmac_sha512_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_update(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha512_ctx == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(hmac_sha512_ctx, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_final(void *hmac_sha512_ctx, uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (hmac_sha512_ctx == NULL || hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(hmac_sha512_ctx, hmac_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_hmac_sha512_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
uint8_t *hmac_value)
{
if (hmac_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hmac_all("hmac(sha512)", key, key_size, data, data_size, hmac_value);
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
// This is non-gpl symbol and not part of LKCA so no need to stub it out
bool libspdm_random_bytes(uint8_t *output, size_t size)
{
get_random_bytes(output, size);
return true;
}
// This is specifically allowed by spdm
bool libspdm_random_seed(const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_size)
{
return true;
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* Comments, prototypes and checks taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
void *libspdm_sha256_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("sha256");
}
void libspdm_sha256_free(void *sha256_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(sha256_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_sha256_init(void *sha256_context)
{
return crypto_shash_init(sha256_context) == 0;
}
bool libspdm_sha256_duplicate(const void *sha256_context,
void *new_sha256_context)
{
if (sha256_context == NULL || new_sha256_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_duplicate(new_sha256_context, sha256_context);
}
bool libspdm_sha256_update(void *sha256_context, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha256_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(sha256_context, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha256_final(void *sha256_context, uint8_t *hash_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha256_context == NULL || hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(sha256_context, hash_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha256_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
uint8_t *hash_value)
{
if (hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_all("sha256", data, data_size, hash_value);
}
void *libspdm_sha384_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("sha384");
}
void libspdm_sha384_free(void *sha384_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(sha384_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_sha384_init(void *sha384_context)
{
return crypto_shash_init(sha384_context) == 0;
}
bool libspdm_sha384_duplicate(const void *sha384_context,
void *new_sha384_context)
{
if (sha384_context == NULL || new_sha384_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_duplicate(new_sha384_context, sha384_context);
}
bool libspdm_sha384_update(void *sha384_context, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha384_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(sha384_context, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha384_final(void *sha384_context, uint8_t *hash_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha384_context == NULL || hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(sha384_context, hash_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha384_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
uint8_t *hash_value)
{
if (hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_all("sha384", data, data_size, hash_value);
}
void *libspdm_sha512_new(void)
{
return lkca_hash_new("sha512");
}
void libspdm_sha512_free(void *sha512_ctx)
{
lkca_hash_free(sha512_ctx);
}
bool libspdm_sha512_init(void *sha512_context)
{
return crypto_shash_init(sha512_context) == 0;
}
bool libspdm_sha512_duplicate(const void *sha512_context,
void *new_sha512_context)
{
if (sha512_context == NULL || new_sha512_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_duplicate(new_sha512_context, sha512_context);
}
bool libspdm_sha512_update(void *sha512_context, const void *data,
size_t data_size)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha512_context == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(sha512_context, data, data_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha512_final(void *sha512_context, uint8_t *hash_value)
{
int32_t ret;
if (sha512_context == NULL || hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(sha512_context, hash_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_sha512_hash_all(const void *data, size_t data_size,
uint8_t *hash_value)
{
if (hash_value == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (data == NULL && data_size != 0) {
return false;
}
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
return false;
}
return lkca_hash_all("sha512", data, data_size, hash_value);
}

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/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
void *lkca_hash_new(const char* alg_name)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
//XXX: can we reuse crypto_shash part and just allocate desc
struct crypto_shash *alg;
struct shash_desc *desc;
alg = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
printk (KERN_INFO "Failed to alloc %s\n", alg_name);
return NULL;
}
desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (desc == NULL){
printk (KERN_INFO "Kernel out of mem\n");
crypto_free_shash(alg);
return NULL;
}
desc->tfm = alg;
return desc;
#endif
}
void lkca_hash_free(struct shash_desc *ctx)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
#else
crypto_free_shash(ctx->tfm);
kfree(ctx);
#endif
}
bool lkca_hash_duplicate(struct shash_desc *dst, struct shash_desc const *src)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(tmp, src);
if (crypto_shash_export((struct shash_desc *) src, tmp)) {
return false;
}
if (crypto_shash_import(dst, tmp)) {
return false;
}
return true;
#endif
}
bool lkca_hmac_duplicate(struct shash_desc *dst, struct shash_desc const *src)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
// in LKCA hmac export doesn't export ipad/opad, so we need to WAR it
struct crypto_shash *src_tfm = src->tfm;
struct crypto_shash *dst_tfm = dst->tfm;
char *src_ipad = crypto_tfm_ctx_aligned(&src_tfm->base);
char *dst_ipad = crypto_tfm_ctx_aligned(&dst_tfm->base);
int ss = crypto_shash_statesize(dst_tfm);
memcpy(dst_ipad, src_ipad, crypto_shash_blocksize(src->tfm));
memcpy(dst_ipad + ss, src_ipad + ss, crypto_shash_blocksize(src->tfm));
crypto_shash_clear_flags(dst->tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
return lkca_hash_duplicate(dst, src);
#endif
}
bool lkca_hash_all(const char* alg_name, const void *data,
size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
int ret;
struct crypto_shash *alg;
alg = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(alg, data, data_size, hash_value);
crypto_free_shash(alg);
return (ret == 0);
#endif
}
bool lkca_hmac_set_key(struct shash_desc *desc, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
int ret;
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_size);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
}
return ret == 0;
#endif
}
bool lkca_hmac_all(const char* alg_name, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, uint8_t *hash_value)
{
#ifndef USE_LKCA
return false;
#else
int ret;
struct crypto_shash *alg;
alg = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
return false;
}
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(alg, key, key_size);
if (ret == 0){
ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(alg, data, data_size, hash_value);
}
crypto_free_shash(alg);
return (ret == 0);
#endif
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*
* libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain, libspdm_x509_get_cert_from_cert_chain, check
* and prototypes taken from DMTF: Copyright 2021-2022 DMTF. All rights reserved.
* License: BSD 3-Clause License. For full text see link: https://github.com/DMTF/libspdm/blob/main/LICENSE.md
*/
#include "internal_crypt_lib.h"
#ifdef USE_LKCA
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#endif
bool libspdm_x509_construct_certificate(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t **single_x509_cert)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_construct_certificate_stack(uint8_t **x509_stack, ...)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
void libspdm_x509_free(void *x509_cert)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
}
void libspdm_x509_stack_free(void *x509_stack)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
}
static bool lkca_asn1_get_tag(uint8_t const *ptr, uint8_t const *end,
size_t *length, uint32_t tag)
{
uint64_t max_len = end - ptr;
// Chain must be less than 1 GB
if ((max_len < 2) || (max_len > (1024 * 1024 * 1024))) {
return false;
}
// We only deal with universal and application tags
if (ptr[0] != tag) {
return false;
}
if (ptr[1] < 0x80) {
*length = ptr[1] + 2;
} else if (ptr[1] == 0x81) {
if (max_len < 3) {
return false;
}
*length = ptr[2] + 3;
} else if (ptr[1] == 0x82) {
if (max_len < 4) {
return false;
}
*length = (ptr[2] << 8) + ptr[3] + 4;
} else {
// In theory it could be bigger than 64KB
return false;
}
if (*length > max_len) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool libspdm_asn1_get_tag(uint8_t **ptr, const uint8_t *end, size_t *length,
uint32_t tag)
{
return lkca_asn1_get_tag(*ptr, end, length, tag);
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_subject_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *cert_subject,
size_t *subject_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_common_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
char *common_name,
size_t *common_name_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool
libspdm_x509_get_organization_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
char *name_buffer,
size_t *name_buffer_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
#if (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
bool libspdm_rsa_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **rsa_context)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
#endif /* (LIBSPDM_RSA_SSA_SUPPORT) || (LIBSPDM_RSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */
bool libspdm_ec_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **ec_context)
{
#ifdef USE_LKCA
bool ret = false;
uint32_t key_size = 0;
struct key_preparsed_payload lkca_cert;
struct public_key *pub;
lkca_cert.data = cert;
lkca_cert.datalen = cert_size;
if (cert == NULL) {
return false;
}
if(key_type_asymmetric.preparse(&lkca_cert)) {
return false;
}
pub = lkca_cert.payload.data[asym_crypto];
// -1 is since lkca prepends '4' to public keys...
key_size = pub->keylen - 1;
if (key_size == (2 * 256 / 8)) {
*ec_context = libspdm_ec_new_by_nid(LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP256R1);
} else if (key_size == (2 * 384 / 8)) {
*ec_context = libspdm_ec_new_by_nid(LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_NID_SECP384R1);
} else {
goto err;
}
if (*ec_context == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Again skip '4' in key to be in line with spdm protocol. We will add it
// back in ecda_verify
if (!lkca_ec_set_pub_key(*ec_context, (char *) pub->key + 1, key_size)) {
libspdm_ec_free(*ec_context);
goto err;
}
ret = true;
err:
key_type_asymmetric.free_preparse(&lkca_cert);
return ret;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
bool libspdm_ecd_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **ecd_context)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_sm2_get_public_key_from_x509(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
void **sm2_context)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
static int lkca_x509_verify_cert(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
const uint8_t *ca_cert, size_t ca_cert_size)
{
#ifdef USE_LKCA
int ret;
struct key_preparsed_payload lkca_cert;
struct key_preparsed_payload lkca_ca_cert;
lkca_cert.data = cert;
lkca_cert.datalen = cert_size;
lkca_ca_cert.data = ca_cert;
lkca_ca_cert.datalen = ca_cert_size;
ret = key_type_asymmetric.preparse(&lkca_cert);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
ret = key_type_asymmetric.preparse(&lkca_ca_cert);
if (ret) {
key_type_asymmetric.free_preparse(&lkca_cert);
return ret;
}
ret = public_key_verify_signature(lkca_ca_cert.payload.data[asym_crypto],
lkca_cert.payload.data[asym_auth]);
key_type_asymmetric.free_preparse(&lkca_cert);
key_type_asymmetric.free_preparse(&lkca_ca_cert);
return ret;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
bool libspdm_x509_verify_cert(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
const uint8_t *ca_cert, size_t ca_cert_size)
{
return lkca_x509_verify_cert(cert, cert_size, ca_cert, ca_cert_size) == 0;
}
bool libspdm_x509_verify_cert_chain(const uint8_t *root_cert, size_t root_cert_length,
const uint8_t *cert_chain, size_t cert_chain_length)
{
size_t preceding_cert_len;
const uint8_t *preceding_cert;
size_t current_cert_len;
const uint8_t *current_cert;
bool verify_flag;
int ret;
verify_flag = false;
preceding_cert = root_cert;
preceding_cert_len = root_cert_length;
current_cert = cert_chain;
/* Get Current certificate from certificates buffer and Verify with preceding cert*/
do {
if (!lkca_asn1_get_tag(
current_cert, cert_chain + cert_chain_length, &current_cert_len,
LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
break;
}
ret = lkca_x509_verify_cert(current_cert, current_cert_len,
preceding_cert, preceding_cert_len);
if (ret != 0) {
verify_flag = false;
break;
} else {
verify_flag = true;
}
preceding_cert = current_cert;
preceding_cert_len = current_cert_len;
current_cert = current_cert + current_cert_len;
} while (true);
return verify_flag;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_cert_from_cert_chain(const uint8_t *cert_chain,
size_t cert_chain_length,
const int32_t cert_index, const uint8_t **cert,
size_t *cert_length)
{
size_t asn1_len;
int32_t current_index;
size_t current_cert_len;
const uint8_t *current_cert;
current_cert_len = 0;
/* Check input parameters.*/
if ((cert_chain == NULL) || (cert == NULL) || (cert_index < -1) ||
(cert_length == NULL)) {
return false;
}
current_cert = cert_chain;
current_index = -1;
/* Traverse the certificate chain*/
while (true) {
/* Get asn1 tag len*/
if (!lkca_asn1_get_tag(
current_cert, cert_chain + cert_chain_length, &asn1_len,
LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | LIBSPDM_CRYPTO_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
break;
}
current_cert_len = asn1_len;
current_index++;
if (current_index == cert_index) {
*cert = current_cert;
*cert_length = current_cert_len;
return true;
}
current_cert = current_cert + current_cert_len;
}
/* If cert_index is -1, Return the last certificate*/
if (cert_index == -1 && current_index >= 0) {
*cert = current_cert - current_cert_len;
*cert_length = current_cert_len;
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_tbs_cert(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t **tbs_cert, size_t *tbs_cert_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_version(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
size_t *version)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_serial_number(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *serial_number,
size_t *serial_number_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_issuer_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *cert_issuer,
size_t *issuer_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool
libspdm_x509_get_issuer_common_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
char *common_name,
size_t *common_name_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool
libspdm_x509_get_issuer_orgnization_name(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
char *name_buffer,
size_t *name_buffer_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_signature_algorithm(const uint8_t *cert,
size_t cert_size, uint8_t *oid,
size_t *oid_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_extension_data(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
const uint8_t *oid, size_t oid_size,
uint8_t *extension_data,
size_t *extension_data_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_validity(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *from, size_t *from_size, uint8_t *to,
size_t *to_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
size_t *usage)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_extended_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert,
size_t cert_size, uint8_t *usage,
size_t *usage_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_get_extended_basic_constraints(const uint8_t *cert,
size_t cert_size,
uint8_t *basic_constraints,
size_t *basic_constraints_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
bool libspdm_x509_set_date_time(char const *date_time_str, void *date_time, size_t *date_time_size)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}
int32_t libspdm_x509_compare_date_time(const void *date_time1, const void *date_time2)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return -3;
}
bool libspdm_gen_x509_csr(size_t hash_nid, size_t asym_nid,
uint8_t *requester_info, size_t requester_info_length,
void *context, char *subject_name,
size_t *csr_len, uint8_t **csr_pointer)
{
LIBSPDM_ASSERT(false);
return false;
}

View File

@ -2691,3 +2691,17 @@ nvswitch_os_get_supported_register_events_params
*os_descriptor = NV_FALSE;
return NVL_SUCCESS;
}
NvlStatus
nvswitch_os_get_pid
(
NvU32 *pPid
)
{
if (pPid != NULL)
{
*pPid = task_pid_nr(current);
}
return NVL_SUCCESS;
}

View File

@ -86,6 +86,14 @@
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#if defined(NV_LINUX_CC_PLATFORM_H_PRESENT)
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#endif
#if defined(NV_ASM_CPUFEATURE_H_PRESENT)
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#endif
#include "conftest/patches.h"
#define RM_THRESHOLD_TOTAL_IRQ_COUNT 100000
@ -139,8 +147,6 @@ struct semaphore nv_linux_devices_lock;
static NvTristate nv_chipset_is_io_coherent = NV_TRISTATE_INDETERMINATE;
NvU64 nv_shared_gpa_boundary = 0;
// True if all the successfully probed devices support ATS
// Assigned at device probe (module init) time
NvBool nv_ats_supported = NVCPU_IS_PPC64LE
@ -234,77 +240,23 @@ struct dev_pm_ops nv_pm_ops = {
*** STATIC functions
***/
#if defined(NVCPU_X86_64)
#define NV_AMD_SEV_BIT BIT(1)
#define NV_GENMASK_ULL(h, l) \
(((~0ULL) << (l)) & (~0ULL >> (BITS_PER_LONG_LONG - 1 - (h))))
static
void get_shared_gpa_boundary(
void nv_detect_conf_compute_platform(
void
)
{
NvU32 priv_high = cpuid_ebx(0x40000003);
if (priv_high & BIT(22))
#if defined(NV_CC_PLATFORM_PRESENT)
os_cc_enabled = cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT);
#if defined(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
{
NvU32 isolation_config_b = cpuid_ebx(0x4000000C);
nv_shared_gpa_boundary = ((NvU64)1) << ((isolation_config_b & NV_GENMASK_ULL(11, 6)) >> 6);
os_cc_tdx_enabled = NV_TRUE;
}
}
static
NvBool nv_is_sev_supported(
void
)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
eax = 0x80000000;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (eax < 0x8000001f)
return NV_FALSE;
/* By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting */
get_shared_gpa_boundary();
if (nv_shared_gpa_boundary != 0)
return NV_TRUE;
eax = 0x8000001f;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
/* Check whether SEV is supported */
if (!(eax & NV_AMD_SEV_BIT))
return NV_FALSE;
return NV_TRUE;
}
#endif
static
void nv_sev_init(
void
)
{
#if defined(MSR_AMD64_SEV) && defined(NVCPU_X86_64)
NvU32 lo_val, hi_val;
if (!nv_is_sev_supported())
return;
rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV, lo_val, hi_val);
os_sev_status = lo_val;
#if defined(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)
os_sev_enabled = (os_sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
#endif
/* By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting */
if (nv_shared_gpa_boundary != 0)
os_sev_enabled = NV_TRUE;
#else
os_cc_enabled = NV_FALSE;
os_cc_tdx_enabled = NV_FALSE;
#endif
}
@ -710,7 +662,7 @@ nv_module_init(nv_stack_t **sp)
}
nv_init_rsync_info();
nv_sev_init();
nv_detect_conf_compute_platform();
if (!rm_init_rm(*sp))
{
@ -1396,6 +1348,8 @@ static int nv_start_device(nv_state_t *nv, nvidia_stack_t *sp)
nv->flags |= NV_FLAG_OPEN;
rm_request_dnotifier_state(sp, nv);
/*
* Now that RM init is done, allow dynamic power to control the GPU in FINE
* mode, if enabled. (If the mode is COARSE, this unref will do nothing
@ -4568,19 +4522,19 @@ NvU64 NV_API_CALL nv_get_dma_start_address(
* as the starting address for all DMA mappings.
*/
saved_dma_mask = pci_dev->dma_mask;
if (pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)) != 0)
if (dma_set_mask(&pci_dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)) != 0)
{
goto done;
}
dma_addr = pci_map_single(pci_dev, NULL, 1, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (pci_dma_mapping_error(pci_dev, dma_addr))
dma_addr = dma_map_single(&pci_dev->dev, NULL, 1, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
if (dma_mapping_error(&pci_dev->dev, dma_addr))
{
pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, saved_dma_mask);
dma_set_mask(&pci_dev->dev, saved_dma_mask);
goto done;
}
pci_unmap_single(pci_dev, dma_addr, 1, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
dma_unmap_single(&pci_dev->dev, dma_addr, 1, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
/*
* From IBM: "For IODA2, native DMA bypass or KVM TCE-based implementation
@ -4612,7 +4566,7 @@ NvU64 NV_API_CALL nv_get_dma_start_address(
*/
nv_printf(NV_DBG_WARNINGS,
"NVRM: DMA window limited by platform\n");
pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, saved_dma_mask);
dma_set_mask(&pci_dev->dev, saved_dma_mask);
goto done;
}
else if ((dma_addr & saved_dma_mask) != 0)
@ -4631,7 +4585,7 @@ NvU64 NV_API_CALL nv_get_dma_start_address(
*/
nv_printf(NV_DBG_WARNINGS,
"NVRM: DMA window limited by memory size\n");
pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, saved_dma_mask);
dma_set_mask(&pci_dev->dev, saved_dma_mask);
goto done;
}
}

View File

@ -290,10 +290,6 @@ NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsFlushReplayableFaultBuffer(struct gpuDevice *device);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslContextInit(struct ccslContext_t **ctx,
gpuChannelHandle channel);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslContextClear(struct ccslContext_t *ctx);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslLogDeviceEncryption(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 *decryptIv);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslAcquireEncryptionIv(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 *encryptIv);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslRotateIv(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 direction);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslEncrypt(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
@ -312,6 +308,8 @@ NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslDecrypt(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 const *inputBuffer,
NvU8 const *decryptIv,
NvU8 *outputBuffer,
NvU8 const *addAuthData,
NvU32 addAuthDataSize,
NvU8 const *authTagBuffer);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslSign(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU32 bufferSize,
@ -320,5 +318,9 @@ NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsCcslSign(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsQueryMessagePool(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 direction,
NvU64 *messageNum);
NV_STATUS nvGpuOpsIncrementIv(struct ccslContext_t *ctx,
NvU8 direction,
NvU64 increment,
NvU8 *iv);
#endif /* _NV_GPU_OPS_H_*/

View File

@ -126,6 +126,19 @@ static void nvUvmFreeSafeStack(nvidia_stack_t *sp)
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(sp);
}
static NV_STATUS nvUvmDestroyFaultInfoAndStacks(nvidia_stack_t *sp,
uvmGpuDeviceHandle device,
UvmGpuFaultInfo *pFaultInfo)
{
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(pFaultInfo->replayable.cslCtx.nvidia_stack);
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp);
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp);
return rm_gpu_ops_destroy_fault_info(sp,
(gpuDeviceHandle)device,
pFaultInfo);
}
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceRegisterGpu(const NvProcessorUuid *gpuUuid, UvmGpuPlatformInfo *gpuInfo)
{
nvidia_stack_t *sp = NULL;
@ -196,7 +209,7 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceSessionCreate(uvmGpuSessionHandle *session,
memset(platformInfo, 0, sizeof(*platformInfo));
platformInfo->atsSupported = nv_ats_supported;
platformInfo->sevEnabled = os_sev_enabled;
platformInfo->sevEnabled = os_cc_enabled;
status = rm_gpu_ops_create_session(sp, (gpuSessionHandle *)session);
@ -855,6 +868,7 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceInitFaultInfo(uvmGpuDeviceHandle device,
{
nvidia_stack_t *sp = NULL;
NV_STATUS status;
int err;
if (nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack(&sp) != 0)
{
@ -864,36 +878,48 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceInitFaultInfo(uvmGpuDeviceHandle device,
status = rm_gpu_ops_init_fault_info(sp,
(gpuDeviceHandle)device,
pFaultInfo);
if (status != NV_OK)
{
goto done;
}
// Preallocate a stack for functions called from ISR top half
pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp = NULL;
pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp = NULL;
if (status == NV_OK)
pFaultInfo->replayable.cslCtx.nvidia_stack = NULL;
// NOTE: nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack does not allocate a stack on PPC.
// Therefore, the pointer can be NULL on success. Always use the
// returned error code to determine if the operation was successful.
err = nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack((nvidia_stack_t **)&pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp);
if (err)
{
// NOTE: nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack does not allocate a stack on PPC.
// Therefore, the pointer can be NULL on success. Always use the
// returned error code to determine if the operation was successful.
int err = nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack((nvidia_stack_t **)&pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp);
if (!err)
{
err = nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack((nvidia_stack_t **)&pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp);
if (err)
{
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp);
pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp = NULL;
}
}
if (err)
{
rm_gpu_ops_destroy_fault_info(sp,
(gpuDeviceHandle)device,
pFaultInfo);
status = NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
}
goto error;
}
err = nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack((nvidia_stack_t **)&pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp);
if (err)
{
goto error;
}
// The cslCtx.ctx pointer is not NULL only when ConfidentialComputing is enabled.
if (pFaultInfo->replayable.cslCtx.ctx != NULL)
{
err = nv_kmem_cache_alloc_stack((nvidia_stack_t **)&pFaultInfo->replayable.cslCtx.nvidia_stack);
if (err)
{
goto error;
}
}
goto done;
error:
nvUvmDestroyFaultInfoAndStacks(sp,
device,
pFaultInfo);
status = NV_ERR_NO_MEMORY;
done:
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack(sp);
return status;
}
@ -949,23 +975,9 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceDestroyFaultInfo(uvmGpuDeviceHandle device,
nvidia_stack_t *sp = nvUvmGetSafeStack();
NV_STATUS status;
// Free the preallocated stack for functions called from ISR
if (pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp != NULL)
{
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack((nvidia_stack_t *)pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp);
pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_sp = NULL;
}
if (pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp != NULL)
{
nv_kmem_cache_free_stack((nvidia_stack_t *)pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp);
pFaultInfo->nonReplayable.isr_bh_sp = NULL;
}
status = rm_gpu_ops_destroy_fault_info(sp,
(gpuDeviceHandle)device,
pFaultInfo);
status = nvUvmDestroyFaultInfoAndStacks(sp,
device,
pFaultInfo);
nvUvmFreeSafeStack(sp);
return status;
}
@ -1504,44 +1516,18 @@ void nvUvmInterfaceDeinitCslContext(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceDeinitCslContext);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslIv *decryptIv)
{
NV_STATUS status;
nvidia_stack_t *sp = uvmCslContext->nvidia_stack;
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_log_device_encryption(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, (NvU8 *)decryptIv);
return status;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslLogDeviceEncryption);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslDirection direction)
UvmCslOperation operation)
{
NV_STATUS status;
nvidia_stack_t *sp = uvmCslContext->nvidia_stack;
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_rotate_iv(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, direction);
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_rotate_iv(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, operation);
return status;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslRotateIv);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslAcquireEncryptionIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslIv *encryptIv)
{
NV_STATUS status;
nvidia_stack_t *sp = uvmCslContext->nvidia_stack;
BUILD_BUG_ON(NV_OFFSETOF(UvmCslIv, fresh) != sizeof(encryptIv->iv));
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_acquire_encryption_iv(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, (NvU8*)encryptIv);
return status;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslAcquireEncryptionIv);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslEncrypt(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
NvU32 bufferSize,
NvU8 const *inputBuffer,
@ -1566,6 +1552,8 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
NvU8 const *inputBuffer,
UvmCslIv const *decryptIv,
NvU8 *outputBuffer,
NvU8 const *addAuthData,
NvU32 addAuthDataSize,
NvU8 const *authTagBuffer)
{
NV_STATUS status;
@ -1577,6 +1565,8 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslDecrypt(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
inputBuffer,
(NvU8 *)decryptIv,
outputBuffer,
addAuthData,
addAuthDataSize,
authTagBuffer);
return status;
@ -1598,18 +1588,32 @@ NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslSign(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslSign);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslQueryMessagePool(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslDirection direction,
UvmCslOperation operation,
NvU64 *messageNum)
{
NV_STATUS status;
nvidia_stack_t *sp = uvmCslContext->nvidia_stack;
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_query_message_pool(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, direction, messageNum);
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_query_message_pool(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, operation, messageNum);
return status;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslQueryMessagePool);
NV_STATUS nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv(UvmCslContext *uvmCslContext,
UvmCslOperation operation,
NvU64 increment,
UvmCslIv *iv)
{
NV_STATUS status;
nvidia_stack_t *sp = uvmCslContext->nvidia_stack;
status = rm_gpu_ops_ccsl_increment_iv(sp, uvmCslContext->ctx, operation, increment, (NvU8 *)iv);
return status;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nvUvmInterfaceCslIncrementIv);
#else // NV_UVM_ENABLE
NV_STATUS nv_uvm_suspend(void)

View File

@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nv-msi.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nv-caps.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nv-frontend.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nv_uvm_interface.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_aead.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_ecc.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_hkdf.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_rand.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_shash.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_aead_aes_gcm.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_sha.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_hmac_sha.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_hkdf_sha.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_ec.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/libspdm_x509.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nvlink_linux.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/nvlink_caps.c
NVIDIA_SOURCES += nvidia/linux_nvswitch.c

View File

@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += set_memory_array_uc
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += set_pages_array_uc
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ioremap_cache
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ioremap_wc
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ioremap_driver_hardened
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ioremap_driver_hardened_wc
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ioremap_cache_shared
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += get_num_physpages
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += pde_data
@ -156,8 +159,7 @@ NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += ktime_get_real_ts64
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += full_name_hash
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += vga_tryget
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += pgprot_decrypted
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += cc_mkdec
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += cc_platform_has
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += seq_read_iter
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += unsafe_follow_pfn
NV_CONFTEST_FUNCTION_COMPILE_TESTS += drm_gem_object_get
@ -222,6 +224,8 @@ NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_tsec_comms_set_init
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_tsec_comms_clear_init_cb
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_tsec_comms_alloc_mem_from_gscco
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_tsec_comms_free_gscco_mem
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += is_export_symbol_present_memory_block_size_bytes
NV_CONFTEST_SYMBOL_COMPILE_TESTS += crypto
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += dma_ops
NV_CONFTEST_TYPE_COMPILE_TESTS += swiotlb_dma_ops
@ -261,4 +265,4 @@ NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += vfio_pci_core_available
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += mdev_available
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += cmd_uphy_display_port_init
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += cmd_uphy_display_port_off
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += memory_failure_mf_sw_simulated_defined
NV_CONFTEST_GENERIC_COMPILE_TESTS += memory_failure_mf_sw_simulated_defined

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2019 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2019-2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern "C" {
#include "nvlink_common.h"
#define TOP_LEVEL_LOCKING_DISABLED 1
#define PER_LINK_LOCKING_DISABLED 1
#define NVLINK_FREE(x) nvlink_free((void *)x)
// Memory management functions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"),
* to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation
* the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
* and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the
* Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
* DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
bool libspdm_aead_gcm_prealloc(void **context);
void libspdm_aead_free(void *context);
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_encrypt_prealloc(void *context,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
uint8_t *tag_out, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);
bool libspdm_aead_aes_gcm_decrypt_prealloc(void *context,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size,
const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
const uint8_t *a_data, size_t a_data_size,
const uint8_t *data_in, size_t data_in_size,
const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *data_out, size_t *data_out_size);

View File

@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ extern nv_kthread_q_t nv_kthread_q;
NvU32 os_page_size = PAGE_SIZE;
NvU64 os_page_mask = NV_PAGE_MASK;
NvU8 os_page_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
NvU32 os_sev_status = 0;
NvBool os_sev_enabled = 0;
NvBool os_cc_enabled = 0;
NvBool os_cc_tdx_enabled = 0;
#if defined(CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER)
NvBool os_dma_buf_enabled = NV_TRUE;
@ -1787,6 +1787,10 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_numa_memblock_size
NvU64 *memblock_size
)
{
#if NV_IS_EXPORT_SYMBOL_PRESENT_memory_block_size_bytes
*memblock_size = memory_block_size_bytes();
return NV_OK;
#endif
if (nv_ctl_device.numa_memblock_size == 0)
return NV_ERR_INVALID_STATE;
*memblock_size = nv_ctl_device.numa_memblock_size;
@ -2118,6 +2122,53 @@ void NV_API_CALL os_nv_cap_close_fd
nv_cap_close_fd(fd);
}
typedef struct os_numa_gpu_mem_hotplug_notifier_s
{
NvU64 start_pa;
NvU64 size;
nv_pci_info_t pci_info;
struct notifier_block memory_notifier;
} os_numa_gpu_mem_hotplug_notifier_t;
static int os_numa_verify_gpu_memory_zone(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long action, void *data)
{
os_numa_gpu_mem_hotplug_notifier_t *notifier = container_of(nb,
os_numa_gpu_mem_hotplug_notifier_t,
memory_notifier);
struct memory_notify *mhp = data;
NvU64 start_pa = PFN_PHYS(mhp->start_pfn);
NvU64 size = PFN_PHYS(mhp->nr_pages);
if (action == MEM_GOING_ONLINE)
{
// Check if onlining memory falls in the GPU memory range
if ((start_pa >= notifier->start_pa) &&
(start_pa + size) <= (notifier->start_pa + notifier->size))
{
/*
* Verify GPU memory NUMA node has memory only in ZONE_MOVABLE before
* onlining the memory so that incorrect auto online setting doesn't
* cause the memory onlined in a zone where kernel allocations
* could happen, resulting in GPU memory hot unpluggable and requiring
* system reboot.
*/
if (page_zonenum((pfn_to_page(mhp->start_pfn))) != ZONE_MOVABLE)
{
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "NVRM: Failing GPU memory onlining as the onlining zone "
"is not movable. pa: 0x%llx size: 0x%llx\n"
"NVRM: The NVIDIA GPU %04x:%02x:%02x.%x installed in the system\n"
"NVRM: requires auto onlining mode online_movable enabled in\n"
"NVRM: /sys/devices/system/memory/auto_online_blocks\n",
start_pa, size, notifier->pci_info.domain, notifier->pci_info.bus,
notifier->pci_info.slot, notifier->pci_info.function);
return NOTIFY_BAD;
}
}
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_numa_add_gpu_memory
(
void *handle,
@ -2129,8 +2180,16 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_numa_add_gpu_memory
#if defined(NV_ADD_MEMORY_DRIVER_MANAGED_PRESENT)
int node = 0;
nv_linux_state_t *nvl = pci_get_drvdata(handle);
nv_state_t *nv = NV_STATE_PTR(nvl);
NvU64 base = offset + nvl->coherent_link_info.gpu_mem_pa;
int ret;
os_numa_gpu_mem_hotplug_notifier_t notifier =
{
.start_pa = base,
.size = size,
.pci_info = nv->pci_info,
.memory_notifier.notifier_call = os_numa_verify_gpu_memory_zone,
};
if (nodeId == NULL)
{
@ -2149,21 +2208,31 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_numa_add_gpu_memory
NV_ATOMIC_SET(nvl->numa_info.status, NV_IOCTL_NUMA_STATUS_ONLINE_IN_PROGRESS);
ret = register_memory_notifier(&notifier.memory_notifier);
if (ret)
{
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "NVRM: Memory hotplug notifier registration failed\n");
goto failed;
}
#ifdef NV_ADD_MEMORY_DRIVER_MANAGED_HAS_MHP_FLAGS_ARG
ret = add_memory_driver_managed(node, base, size, "System RAM (NVIDIA)", MHP_NONE);
#else
ret = add_memory_driver_managed(node, base, size, "System RAM (NVIDIA)");
#endif
unregister_memory_notifier(&notifier.memory_notifier);
if (ret == 0)
{
struct zone *zone = &NODE_DATA(node)->node_zones[ZONE_MOVABLE];
NvU64 start_pfn = base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
NvU64 end_pfn = (base + size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* Verify the full GPU memory range passed on is onlined */
if (zone->zone_start_pfn != start_pfn ||
zone_end_pfn(zone) != end_pfn)
{
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "GPU memory zone movable auto onlining failed!\n");
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "NVRM: GPU memory zone movable auto onlining failed!\n");
#ifdef NV_OFFLINE_AND_REMOVE_MEMORY_PRESENT
#ifdef NV_REMOVE_MEMORY_HAS_NID_ARG
if (offline_and_remove_memory(node, base, size) != 0)
@ -2171,7 +2240,7 @@ NV_STATUS NV_API_CALL os_numa_add_gpu_memory
if (offline_and_remove_memory(base, size) != 0)
#endif
{
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "offline_and_remove_memory failed\n");
nv_printf(NV_DBG_ERRORS, "NVRM: offline_and_remove_memory failed\n");
}
#endif
goto failed;

View File

@ -1068,6 +1068,12 @@ bool DeviceImpl::getSDPExtnForColorimetrySupported()
}
}
if (!targetDevice)
{
DP_ASSERT(0 && "targetDevice is invalid for SDP_EXT COLORIMETRY");
return false;
}
// Send remote DPCD for devices behind the branch
if ((AuxBus::success == targetDevice->getDpcdData(NV_DPCD_TRAINING_AUX_RD_INTERVAL,
&byte, sizeof byte, &size, &nakReason)) &&
@ -2476,7 +2482,7 @@ bool DeviceImpl::getPCONCaps(PCONCaps *pPCONCaps)
break;
}
DP_LOG((" DP2HDMI PCON caps - Max TMDS Clk: %u LinkBWGbps: %u MaxBpc: %u",
DP_LOG((" DP2HDMI PCON caps - Max TMDS Clk: %u LinkBWGbps: %u MaxBpc: %u",
pPCONCaps->maxTmdsClkRate, pPCONCaps->maxHdmiLinkBandwidthGbps, pPCONCaps->maxBpc));
}
}

View File

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define GPS_FUNC_SUPPORT 0x00000000 // Bit list of supported functions
#define GPS_FUNC_GETOBJBYTYPE 0x00000010 // Fetch any specific Object by Type
#define GPS_FUNC_GETALLOBJS 0x00000011 // Fetch all Objects
#define GPS_FUNC_REQUESTDXSTATE 0x00000012 // Request D-Notifier state
#define GPS_FUNC_GETCALLBACKS 0x00000013 // Get system requested callbacks
#define GPS_FUNC_PCONTROL 0x0000001C // GPU power control function
#define GPS_FUNC_PSHARESTATUS 0x00000020 // Get system requested Power Steering settings

View File

@ -36,25 +36,25 @@
// and then checked back in. You cannot make changes to these sections without
// corresponding changes to the buildmeister script
#ifndef NV_BUILD_BRANCH
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH r535_87
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH VK535_87
#endif
#ifndef NV_PUBLIC_BRANCH
#define NV_PUBLIC_BRANCH r535_87
#define NV_PUBLIC_BRANCH VK535_87
#endif
#if defined(NV_LINUX) || defined(NV_BSD) || defined(NV_SUNOS)
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH_VERSION "rel/gpu_drv/r535/r535_87-122"
#define NV_BUILD_CHANGELIST_NUM (32882771)
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH_VERSION "rel/gpu_drv/r535/VK535_87-128"
#define NV_BUILD_CHANGELIST_NUM (33195052)
#define NV_BUILD_TYPE "Official"
#define NV_BUILD_NAME "rel/gpu_drv/r535/r535_87-122"
#define NV_LAST_OFFICIAL_CHANGELIST_NUM (32882771)
#define NV_BUILD_NAME "rel/gpu_drv/r535/VK535_87-128"
#define NV_LAST_OFFICIAL_CHANGELIST_NUM (33195052)
#else /* Windows builds */
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH_VERSION "r535_87-4"
#define NV_BUILD_CHANGELIST_NUM (32875904)
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH_VERSION "VK535_87-8"
#define NV_BUILD_CHANGELIST_NUM (33190458)
#define NV_BUILD_TYPE "Official"
#define NV_BUILD_NAME "535.93"
#define NV_LAST_OFFICIAL_CHANGELIST_NUM (32875904)
#define NV_BUILD_NAME "537.16"
#define NV_LAST_OFFICIAL_CHANGELIST_NUM (33190458)
#define NV_BUILD_BRANCH_BASE_VERSION R535
#endif
// End buildmeister python edited section

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2009 - 2022 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2009 - 2023 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ static const PNPVendorId PNPVendorIds[] =
{ "SAN", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Sanyo Electric Co.,Ltd.") },
{ "SCC", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("SORD") },
{ "SCD", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Sanyo") },
{ "SDC", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Samsung Display Corp.") },
{ "SDI", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Samtron/Sigma Designs") },
{ "SDT", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Siemens AG") },
{ "SEA", _VENDOR_NAME_ENTRY("Segate") },

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#if defined(NV_LINUX) || defined(NV_BSD) || defined(NV_SUNOS) || defined(NV_VMWARE) || defined(NV_QNX) || defined(NV_INTEGRITY) || \
(defined(RMCFG_FEATURE_PLATFORM_GSP) && RMCFG_FEATURE_PLATFORM_GSP == 1)
#define NV_VERSION_STRING "535.43.02"
#define NV_VERSION_STRING "535.43.08"
#else

View File

@ -112,21 +112,12 @@ struct _NVLOG_BUFFER
#endif // NVOS_IS_UNIX
//
// Due to this file's peculiar location, NvPort may or may not be includable
// This hack will go away when NvLog is moved into common/shared
//
#if NVOS_IS_MACINTOSH
#if !PORT_IS_KERNEL_BUILD
typedef struct PORT_SPINLOCK PORT_SPINLOCK;
#else
#include "nvport/nvport.h"
#endif
typedef struct PORT_MUTEX PORT_MUTEX;
typedef struct PORT_RWLOCK PORT_RWLOCK;
#elif !defined(PORT_IS_KERNEL_BUILD)
typedef struct PORT_SPINLOCK PORT_SPINLOCK;
#else
#if PORT_IS_KERNEL_BUILD
#include "nvport/nvport.h"
#endif
@ -143,11 +134,35 @@ typedef struct _NVLOG_LOGGER
NvU32 nextFree;
/** Total number of free buffer slots */
NvU32 totalFree;
/** Lock for all buffer oprations */
/** Lock for some buffer oprations */
PORT_SPINLOCK* mainLock;
/** Lock for creating/deleting pBuffers and accessing them from RmCtrls */
PORT_MUTEX* buffersLock;
/** Lock for registering/deregistering flush callbacks */
PORT_RWLOCK *flushCbsLock;
} NVLOG_LOGGER;
extern NVLOG_LOGGER NvLogLogger;
/**
* NvLog uses two locks:
* - NVLOG_LOGGER::mainLock is used to protect some accesses to pBuffers, or
* an individual pBuffers entry depending on locking flags.
* - NVLOG_LOGGER::buffersLock is used to protect creating/deleting pBuffers and accessing them
* from certain RmCtrl handlers.
*
* Historically in most contexts obtaining RMAPI lock would suffice, and mainLock would optionally
* be used for certain buffers. Ioctl NV_ESC_RM_NVLOG_CTRL cannot touch RMAPI lock and needs
* to access NvLog. The latter operation might race if called at an inopportune time: e.g. if the
* ioctl is called during RM init when KGSP creates/deletes GSP NvLog buffers. Using buffersLock is
* thus necessary to resolve the potential race.
*
* This leads to an unfortunate sequence where mainLock and buffersLock are nested. The latter lock
* cannot be removed as it is used in IRQ paths.
*
* This should be refactored to use a single RWLock that does conditional acquire in possible IRQ
* paths.
*/
//
// Buffer flags
//

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